Agenda 2063 and the End of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan

Taylor Widhalm, Africa Center for Strategy & Policy
twidhalm@acstrap.org

THE ISSUE

Ten years into its implementation, Agenda 2063 is already facing considerable challenges to its future success. Institutional weakness is seen across the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and member states are seen as the root of the problem for the challenges the agenda faces. If action is not taken to address problems in Agenda 2063’s performance, the African Union’s credibility within the continent and across the globe will suffer. This report urges the AU to strategically allocate financial and human resources to Aspiration Three, a specific goal within Agenda 2063 which focuses on state capacity and effectiveness. This report further advocates for targeted goals and increased investment in research, integrating research teams into member states’ reporting, while also emphasizing a prudent evaluation of Agenda 2063 priorities for effective resource allocation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Agenda 2063, initiated by the African Union (AU) in 2013, outlines a transformative blueprint for Africa’s development over 50 years. Comprising seven aspirations and 20 goals, the agenda seeks inclusive economic growth, democratic governance, peace, and security. Despite the progress made during the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (FTYIP), challenges persist, notably institutional weaknesses within the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and member states.

Crucially, this report advocates for a strategic approach, urging the AU to allocate financial and human resources specifically to Aspirations Three and Four. This prioritization is deemed essential in overcoming institutional weaknesses, which have been a major impediment to progress on Agenda 2063. The report emphasizes that effective reforms in areas like women’s equality, indigenous education, financial independence, and healthcare are contingent upon the strength of the institutions responsible for their implementation.

Furthermore, the report stresses the importance of fostering collaboration and harmonization among Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. It highlights the need for effective interagency communication, proposing a targeted and rank priorities plan with specific, achievable goals for institution-building among all stakeholders.

The report also recommends increased investment in research and data analysis to monitor institutional effectiveness, best practices, and Agenda 2063’s progress. While recognizing the significant financial and human resources needed, the report advises an evaluation of priorities within Agenda 2063 to ensure effective resource allocation.

In conclusion, the author underscores the complexities and challenges faced by Agenda 2063 and emphasizes the imperative for comprehensive institutional reform, strategic prioritization, and collaborative efforts to realize the ambitious goals of transforming Africa by 2063.

SECTIONS

THE ISSUE

THE CHALLENGE
IMPLICATIONS
LESSONS
PROGRESS
CONCLUSION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Agenda 2063 and the End of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan: Success or Failure?

THE CHALLENGE

Introduction

Following the 50th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the now African Union (AU), in May 2013 committed to Agenda 2063, a blueprint for the transformation of Africa. This was a significant step in African unity as all AU member states, which represents all African countries, including the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic¹, signed the Solemn Declaration.²

“It is the continent’s strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.” (African Union)³

Agenda 2063 looks to promote inclusive economic development, continental and regional integration, democratic governance, peace, and security through seven overarching aspirations and twenty goals. The aspirations and goals are as follows:

Aspiration

Goals

Aspiration One: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

1. A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens

2. Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation

3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens

4. Transformed Economies

5. Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production

6. Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth

7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities

Aspiration Two: An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance

8. United Africa (Federal or Confederate)

9. Continental Financial and Monetary Institutions are established and functional

10. World Class Infrastructure crisscrosses Africa

Aspiration Three: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law

11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched

12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place

Aspiration Four: A peaceful and secure Africa

13. Peace Security and Stability is preserved

14. A Stable and Peaceful Africa

15. A Fully functional and operational APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture)

Aspiration Five: An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics

16. African Cultural Renaissance is pre- eminent

17. A Fully functional and operational APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture)

Aspiration Six: An Africa, whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women, and youth, and caring for children

17. Full Gender Equality in All Spheres of Life

18. Engaged and Empowered Youth and Children

Aspiration Seven: Africa as a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player and partner

19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence

20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development⁴

Agenda 2063 is further divided into five, ten-year implementation plans. The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (FTYIP) was set for 2013-2023.

First Ten-Year Implementation Plan Key Areas

Expected Outcomes by 2023

Improvements in Living Standards

1. Real per-capita incomes would be a third more than 2013 levels.

2. Incidence of hunger, especially amongst Women and Youth will only be 20% of 2023 levels.

3. Job opportunities will be available to at least one in four people looking for work.

4. At least one out of every three children will have access to kindergarten education with every child of secondary school age in school and seven out of ten of its graduates without access to tertiary education enrolled in TVET programs.

