Authors:

Apungwa Cornelius Ntabe: Director, African Political Economy Lab
Isaac Clemons: Research Associate, African Political Economy Lab
Nicholas H. Johnson: Researcher, African Political Economy Lab

THE ISSUE

The great powers’ competition for influence on the African continent is an undeniable geopolitical reality. By 2050, a quarter of the world’s population will be African, and the continent’s youthful and growing labor force—the largest in the world by that point—will stand in stark contrast to the aging populations of other regions. Human capital and natural resources will increasingly become the most important features of Africa’s global profile. As a result, a significant power struggle has emerged in the 21st century among the great powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, for influence across the African continent. This great power struggle for hegemony on the continent is focused on gaining access to Africa’s plethora of natural resources, growing population, key maritime routes, and vast investment market.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By 2050, a quarter of the world’s population will be African, and the continent’s youthful and growing labor force—the largest in the world by that point—will stand in stark contrast to the aging populations of other regions.¹Michelle D Gavin, “Major Power Rivalry in Africa,”  (2021). External powers increasingly turn their attention to Africa because of its rich oil, natural gas, and mineral reserves—including uranium and cobalt—and its rapidly growing population. Historically, Africa has been continually subjected to the imperialist desires of great powers. By the 16th century, Africa’s coastlines had become battlegrounds of escalating great-power competition.²Malyn Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion 1400-1668 (Routledge, 2004); Pankhurst Richard, “The Ethiopians: A History,”  (2001); Andrew C Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier (University of Chicago Press, 2010); DK Bassett, “Cr Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825.(The History of Human Society.) Xxvi, 426 Pp., 16 Plates, Map. London: Hutchinson and Co.(Publishers) Ltd., 1969. 55s,” Bulletin of SOAS 34, no. 1 (1971); C.R. Boxer, “The Dutch Seaborne Empire,”(1965). Later, in the second half of the 19th century, European powers engaged in fierce competition during the so-called Scramble for Africa. During the Cold War, the continent became an extension of great-power politics.

The current hegemonic power competition in global politics mainly involves the United States, China, and Russia. This rivalry manifests across multiple domains, including military power, cybersecurity, technological power (5G), foreign aid, and alliance building.³ Muhammad Faizal Alfian et al., “Technology as an Instrument in Great Power Politics: An Overview of the Us-China Tech War,” Dinamika Global: Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 10, no. 1 (2025);  MITRE, “Navigating the New Global Dynamic with Deeply Informed Systems Thinking,”  https://www.mitre.org/our-impact/policy-and-thought-leadership/center-strategic-competition ;Thomas F Lynch, “The Future of Great Power Competition,” in The Routledge Handbook of Great Power Competition (Routledge, 2024);  Alfian et al. These contests unfold not only through overt military deployments but also within key government agencies, diplomatic platforms, and academic institutions that shape policy, innovation, and global influence.

This report examines the impact of great-power rivalry on Africa’s political economy. Based on the examination, the report highlighted specific lessons and recommendations, including decreasing reliance on foreign powers, transforming the raw materials economy, and capitalizing on each great power’s development agendas.

SECTIONS

THE ISSUE

1. THE CHALLENGE

2. IMPLICATIONS

3. LESSONS

4. PROGRESS

5. CONCLUSION

ENDNOTES
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Exploring the potential political-economic impact of renewed global superpower rivalries on African countries and African regional institutions

THE CHALLENGE

Introduction

Africa, covering about one-fifth of the world’s land surface, is the second largest continent.⁴Samah Elbarbary et al., “Geothermal Renewable Energy Prospects of the African Continent Using Gis,” Geothermal Energy 10, no. 1 (2022).  The continent touches nearly every major maritime transit route, making it a key hub of world trade throughout history.⁵Wkipedia, “Africa,”  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa.

In addition to its strategic location, the continent has held abundant and valuable natural resources, including large global shares of gold, silver, iron ore, diamonds, sugar, and salt since antiquity.⁶SARI Buğra, “Africa: A Constant Battlefield of Great Power Rivalry,” Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 22, no. 1. In the modern era, its resources have diversified for use in military products and in key industries such as natural gas and uranium.⁷Ibid. By 2050, Africa will account for a quarter of the world‘s population, with its young and growing workforce expected to be the largest globally, unlike the aging populations in other regions. Human capital will become increasingly central to Africa’s global profile. Because of these reserves and the future composition of its population, Africa has long drawn the attention of outside powers. Thus, no great power can realistically achieve global hegemony without a strategy for engaging Africa and building meaningful partnerships on the continent. 

The Trump administration’s emphasis on countering Chinese and Russian involvement in Africa, for example, has raised concerns about unwelcome echoes of the Cold War era.⁸Gavin. This report examines the impact of great-power rivalry on Africa’s political economy and offers recommendations on how the continent can capitalize on its geopolitical significance.

By the 16th century, Africa’s coastlines had become battlegrounds of escalating great-power competition.⁹Malyn Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion 1400-1668 (Routledge, 2004); Pankhurst Richard, “The Ethiopians: A History,”  (2001); Andrew C Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier (University of Chicago Press, 2010); DK Bassett, “Cr Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825.(The History of Human Society.) Xxvi, 426 Pp., 16 Plates, Map. London: Hutchinson and Co.(Publishers) Ltd., 1969. 55s,” Bulletin of SOAS 34, no. 1 (1971); C.R. Boxer, “The Dutch Seaborne Empire,”(1965). Later, in the second half of the 19th century, European powers engaged in fierce competition during the so-called Scramble for Africa.¹⁰Buğra.[/mfn[ resulting in the violent partitioning of the continent. During the Cold War, Africa became a battleground for the broader global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, reflecting the ideological struggle between the East and the West.

While the collapse of the USSR on December 26, 1991 left the U.S. without any rival on the continent, the rise of China soon challenged its dominant position. Since the 2000s, China has increasingly engaged with Africa alongside the U.S., driven by China’s economic boom and the continent’s proven energy reserves.¹⁰Ibid. The U.S. sees China’s growing engagement in Africa as a threat to its global hegemony. As a result, a new great-power rivalry on the continent emerges in the 21st century among the U.S., China, Russia, Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar), and Türkiye.¹¹GÉRARD PRUNIER, “Gulf Countries and Turkey Pitch against Each Other… In Africa,”  https://orientxxi.info/magazine/gulf-countries-and-turkey-pitch-against-each-other-in-africa,2772.

IMPLICATIONS

During the 19^thcentury Scramble for Africa, European countries exploited the continent’s labor and raw materials to bolster their own ‘superpower’ status. This rivalry between European powers would shape international politics and the world economy in the future. Competition in a 21st-century context refers to the decentralization of power in the West, with China’s development and growing influence eroding U.S. global hegemony.

The reshaping of global hegemony and the rising influence of other international actors point to a future where global affairs operate within an increasingly multipolar system. As states—such as the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and others—design and implement foreign policies to shift further and secure their polarity within the global hierarchy, Africa remains a key geographic site of strategic competition, investment, cooperation, and conflict.¹²Buğra.

The United States and China continue to be at odds vying for African support on their differing international norms; the two powers deviate on numerous issues related to human rights and sovereignty.¹³Folashadé Soulé, “Zero-Sum? Benefitting from Great Power Rivalry in Africa,” APRI  (2021).  Achieving real political influence within African governments remains a critical objective for China and the U.S. The growing military interest of great powers seeking to solidify their positions in Africa—via a physical presence and the promotion of joint exercises and training—also underscores how partnerships and access to Africa are becoming central to shaping global power and influence. 

Competitive international policies in African countries could foster symbiosis between superpowers seeking to solidify their roles in African economies and African states.¹⁴Buğra. The evolution of major powers’ ambitions for Africa’s natural resources sheds light on the growing global technology economy, which requires rare earth minerals and other metals. As U.S.-China tensions persist, the United States’ reliance on China as a source of rare earth minerals increasingly becomes a vulnerability, and African states may be desirable alternative suppliers. Institutions such as the African Union (AU) and regional formations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as great powers, will be parties to negotiations and security deals for national and local development projects. The following are synopses of recent activities by competing international powers on the African continent.

United States

The United States has broad security, economic, and political interests at stake in Africa, although it has had only sporadic success in pursuing them. Despite the current Trump administration’s talk of a drawdown in military personnel, the U.S. Department of War (DOW) still has thousands of military personnel on the ground in Africa.¹⁵Fathia Olasupo, “Top 10 African Nations with the Most U.S. Military Presence and the Possible Impacts of Trump’s Administration,”  https://www.africanexponent.com/top-10-african-nations-with-the-most-u-s-military-presence-and-the-possible-impacts-of-trumps-administration/. The United States currently has the only permanent military base on the continent, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti (a hub for U.S. military activities in Yemen and on the African continent).¹⁶U.S. Department of Defense, “Pentagon Policy Official Underscores Defense Ties With Djibouti,” Defense.gov, accessed November 17, 2025