5. Malnutrition, maternal, child and neo-natal deaths as at 2013 would be reduced by half; access to anti-retroviral will be automatic and proportion of deaths attributable to HIV/AIDs and malaria would have been halved.

6. Nine out of ten people will have access to safe drinking water and sanitation; electricity supply and internet connectivity will be up by 50% and cities will be recycling at least 50% of the waste they generate.

Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Economies

1. GDP will be growing at 7% and at least a third of the outputs will be generated by national firms.

2. Labour intensive manufacturing, underpinned by value addition to commodities and doubling of the total agricultural factor productivity will be attained by 2023.

3. The beginnings of value addition blue economy – fisheries, eco-friendly coastal tourism, marine bio-technology products and port operations- will emerge.

4. Creative arts businesses will be contributing twice as much to real terms as their 2013 contribution to GDP.

5. ICT penetration and contribution to real GDP in absolute terms would be double of 2013 levels.

6. Regional industrialization hubs linked to the global value chains and commodity exchanges will be in place by 2023

7. At least 17% of terrestrial and inland water and 10% of coastal and marine areas would have been preserved and 30% of farmers, fisher folks and pastoralists will be practicing climate resilient production systems.

Integrated Africa

1. There will be free movement of goods, services and capital; and persons travelling to any member state could get the visa at the point of entry.

2. The volume of intra-African trade especially in agricultural value-added products would increase threefold by 2023.

3. The African Customs Union, an African Common Market and an African Monetary Union will be operational by 2023.

4. The African Speed Train Network will have passed the inception stage and will be taking its first passengers between two connected cities.

5. African Skies will be open to all African Airlines.

6. Regional power pools are boosted by at least 50% increase in power generation and the INGA dam will be operational and will contribute to the powering of the industrial transformation of the continent and comfort of the citizenry.

7. African Education Accreditation Agency and a common educational system are in place and the African Youth will have the choice to study at any university and work anywhere on the continent.

Empowered Women, Youth and Children

1. All obstacles related to Women owing/inheriting property or business, signing a contract, owning or managing a bank account would be removed by 2023.

2. At least one in five women would have access to and control of productive assets.

3. Gender parity in control, representation, advancement will be the norm in all AU Organs and the RECs.

4. All forms of violence against women would have been reduced by a third in 2023.

5. All harmful social norms and customary practices would have ended by 2023.

6. The African Youth will be mobile and 15% of all new businesses will emanate from their ingenuity and talent and the proportion of 2013 youth unemployed will be reduced by at least a quarter.

7. Child labor exploitation, marriages, trafficking and soldiering would have ended by 2023.

Well-governed, peaceful and cultural centric Africa in a Global Context

1. Democratic values and culture as enshrined in the African Governance Architecture would have been entrenched by 2023.

2. At least seven out of ten persons in every member state of the union will perceive: elections to be free, fair and credible; democratic institutions, processes and leaders accountable; the judiciary impartial and independent; and the legislature independent and key component of the national governance process.

3. African Peer Review Mechanism will have been ascribed to by all Member States and its positive impact on governance metrics felt.

4. All guns would have been silenced by 2023.

5. All Member States of the Union will have in place local and national

6. Mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution.

7. All Member States of the Union will have in place a dual citizen’s program for the diaspora.

8. The Encyclopedia Africana will be launched by the 2023 Assembly of the Union.

9. One in five poly techniques will be offering program in the creative arts and management of micro cultural enterprises to support the growth of the creative arts businesses

10. Local content in all print and electronic media would have increased by 60%.

11. At least 30% of all cultural patrimonies would have been retrieved by 2023.

12. An African Space Agency would have been established by 2023.

13. An African Global Platform will be in place by 2017 and will contribute to an increase in the share of Africa’s exports in global exports in 2023 by at least 20%.

14. An Investment Bank, the African Guarantee Facility, the African Remittances Institute and at least 2 Regional Stock Exchanges would have been established and functioning.

15. National capital markets will contribute at least 10% of development financing and the proportion of aid in the national budget will be no more than 25% of the 2013 level.⁵

The agenda also includes fifteen flagship projects which are seen as key programs and initiatives that the African Union deems necessary to accelerate Africa’s economic growth and development as well as promotion of a common identity.