The United States declared its Africa Command (AFRICOM) a fully unified command on 1 October 2008.¹⁷Stefan Gänzle, “Africom and Us Africa Policy:‘Pentagonising’foreign Policy or Providing a Model for Joint Approaches?,” African Security Review 20, no. 1 (2011). Although AFRICOM was officially established on October 1, 2007, Stuttgart, Germany served as its temporary headquarters during the first 12 months. AFRICOM is the sixth U.S. geographic combatant command to be established. At its founding, AFRICOM aimed to foster closer cooperation between the civilian and military sides of U.S. Africa policy. Then-U.S. President George W. Bush declared that AFRICOM “will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.”¹⁸White House, “President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” The George W. Bush White House—Office of the Press Secretary 6 (2007).  While celebrated by some observers as a “post-Cold War experiment that radically rethinks security in the early 21st century”¹⁹Sean McFate, “Us Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?,” Military Review 88, no. 1 (2008)., critics argued that AFRICOM is a case of “old wine in a new bottle”.²⁰Christopher Isike, Ufo Okeke Uzodike, and Lysias Gilbert, “The United States Africa Command: Enhancing American Security or Fostering African Development?,” African Security Studies 17, no. 1 (2008). During its formation, for instance, key African nation-states, including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and Libya,²¹Captain Moussa Diop Mboup, “Misguided Intentions: Resisting Africom,”  https://www.army.mil/article/35036/misguided_intentions_resisting_africom.  responded with fierce criticism and rejection.²²McFate. Due to the legacy of colonial-era slavery and resource exploitation, Africans remain wary of U.S. intentions and have protested agreements that expand AFRICOM’s power, arguing that it threatens the sovereignty of African states.²³Middle East, “Dossier No. 42: Defending Our Sovereignty: Us Military Bases in Africa and the Future of African Unity.”

China

China’s direct investment in Africa has grown at about 40 percent annually over the past decade.²⁴Daniel F Runde, “China and Smes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Window of Opportunity for the United States,” JSTOR Security Studies Collection  (2021). China is by far the largest source of infrastructure financing on the continent.²⁵Steve Johnson, “China by Far the Largest Investor in African Infrastructure,” Financial Times 30 (2015). Chinese-financed infrastructure projects span Africa, from roads and rails to ports and power plants. China subsidizes major projects, producing tangible economic opportunities for African states.²⁶Hannah Edinger and Jean-Pierre Labuschagne, “If You Want to Prosper, Consider Building Roads,” Deloitte, March 22 (2019). However, the opacity of financing terms raises serious concerns about debt.²⁷Gavin.

Some Western politicians have continuously expressed concern that China’s intentions in Africa are dubious, intended to create a network of indebted African states forced to repay debts with access to resources, trade opportunities, and locations for military bases.

However, the idea that China might use these debts to expand its influence in Africa and gain access to resources cannot be ignored or dismissed. China is an emerging superpower in strategic competition with the U.S., and building stronger economic relationships in Africa would be a reasonable step toward its goal of attaining global hegemony.

Russia

Russia has raised its public profile in Africa, most notably through the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi and the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit held at the Expo Forum in St. Petersburg. In July 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged to send 200,000 tons of free grain to six African countries, i.e., Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea.²⁸Burc Eruygur, “Putin Says Russia Will Provide Free Grain to 6 African Countries in Next 3-4 Months,”  (2023). By February 2024, the Russian Minister of Agriculture, Dmitry Patrushev, confirmed that the promised 200,000 tons of grain had been delivered to all six countries.²⁹Elena Teslova, “Russian Agriculture Minister Says 200,000 Tons of Grain Delivered to 6 African Countries,”  https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-agriculture-minister-says-200-000-tons-of-grain-delivered-to-6-african-countries/3143727.

Russian private security companies, such as the Wagner Group, purport to redress complex local military and terrorism conflicts with which African governments have struggled. They also enable African governments to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations unconstrained by human rights responsibilities.³⁰Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure,”  https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/. The Wagner Group is a prominent Kremlin-linked private military company (PMC) estimated to have some five thousand members stationed across Africa, a mix of former Russian soldiers, convicts, and foreign nationals.³¹W Rampe, “What Is Russia’s Wagner Group Doing in Africa?. Council on Foreign Relations,” (2023). Reports indicate that Russia established an entity called Africa Corps in the summer of 2023, after the Wagner Group’s rebellion, which has taken over Wagner’s military operations in Africa.³²John A Lechner and Sergei Eledinov, “Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?,” Foreign Policy 7 (2024). The Africa Corps was established as a successor to the Wagner Group, managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU.³³Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded,” BBC, available at: https://www. bbc. com/news/world-africa-68322230 (accessed: 20 March 2024)  (2024). Russia’s Main Directorate (often referred to as the GRU) controls the Africa Corps under the leadership of Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.³⁴Lechner and Eledinov. GRU ensures that Wagner personnel focus solely on pursuing the Kremlin’s interests.³⁵Ryan Bauer ; Erik E. Mueller, “Russian Private Military Companies Thriving Due to War with Ukraine ” The Moscow Times  (2023). The newly formed Africa Corps leads the charge in expanding Russian security to new African countries. The Africa Corps announced its arrival in Burkina Faso in late 2023, where its ‘military instructors’ assist the country’s military junta, helping it to maintain its grip on power in Ouagadougou.³⁶Julia Stanyard, “Mercenaries and Illicit Markets: Russia’s Africa Corps and the Business of Conflict,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (February 2025), 9. In April 2024, Russian military personnel and equipment arrived in Niamey, Niger as well.³⁷ActuNiger, “La Russie Élargit Son Soutien Au Niger : Un Troisième Vol Cargo Livre Équipements Militaires, Instructeurs Et Aide Humanitaire,”  https://www.actuniger.com/societe/20079-la-russie-elargit-son-soutien-au-niger-un-troisieme-vol-cargo-livre-equipements-militaires-instructeurs-et-aide-humanitaire.html. Because Africa Corps is more directly linked to the Russian government than Wagner Group was, it seems ‘more legitimate’ to African governments, according to Sergey Eledinov, a security analyst and former Russian PMC representative.

However, Russia’s trade relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa remains significantly smaller than that of its primary geopolitical competitors. As of 2024, Russia’s total trade volume with Africa reached about US$24.5 billion, which is roughly one-quarter of the United States’ trade volume and less than one-tenth of China’s dominant trade presence in the region.³⁸Gavin. Despite the relatively small scale of trade, Russia compensates by focusing on high-value and politically sensitive sectors, particularly arms supply, where it is the leading supplier to Africa, accounting for about 30–40% of the continent’s major weapon imports.³⁹Greg Simons et al., “Russia’s Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa: Moving to a New Stage,” in The Global South in the Kremlin’s Foreign Policy after 24/2 (Springer, 2025); Özgür Tüfekçi, “Rising Power Activism Vs Great Power Statusquoism: Quest for a Place in African Power Politics,” Uluslararası İktisadi ve İdari İncelemeler Dergisi, no. 47 (2025). This strong military trade influence is complemented by diplomatic efforts but contrasts starkly with China’s approach, which emphasizes broad-based economic integration, infrastructure projects, and large-scale lending.⁴⁰Mukesh Shankar Bharti and Suprabha Kumari, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Its Implications for Asean-China Strategic Partnership,” Asian Review of Political Economy 3, no. 1 (2024). Consequently, Russia’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa is modest in economic terms but strategically significant for security cooperation, showcasing a relationship-building strategy centered on military and political influence rather than comprehensive economic engagement.

European Union

In certain African countries, a sizeable European diaspora influences policy decisions, particularly regarding fundamental issues of stability.⁴¹Gavin. Europe often points out that when European countries are treated as a bloc, the European Union (EU) is Africa’s leading trade partner.⁴²Eurostat Statistic Explained, “Africa-Eu: International Trade in Goods Statistics,” URL: https://ec. europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. php  (2020). Since 2020, the EU has pursued elevating its Africa partnerships. They have done so both in response to increasing political sensitivity to migration from Africa among member states and as part of a strategy to protect Europe’s interests amid geopolitical change. Additionally, the likelihood of a future defined by intensified U.S.-China competition has necessitated increased African partnership. Among European states, France has the most significant influence in Africa. France has long provided security guarantees to former colonies; Operation Barkhane was France’s largest overseas military commitment, with nearly five thousand French personnel deployed in counterinsurgency efforts to contain radical extremists in the Sahel.⁴³Gavin. Over two thousand additional French service members are stationed elsewhere on the continent, including at a permanent base in Djibouti, which sometimes hosts personnel from other European states.⁴⁴Neil Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region,”  (2019). France maintains extensive commercial ties to francophone Africa, to the point of retaining involvement in the monetary policy of fourteen African states (though West African states recently moved to end this anachronistic arrangement).⁴⁵David Pilling David Keohane, “France Loosens Supervision of ‘Colonial’ West African Currency,” 2019 2019. Under President Emmanuel Macron’s leadership, France has also made significant efforts to bolster economic ties with Anglophone countries such as Nigeria and Kenya.⁴⁶Neil Munshi Victor Mallet, David Pilling, “Why Macron’s Attempt to Reset French Ties to Africa Has Hit Trouble,”  https://www.ft.com/content/cea9cdd9-c500-41bc-a2ae-2e4c01eaf2e8.

In 2021, the governments of South Africa, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, along with the European Union, announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) to support South Africa’s decarbonization efforts.⁴⁷European Commission, “France, Germany, Uk, Us and Eu Launch Ground-Breaking International Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa,”  (2021). This agreement pledges grants and loans to South Africa in exchange for the country’s commitment to retire coal plants, shift to renewable energy, and retrain workers. In 2022, South Africa, France, and Germany each signed loan agreements to extend €300 million in concessional financing to support the country’s efforts in reducing its reliance on coal.⁴⁸Alan Mammoser, “South Africa’s Clean Energy Partnership Gets First Funding at Cop 27,”  https://energy-utilities.com/south-africa-s-clean-energy-partnership-gets-news119419.html.