Flagship Projects

Integrated High Speed Train Network
Establishment of an African Commodities Strategy
Establishment of The African Continental Free Trade Area
The African Passport and Free Movement of People
Silencing The Guns By 2020
Implementation of The Grand Inga Dam Project
Establishment of A Single African Air-Transport Market (Saatm)
Establishment of An Annual African Economic Forum
Establishment of The African Financial Institutions
The Pan-African E-Network
Africa Outer Space Strategy
An African Virtual And E-University
Cyber Security
Great African Museum
Encyclopedia Africana⁶

Progress and performance of Agenda 2062 and the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan is monitored and evaluated using an empirical research methodology developed by the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Union Development Agency – NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD).⁷ The AU Technical and Working Group on the Monitoring and Evaluation of Agenda 2063 works under the guidance of the AUC and AUDA-NEPAD to review and update data tools required for the AU’s standard methodology for reporting on Agenda 2063.⁸ Data collection regarding performance also relies heavily on member states who report to the AU their progress on the various aspirations and goals.

Regional Economic Communities and Agenda 2063

With 55 member states in the African Union, Agenda 2063 can be seen as an immense project to implement across the continent. The AU consulted The eight recognized RECs by the African Union are the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁹ Many African states are part of multiple RECs and that some RECs are more active in economic, peace, and security issues than others. The African Union seeks to use these RECs as building blocks for an African Common Market, which falls under the flagship project of African financial institutions.¹⁰ The progress of Agenda 2063 and the FTYIP illustrates the ability of RECs in Africa to collaborate and harmonize approaches to address Africa’s issues. Cooperation among the AU and RECs will be essential for Africa’s stability/sustainability. As economic, peace, and security issues continue to afflict the African continent, the question emerges: Does the African Union have the resources and support to implement the FTYIP or Agenda 2063 as a whole?

IMPLICATIONS

Economic

Agenda 2063, FTYIP, and the flagship projects all place significant weight on sustainable economic development, essentially continued positive growth and higher value-added processes, to progress the agenda. The establishment of the AfCFTA is projected to have a monumental impact on Africa’s economy¹¹. Positive economic growth is necessary for the continued implementation of Agenda 2063 as domestic resource mobilization is the majority contributor to the financing of Agenda 2063 as outlined in the financing and resource mobilization strategy.¹²

Political

One of the main overarching political goals in Agenda 2063 is the promotion of democratic values. This will be mostly achieved through goals outlined in Aspiration Three but is also connected to Aspiration Four. Good governance and democracy are not easily developed and implemented as one cannot simply decide to be democratic, it instead requires significant socio-political and economic reforms which are organic and localized to Africa. However, if achieved, further democratization across Africa has the potential to bring positive change in issues like security, human rights, and the rule of law.

Cultural

The cultural goals in Agenda 2063 are unique in the sense that they outline a plan for an African cultural renaissance. Focusing on the principles of Pan-Africanism, an ideology of intergroup solidarity, can have beneficial impacts on interactions among African states.¹³ Pan-Africanism essentially sees the future of Africa’s development and growth as one nation that is benefiting from increased regional stability.

Regional Economic Communities

Agenda 2063 opens the door for strengthening communication lines between different RECs and the AU and RECs. Agenda 2063 has the potential to strengthen state institutions, if properly implemented, and enhance RECs capacity and effectiveness. For this future to take place, significant steps need to be taken regarding how these different institutions and their agencies collaborate and communicate with one another.

Concerns

While there are significant positive economic, political, and cultural impacts that can come from Agenda 2063 and the FTYIP, the lack of effective plan implementation can lead to significant issues in the future with the agenda itself and its perception of the African Union. If a significant number of goals or projects that are outlined in the FTYIP are not achieved, then the following ten-year plan will have to include goals that were not achieved previously, potentially overwhelming the number of goals that can be successfully achieved. This will also require significant financial assistance to complete two separate goal timelines now concurrent. Furthermore, the African Union already faces significant criticism regarding its effectiveness as an institution and its credibility globally. While Agenda 2063 is a very ambitious initiative, their publicized commitment to the agenda requires them to achieve a significant portion of the agenda to positively increase their perception with the African people. Any significant failure of the agenda has the potential to ruin the African Union’s credibility both on the continent and internationally.