At the Compact with Africa Summit in Berlin in 2023, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Germany would invest €4 billion in sustainable energy projects in Africa until 2030 to help improve the continent’s role in renewable power, green hydrogen, and critical raw material extraction.⁴⁹Benjamin Wehrmann, “German Chancellor Pledges €4 Bn for Africa-Eu Green Energy Initiative,”  https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/german-chancellor-pledges-eu4-bn-africa-eu-green-energy-initiative.

India

India has significantly intensified its strategic efforts to counter China’s dominance in the Indian Ocean, adopting a comprehensive approach that includes naval expansion, strengthening diplomatic ties, and development projects. The country has strengthened its maritime presence by establishing a monitoring base in Madagascar and advancing military infrastructure in the Seychelles and Mauritius. Furthermore, India entered into agreements with France and the United States, gaining access to their military bases in the Indian Ocean. These developments significantly extend India’s operational scope and enhance its surveillance capabilities over vital maritime routes.⁵⁰Nishant Rajeev, “India’s Expanding Naval Presence in the Indo-Pacific. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.,”  (2025).

India also plays a significant role in multilateral naval drills, including the Malabar exercises with its Quad partners—Japan, Australia, and the United States—strengthening a collaborative regional framework to counter China’s expanding maritime influence. Notably, India’s naval presence has grown around key strategic points, such as the Strait of Malacca, reflecting its assertive stance in upholding freedom of navigation and promoting regional stability.⁵¹Raisina House, “India’s Evolving Maritime Approach in the Indian Ocean Region,”  https://raisinahouse.org/indo-pacific-vision-2025/f/indias-evolving-maritime-approach-in-the-indian-ocean-region.

India, in collaboration with Japan, has introduced the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) as a complement to its military strategy. Positioned as a sustainable and transparent counterpart to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this initiative aims to foster development and cooperation grounded in a value-driven and liberal framework. It prioritizes respect for sovereignty and promotes inclusive, growth-oriented progress.⁵²Sathiya Moorthy, “How India Ramps up Indian Ocean Presence Amid Global Power Play,”  https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-india-ramps-up-indian-ocean-presence-amid-global-power-play-13941957.html.

India’s maritime strategy places significant emphasis on strengthening regional collaboration to address non-traditional security challenges such as counter-piracy operations, anti-smuggling patrols, and advancing partnerships in the blue economy. Acknowledging the constraints posed by its contested land border with China, India identifies its maritime domain as a vital platform for asserting power and influence. This approach seeks to challenge China’s accessibility and freedom of movement within the Indo-Pacific region.⁵³Uthaya Suriyan, “India’s Strategy in Indian Ocean Region and Changing Contours in Its Ocean Policy,” International Journal of Political Science 11 (2025). This holistic approach aims to maintain a free, open, and balanced regional order while countering China’s growing influence.⁵⁴Rajeev.

Gulf States & Türkiye

In the Horn of Africa, the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have pointedly expanded their immersion and influence in the region, ramping up diplomatic presence, trade, and investment in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction. Additionally, they have also established a security agenda, seeking new pathways to counter Iranian influence in Yemen and elsewhere.⁵⁵International Crisis Group, “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa,” (2018).

To date, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is considered the most frequent visiting statesman in Africa, making 53 visits to 31 African countries.⁵⁶TRT Afrika English, “Türkiye-Africa Relations Have Grown Stronger over the Years.,”  https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/472cf6c04261. The number of Turkish embassies increased from 12 to 44 from 2002 to 2022.⁵⁷Seda Sezer Bilen, “How Turkey Is Competing with China for Influence in Africa,”  https://www.dw.com/en/how-turkey-is-competing-with-china-for-influence-in-africa/a-70301293. In response, African governments increased the number of their embassies in Türkiye from 10 in 2008 to 38 by 2022.⁵⁸Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, “Turkey’s Growing Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa,”  https://jiss.org.il/en/yanarocak-turkeys-growing-influence-in-sub-saharan-africa/. Erdoğan also attended the African Union summit in 2007,⁵⁹Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s ‘New’engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2011). and a year later, Türkiye became an official partner of the African Union.⁶⁰Mesut Özcan and Mehmet Köse, “The Quest for Balance,” Insight Turkey 26, no. 3 (2024). In 2008, Ankara hosted its first Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in Istanbul, which was attended by 49 African nations.