LESSONS

There are both positive and negative lessons from the implementation of the FTYP which can be analyzed to better understand where Agenda 2063 and the FTYP sit currently and how both may look in the future. The African Union has published two continental reports that detail their perceived progress toward Agenda 2063 based on their research. This helps to gain some understanding of their progress. Other resources used come from independent scholarly analysis of the agenda and public data relating to the aspirations.

Economic

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is positioned to provide significant positive impacts on the African economies. Fifty-four of the fifty-five African states have signed the treaty, Eritrea being the only one to not sign due to its closed economy.¹⁴ As of August 2023, forty-seven states have deposited their instruments of AfCFTA ratification.¹⁵ AfCFTA also includes the eight RECs, making it the world’s largest free trade area.¹⁶ AfCFTA countries hold a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of US$ 3.4 trillion and, by 2035, AfCFTA could be responsible for raising income by 7% (US$ 450 billion).¹⁷ By 2050, AfCFTA is expected to expand Africa’s economy to US$ 29 trillion¹⁸ While the confirmed impact of AfCFTA has yet to be determined due to the infancy of ratification, the number of states who have signed and ratified the treaty is still considered significant progress toward economic success.

The establishment and ratification of AfCFTA is a monumental step for Agenda 2063 and its economic successes related to an integrated Africa outlined in Aspiration Two. According to the most recent continental report, which analyzes progress made up till 2021, Aspiration Two is at “84% progress.”¹⁹ The 84% score is calculated as what percentage of the goals for 2021 were achieved. This score is largely achieved because of the progress of AfCFTA but when looking at the other economic and integrated Africa goals for the FTYIP, the progress does not seem to reflect this high progress rate. While AfCFTA is significant, whether the implementation of this will bring economic success has yet to be seen. Furthermore, other financial institutions that are supposed to be finalized in 2023, as outlined in the FTYIP, have yet to be operational. The African Customs Union, African Common Market, and African Monetary Union are not only non-operational as of April 2024, but when visiting the African Union’s information page on Agenda 2063 financial institutions, there is minimal information regarding the progress of these institutions. The African Union acknowledged the insufficient progress made towards the AU financial institutions at the December 2023 African Union Financial Institutions Consultive Forum and asked member states to take further initiatives to accelerate progress.²⁰ There is value in the acknowledgment of the lack of progress, but the forum has yet to produce a published plan of action to tackle the lack of progress. In line with Aspiration Two and the FTYIP, the African Speed Train Network is supposed to have passed the inception stage and carried passengers between two connected cities by 2023.²¹ The train network has not passed the inception stage and is still in the early development stages.

With every goal outlined in the FTYIP relating the integrated Africa described in Aspiration Two not being met, it raises questions regarding the reliability of progress calculated by the African Union’s analysis in the Second Continental Report. AfCFTA is an important treaty and the progress made should be celebrated. However, when it is hailed as such a large success without actual implementation numbers made clear, and other goals within the same aspiration have not been met, it appears misleading to a reader to hail Aspiration Two at 84% success against 2021 goals. Even if the 2021 goals were mostly aimed at AfCFTA, questions arise regarding how these goals are developed in line with the FTYIP.

Political

Political goals for Agenda 2063 and the FTYIP appear to be the farthest from completion. The clear overarching theme across Agenda 2063 is democracy as a pillar for these aspirations. Aspiration Three tackles this more explicitly, calling for democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.²² According to the Second Continental Report, Aspiration Three performed at 42% against the 2021 targets.²³ Free and fair elections are a large part of achieving these goals and the FTYIP calls for 70% of the population in every member state to perceive elections to be free, fair, and credible.²⁴ In 2021, the AU research team reported that 24% of the population perceived elections as free, fair, and credible, falling 35% behind the 2021 goal of 59% and 46% behind the 2023 goal of 70%.²⁵ While data regarding the 2023 perception of elections has not been published, the outlook appears negative: considering the 2021 numbers were not even half of the goal.

One of the biggest political goals for the FTYIP is the silencing of all guns by 2023, which was subsequently pushed back to 2030 in December 2020²⁶. The extension was due to constitutional, institutional, and cultural challenges according to Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns.²⁷ This extension can be understood as a positive and negative lesson regarding adjustments made to Agenda 2063 and the ten-year implementation plans. On the positive side, the extension proves that adjustments can be made to key initiative timelines when necessary. Other goals, such as the African Integrated High-Speed Train Network, could benefit from extensions on key goals for the initiative to ensure completion in the future. Especially with major projects seeing progress, but slower than expected, extensions could allow the AU to continue progress without stressing member states regarding the quick timeline. On the negative side, extensions run the risk of never ending. As most projects are significantly behind on goals for their perspective timelines, continued extensions not only push back the project, but the entirety of Agenda 2063. Furthermore, initiatives like Silencing the Guns by 2030, which currently do not appear to be achievable, will require multiple extensions, further harming the credibility of the agenda and the AU as a whole.

Cultural

Understanding and conceptualizing the impact of Agenda 2063 on the culture of Africa and the Pan-Africanism movement or renaissance is not simple. Individual perceptions and ideas vary across the continent regarding what it means to be “African.” The FTYIP outlines specific goals that relate to Pan-Africanism such as an encyclopedia Africana to be launched by 2023, all members having a dual-citizen program for the diaspora, and 30% of all cultural artifacts retrieved by 2023.²⁸ One of the main goals analyzed in the Second Continental Report is the implementation of a curriculum on indigenous African culture, values, and languages in primary and secondary schools.²⁹ The continent scored 45% against the 2021 goals.³⁰ Breaking that down further, the 2023 implementation goal of curriculum across member states is 60% and in 2021 that number was 23%, which is also far below the 2021 goal of approximately 51%.³¹ Although these numbers demonstrate significant underperformance toward goals, there was a notable increase from the 2013 score of 14.4%.³² The African Union relies on member states to develop their curriculum for schools and cites Ethiopia, Eswatini, Niger, Ghana, and Morocco as leaders in this development.³³ Allowing states to construct this curriculum is important in ensuring that important history regarding the specific state is developed but this does place serious weight on education departments.

The return of African artifacts to the continent has proven to be extremely challenging since states started calling for their return nearly 50 years ago.³⁴ While very few pieces have returned, Nigeria is one “success” story with two statues returned, the issue is largely out of the control of African states.³⁵ African states do not control or facilitate the return of artifacts to their associated country, which allows the AU to use this as a defense of the lack of progress on the goal. The lack of control could be seen as a weakness for African states, but more so shows the power of European states who hold these artifacts and their continued effort to justify their possession of them. It is nearly impossible for African states to claim restitution because of European power and weaknesses of international law on the subject. The AU can utilize the lack of control as a sort of justification for the lack of progress in the goal, as responsibility does not necessarily fall on the AU, which in turn affects the agenda as a whole.

Inter-REC and AU Communication and Collaboration

Some steps have been taken to increase communication and collaboration between different RECs and the AU and RECs. The Intergovernmental Authority of Development brought Civil Society Support Officers (CSSOs) from Uganda and Ethiopia to collaborate with their South Sudanese counterparts to increase capacity and enhance government institutions.³⁶ The initiative had the prospective CSSOs serve in South Sudan for two years.³⁷ This form of collaboration is important in African institutional development because the use of localized expertise allows capacity building to be “owned” by the African population while also adhering to the cultural values of Africans. In July 2023, the AU and RECs met in Kenya to discuss interagency communication and Agenda 2063’s second ten-year implementation plan.³⁸ Division of labor was identified as a core need to increase coordination and avoid overlap.³⁹ Essentially, the AU and RECs need to develop and collaborate on economic and political initiatives to ensure that individualized programs are established that can build off one another but do not repeat in a state or conflict if not necessary.

Impact of COVID-19

As positive economic growth was identified as a necessary variable for the successful implementation of Agenda 2063, it is important to note the impact Covid-19 has had on the African and global economies. While Africa has recorded lower rates of infection and death compared to the rest of the world⁴⁰, the pandemic still placed significant pressure on African health systems, some of which were already struggling with outbreaks of other infectious diseases.⁴¹ Furthermore, Africa relies significantly on international imports of food and resources to sustain the population and as Covid-19 impacted import pricing of goods, further strain was placed on families and nations. States were also affected by a lack of foreign direct investments and states which rely heavily on tourism were significantly impacted by travel restrictions and health concerns.⁴² While the full effect of Covid-19 on economies is still being understood, various containment efforts significantly affected Africa’s economic output which has impacted investment in Agenda 2063.