At the 2014 Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the partnership included ambitious cooperation and investment programs with a five-year development plan set to start in 2015. The second Summit resulted in the Malabo Declaration, the Africa-Türkiye Joint Implementation Plan, and a matrix of key priority projects covering trade and investment, peace and security, culture, tourism, education, youth empowerment, technology transfer, rural economy, and agriculture, infrastructure (notably energy, ICT, and transport), as well as topics such as health and media.⁶¹African Union, “The 3rd Africa-Turkey Summit to Enhance Partnership for Common Development and Prosperity ” news release, 2021, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20211215/3rd-africa-turkey-summit-enhance-partnership-common-development. For the first time, the partnership added security cooperation to its programs. ⁶²Yanarocak. Ankara’s security agreements include not only training programs but also comprehensive security cooperation agreements that cover training, technical, and scientific cooperation. Altogether, 30 African states signed various security-related agreements with Türkiye.⁶³HA Aksoy, S Çevik, and NT Yaşar, “Visualizing Turkey’s Activism in Africa,” CATS NETWORK.-2022.-3 June.-URL: https://www. cats-network. eu/topics/visualizing-turkeys-activism-in-africa  (2022).  The 2021 Turkish-African summit in Istanbul on “Enhanced Partnership for Common Development and Prosperity” was accompanied by 102 ministers—including 26 foreign ministers—from 39 countries.⁶⁴Yanarocak.

LESSONS

As African countries move forward in the 21^st century, in this new age of globalization and ongoing superpower rivalries, some crucial lessons emerge.

1. Reduce overdependency on foreign powers

Over-dependency on foreign partners has crippled many African countries. International development fails to build regional infrastructure, combat corruption, poverty, and authoritarian forms of government. Increased public debt, neo-colonialism, and the reinforcement of global neo-liberal policies by former colonial powers are dangers of over-dependency. The continent should aim to reduce its dependence on external aid by implementing a regional development agenda that improves living standards and ends poverty. One of the key agendas set forth thus far is the African Union Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is Africa’s 50-year master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future—fully realizing its capacity as a significant economic, political, and cultural force on the world stage. Sustainable development, robust institutions, and inclusive growth will fuel this transformation. Agenda 2063 encapsulates not only Africa’s aspirations for the future but also identifies key flagship programs that can boost the continent’s economic growth and development, thereby leading to rapid transformation.  Challenges such as corruption and authoritarian rule hinder these plans.⁶⁵African Union, 2013, https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview. Authoritarian regimes have a political structure that rejects political pluralism, encourages the use of a strong central power to maintain the political status quo, and decreases focus on the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic voting, which are in stark contrast to Agenda 2063’s development plans. Corruption cuts across all facets of society—public and private—and exists in the political, economic, social, religious, and cultural spheres. All forms of corruption are prevalent in Africa, ranging from small-scale bribes required for routine bureaucratic procedures to large-scale payments of substantial sums in return for preferential treatment or access.⁶⁶Niels Uildriks and Piet Van Reenen, “Human Rights Violations by the Police,” Human Rights Review 2, no. 2 (2001).

2. Diversify export commodities

Diversifying African exports and economies could enable African states to thrive in the global economy and withstand vulnerabilities and economic uncertainties aggravated by commodity price fluctuations. African economies have great potential to transform and achieve higher levels of diversification and competitiveness. The successful implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, an emerging consumer market, the increased use of financial services, a growing middle class, technology, and dynamic private entrepreneurs will push export diversification and sustainable economic growth in Africa. Some African countries—such as Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Egypt—have made substantial progress in diversifying their export structures, moving away from dependence on select commodities and growing into new markets and products.⁶⁷United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Rethinking the Foundations of Export Diversification in Africa: The Catalytic Role of Business and Financial Services,” (2022).

For example, Mauritius successfully shifted from an economy heavily reliant on exports to a more diversified one, with the tourism and services sectors emerging as major contributors to export growth.⁶⁸World Bank, Mauritius Overview, accessed November 17, 2025. Sound government policies created a conducive environment for the private sector to operate in – and diversify – its export base, both across different industries and within the same sector.

Success also requires a high-level political will to diversify exports. Experience shows that strategies developed at the technical level, while well-intentioned and well-designed, face challenges during implementation if they lack top-level political support and follow-through.

3. Capitalize on the shared interest of different superpowers

Despite many sources of friction, the United States, China, and other powers share several interests in Africa. These include maintaining a free flow of commerce, raising prosperity, strengthening the capacity to cope with global threats, and engendering stability that enables these activities and precludes costly interventions and relief efforts. Thus, direct clashes between major powers on the African continent are unlikely in the near future, although the risk of miscalculation and escalation remains. Therefore, these broadly shared interests should be capitalized by African states to create a collaborative agenda—one that includes African partners from beginning to end. An example of such an agenda is the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