First and Second Continental Reports

While Agenda 2063 progress has been measured in the First (2020) and Second (2022) Continental Reports, there are notable flaws in the research produced and its analysis. The main flaw in the calculations of success for individual aspirations and goals in the Second Continental Report is that only 38 of the 55 states in the AU were included in the report.⁴³This is due to a variety of reasons, as some states simply did not submit data or only submitted partial/minimal data. Regardless, with less than 70% of states included in the analysis, this does not give a comprehensive analysis of Agenda 2063’s progress. Furthermore, the Second Continental Report analyzes aspiration goal success percentages by region. In areas like Central Africa, where a majority of states did not report, the success percentage does not reflect the region’s actual success, due to lack of data. While member states are responsible for reporting, the African Union needs to provide further incentives or discipline for states that do not report due to the importance of this data. Member state reporting also carries issues regarding whether or not accurate data is being represented. Further transparency regarding reporting on progress is beneficial to AU credibility and possible future investments.

PROGRESS

Considering Agenda 2063 is a fifty-year plan, the agenda can still be considered in its early stage, allowing for reform to take place to improve effectiveness in the future. The main limitation to progress identified in this research is The African Union has previously acknowledged the need for institutional reform and in July 2016, a reform advisory team identified five focus areas that require urgent action.⁴⁴

The identified areas are as follows:

The AU needs to focus on fewer priority areas with continental scope.
There is a need to review the structure and operations of the AU and ensure Institutional Realignment for better service delivery.
The AU needs to connect with the African Citizenry.
The AU needs to become operationally effective & efficient in the performance of its mandate.
The AU needs to identify and implement sustainable financing for its programs and reduce over-reliance on development partners. ⁴⁵

The advisory team specifically deemed these reforms necessary to see the success of Agenda 2063.⁴⁶ The team has created roadmaps for administrative and financial issues, but minimal information is available regarding the implementation of the roadmaps. This further emphasizes the need for institutional reform as the efforts already made within the AU require new reform. Despite this, institutional reform is never an easy task and has continued to be one of the biggest contributors to instability in Africa. The author of this report recognizes the resources needed to implement such reform and takes that into consideration when making the following recommendations.

Institutional Reform: Building Capacity Through Agenda 2063 and Ten-Year Implementation Plans

For the AU to successfully implement all aspirations outlined in Agenda 2063, it needs to place priority and focus on the aspirations that build capacity in states to implement all the developed goals. This means that Aspirations Three and Four should be the prime concern for the next ten-year implementation plan. Other aspirations could still be included in a smaller percentage of the goals, but Aspirations Three and Four should be the majority of those goals. Good governance and democracy should be further prioritized as they can help accelerate peace and security needs. This means that the financial and human resources dedicated to the next ten-year implementation plan, and Agenda 2063 as a whole, should be diverted more specifically to Agenda Three.

The need for this prioritization is paramount, because weak institutions, both in the AU and its member states, have been the main factor inhibiting progress on Agenda 2063. It cannot be expected for states to make effective reforms in areas like women’s equality, indigenous education, financial independence, and healthcare if the institutions in place that are necessary to implement reform themselves are not effective. Good governance should be at the forefront of the AU’s priorities, if citizens of member states do not have faith in their governments and institutions, then there is no incentive to contribute to democracy. If the AU can not only successfully reform their institutions, but also provide human and financial resources to member states to reform theirs, then the other aspirations in Agenda 2063 become a real possibility to achieve. It should also be noted that this report does not call for the creation of new institutions, but the improvement of what states and organizations already have. This could take form in a variety of ways, but expert consultation should be an investment the AU and member states should consider. Determining the type and background of said experts is crucial to ensure alignment with AU and member states’ values regarding anti-colonialism and sovereignty. While it may appear attractive to bring in experts from successful institutions like the European Union, the administration in the AU must be sensitive to the cultural implications of bringing in former European colonizing states and institutions. This also applies to non-European states such as China and the United States due to the possibility of being labeled as neocolonialism. F While this is not an easy task considering these institutions, regardless of their reported goals, still develop policies based on special interests from larger donor countries often. It is necessary that they allow Africa the opportunity to grow and develop institutions, as this has never been an option historically.