4. African states must become more assertive on the international stage

Finally, major power rivalry risks crowding out African agency and Africa’s own agenda. African states have the capacity to become more assertive on the international stage. However, suppose their aspirations and priorities are understood only through the lens of major power rivalry. In that case, the resulting attention is unlikely to advance a broad African agenda—focused on structural reforms of multilateral institutions and global inequities. Major powers will seek to remove African states from multilateral organizations for their own purposes. Ad hoc arrangements between individual African states and major powers risk weakening Africa’s own institutional infrastructure and norms. Angola exemplifies laudable assertiveness against major power domination, where Angolan officials were able to effectively negotiate infrastructure-for-oil deals with China while disallowing the Chinese excessive influence in the relationship.⁶⁹Ronald Chipaike and Paul Henri Bischoff, “A Challenge to Conventional Wisdom: Locating Agency in Angola’s and Ghana’s Economic Engagements with China,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 7 (2018). China’s need for oil resources has supported Angola’s infrastructure growth and showcased Angolan elites’ negotiation skills. For example, when Angola and the Chinese EXIM Bank agreed on an additional $2 billion loan facility for about 100 projects, the Angolan government managed to “force” its Chinese counterparts to relax conditions of Chinese exports in the project.⁷⁰Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008). They also negotiated the loan repayment interest rate to the London Interbank Offer Rate (Libor) down by 1.25% and increased the repayment period to 15 years.⁷¹Ibid.

PROGRESS

Moments of success for African nations emerge amid modern great power rivalry. African economies can benefit significantly by leveraging the interests of great powers to secure the most favorable, profitable deals. African nations are capable players in the international system, not helpless victims.

An excellent example is Djibouti. Located in a strategic position on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the country holds strategic interest for great powers. Military bases in Djibouti project power into the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea. Around 10% of all global trade passes through the Strait.⁷²Nathan Heath, “A Red Sea Geopolitics Primer,” https://sites.tufts.edu/farescenter/a-red-sea-geopolitics-primer/#:~:text=The%20Red%20Sea%20is%20positioned,trade%20passes%20through%20its%20waters.  The region’s importance attracts both the United States and China.

Djibouti allowed the United States to establish its military base in the country in 2003. The United States pays $83 million a year to lease the land on which the base is located.⁷³Carolyn Presutti, “US signs long term lease for military base in Djibouti,” VOA News, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-expands-presence-in-strategically-located-djibouti/1907900.html  As China’s status improved, it sought to establish its first overseas military base in Djibouti. In 2014, Djibouti signed a defense agreement with China, and two years later, China began building its military base. Djibouti receives $20 million a year from China for the land.⁷⁴Lauren Ploch Blanchard and Sarah R. Collins, “China’s Engagement in Djibouti,” Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11304/3

The Djibouti example offers a small-scale case study of how a country can promote itself to great powers in a way that benefits both sides. Djibouti recognized the importance of its location and made itself available to both parties for deals. Countries situated in strategic areas of interest—Niger, Equatorial Guinea, and Mozambique—could replicate this model.

Beyond the Djibouti example, African nations can leverage strategic assets to improve their bargaining positions in the context of great power competition. These areas include natural resources, available labor force, and the consumer market. For example, China’s investment in Africa’s mining sector is a direct competitor to Russian and Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI) in the same industry.

Economic success within the context of great power competition depends on strong governance capable of managing competitive offers from great powers. African states must develop institutional strength capable of managing great power competition to capitalize on this model. Weak institutions present a challenge for many African countries, as institutional fragility allows corruption to flourish. However, there are examples of success—such as Botswana, Rwanda, and Seychelles, which are among the top governance performers in sub-Saharan Africa—demonstrating progress and simultaneous strong economic growth. These three countries have established a relatively sound foundation for governance through strong political will, commitment, and societal consensus. Botswana developed a robust policy framework to manage its wealth from mining resources. Rwanda rebuilt itself from a devastating conflict by adopting more advanced institutional models. Seychelles, a small island state, responded decisively to its 2008 debt crisis by embarking on a comprehensive program of economic and institutional reforms.⁷⁵Arina Viseth, “Three Strong Governance Performers in Sub-Saharan Africa: Achievements and Way Forward,” in Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa (International Monetary Fund, 2022). All three countries have legally criminalized corruption.⁷⁶Global Integrity, “Africa Integrity Indicators – Project Summary & Methodology Aii8,”  https://www.globalintegrity.org/resource/aii8methodology/.

CONCLUSION

The continent of Africa faces a new struggle. While new states—China, Russia, and Gulf States—vie for influence, former colonial powers remain present. Other international states, such as India, seek to secure a foothold. As long as an underlying emphasis on gaining dominance in global politics exists between Russia, China, and the US, great power competition introduces opportunities and challenges for African states.

The African response to this rivalry is complicated; it includes chances to gain access to resources and leverage, but it also raises concerns about sovereignty, debt dependency, and security risks. Moreover, while some African nations may see this rivalry as an opportunity for enhanced development and economic partnerships, others view it as a continuation of colonial-era power dynamics, potentially leading to increased instability and exploitation. The overall impact of great power influence in Africa depends on how African countries navigate these interactions, prioritize their own interests, and seek sustainable development rather than falling prey to external pressures.

African countries should continuously employ diverse responses and strategies to navigate great power competition, leveraging regional organizations, diplomatic engagements, and economic partnerships to advance their own development agendas and safeguard their interests. Pursuing autonomy for Africans should not be merely about avoiding alignment with great-power interests, but about strategically leveraging relationships to maximize benefits and minimize risks. Increased agency in the African state’s approach to FDI will allow for diversified and resilient international engagements, enabling African states to optimize complex global competition to their benefit.

ENDNOTES

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Buğra, SARI. “Africa: A Constant Battlefield of Great Power Rivalry.”

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler

Fakültesi Dergisi 22, no. 1: 74-97.

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Prunier, Gérard. “Gulf Countries and Turkey Pitch against Each Other… In Africa.” Orient XXI. 2018. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/gulf-countries-and-turkey-pitch-against-each-other-in-africa,2772.

Soulé, Folashadé. “Zero-Sum? Benefitting from Great Power Rivalry in Africa.” African Policy Research Institute. 2021. https://afripoli.org/zero-sum-benefitting-from-great-power-rivalry-in-africa

“The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa.” International Crisis Group. 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates-horn-africa/b065-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa

Governance and Political Economy Policy LAB (GPE-LAB)

About the ACSTRAP Governance and Political Economy Policy Lab

The Governance and Political Economy Policy Lab was established to identify and promote Africa’s greatest trading and economic opportunities.

We are currently working to establish Africa’s first comprehensive database on the financial sector.

About the Authors/Lab Contributors

Apungwa Cornelius Ntabe: Lab Director, Governance and Political Economy Policy Lab

Apungwa is a Cameroonian who holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and a master’s degree in international relations from the International Relations Institute of Cameroon and is currently a PhD student at the University of Buea. He is interested in the political and economic issues of the African continent and has addressed them in writing, proposing different policies to policymakers.

Isaac Clemons: Research Associate, African Political Economy Policy Lab

Isaac is a Washington, D.C.- based graduate student who has studied African political economy for six years. He holds bachelor’s degrees in economics, international studies, and French. He currently studies at Johns Hopkins University. His research primarily focuses on international finance and monetary relations on the continent of Africa.

Nicholas H. Johnson: Researcher, African Political Economy Lab

Nicholas is based in the U.S. and holds a Bachelor of International Studies & Human Communications Studies and a master’s in Global Studies and International Relations from Northeastern University, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He works as a restorative justice and antiracism facilitator and researcher. He is very interested in political, social, economic, and ecological issues in Africa and the African diaspora, and how communities can develop their own solutions to systemic conflicts.

About the Africa Center for Strategy and Policy (ACSTRAP)

ACSTRAP Policy & Strategy reports are published by The Africa Center for Strategy and Policy (ACSTRAP). ASCSTRAP is the first policy think tank to adopt a genuinely African-solution-centered and data-driven approach to African policy and strategy. We are a non-partisan think tank focusing on ANALYZES, EVALUATIONS & DEVELOPMENT of policy and Strategy in view of African governments, peoples, and stakeholders.

The Africa Center for Strategy and Policy takes no institutional positions on strategy and policy issues and has no affiliation with any government. All opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in its publications and other platforms are the sole responsibility of the author(s).

Copyright © by The Africa Center for Strategy and Policy

All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by electronic or mechanical means now known or to be invented, including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.

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METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a qualitative research design grounded in two primary analytical methods: (1) a comprehensive literature review and (2) systematic document and policy analysis. These methods are well-suited for examining the complex political-economic implications of renewed global superpower rivalries for African countries and regional institutions, facilitating an in-depth understanding of the existing knowledge base, policy positions, and institutional responses across the continent.

The research began with a thorough systematic review of relevant academic and policy literature. This included scholarly sources such as books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and historical analyses, as well as grey literature like policy briefs and reports from reputable international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and specialized African research institutions.

The scope of the literature encompassed studies on geopolitics, international political economy, Africa’s external relations, and contemporary global power competition, with a focus on engagement by powers such as China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, India, and various Gulf states.

The thorough literature review thus provided the conceptual and empirical foundation for the in-depth analysis of specific policies and institutional responses.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Governance and Political Economy Policy Lab extends its sincere thanks to Dr. Robin Hardy for her constructive feedback and guidance throughout the drafting and reviewing of this report. The Lab also gratefully acknowledges the editorial team, especially the Chief Editor, Mr. Pandit Mami, for their assistance.

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