Further emphasis on interagency communication is also necessary to bring Agenda 2063 success. Communication between member states and the AU is important for this success, but so is communication and collaboration with RECs. Dividing certain goals and projects amongst member states, RECs, and the AU can allow for the accelerated progress that is needed on the previous ten-year implementation plan for the second ten-year implementation plan to have a chance for success. Essentially, a strategic plan, with specific, achievable, and individualized goals regarding institution building amongst all actors in Agenda 2063, with no overlap, is necessary to tackle the remaining inspirations.

Another administrative modification that can help assist Agenda 2063 and institutional capacity building is increased investment and recruitment in research gathering and data analysis. This should include analysis and data gathering on institutional effectiveness and best practices as well as Agenda 2063 and its progress. The AU has its own team for research on Agenda 2063 and the AU Technical Working Group on the Monitoring and Evaluation of Agenda 2063, but they should be further integrated into each member state’s reporting. While training and initial involvement in the reporting process are crucial, further monitoring needs to take place during data collection to ensure extra accuracy. Once again, the author notes the significant financial and human resources needed for this type of reform and as financing is already a hurdle within Agenda 2063, therefore it is recommended that there is an evaluation of priorities so resources can be diverted to higher priority areas.

CONCLUSION

Agenda 2063 stands as an ambitious and comprehensive blueprint for the transformation of Africa, emphasizing economic growth, regional integration, good governance, and cultural identity. While notable progress has been made, particularly with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), this report reveals significant challenges and risks. Political goals, especially regarding perceptions of free and fair elections, present conflicts, and the broader issue of institutional weakness in the African Union and member states poses a considerable barrier. Lessons learned underscore the importance of flexibility in goal timelines and the need for careful consideration in extending targets. Recommendations emphasize the prioritization of good governance and democracy, institutional reform, and increased investment in research and data analysis. The success of Agenda 2063 hinges on addressing these challenges, fostering collaboration, and implementing strategic reforms to build a foundation for a transformed and united Africa.

Foreign Policy and Diaspora Studies Lab (FP&DS-LAB)

About the ACSTRAP Foreign Policy and Diaspora Studies Lab

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This report was prepared by the Foreign Policy and Diaspora Studies Lab of the Africa Center for Strategy & Policy. The objective of the FP&DS-LAB is to focus on regional and international affairs, particularly the implications of great power competition in Africa. The lab looks at institutional policies at the level of the African Union and the relations among African states and the international community.

About the Authors/Lab Contributors

Taylor Widhalm: Research Analyst

Taylor Widhalm graduated from George Mason in May 2024 with an MS in Conflict Resolution and Analysis and graduated from the University of Malta in March 2024 with an MA in Mediterranean Security and Analysis. She completed her undergraduate in 2022 at Colorado State University in History. Taylor hopes to continue research in foreign policy and security studies related to Africa in the future.

About the Africa Center for Strategy & Policy (ACSTRAP)

ACSTRAP Policy & Strategy reports are published by The Africa Center for Strategic Progress (ACSTRAP). ASCSTRAP is the first policy think tank to adopt a genuinely African-solution-centered and data-driven approach to African policy and strategy. We are a non-partisan think tank focusing on ANALYZES, EVALUATIONS & DEVELOPMENT of policy and Strategy in view of African governments, peoples, and stakeholders.

The Africa Center for Strategic Progress takes no institutional positions on strategy and policy issues and has no affiliation with any government. All opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in its publications and other platforms are the sole responsibility of the author(s).

All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by electronic or mechanical means now known or to be invented, including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.

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Website: www.acstrap.org

METHODOLOGY

This report primarily focuses on analyzing information provided by the African Union in the First and Second Continental Reports. The author also used primary and secondary sources relating to the report’s topic to support or disprove data in the Continental Reports.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Foreign Policy and Diaspora Studies Lab would like to thank the following for constructive conversation and advice based on the writing and reading drafts of this report: Jared Pentz and Nana Bruce-Amanquah. The Foreign Policy and Diaspora Studies Lab would also like to thank the editorial team for their editorial assistance.

View, download and/or print a copy of this report here.

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