Protection of Civilians After UNAMID? Rising Violence Amid the Mission’s Looming Exit

Andrew Karl, Research Fellow, Security & Intelligence Policy Lab
akarl@africacfsp.org

Sudan’s Darfur states have seen a renewed escalation of intercommunal violence in the months of May-July 2020, representing the conflict’s deadliest three-month period since June 2017. While this intensification of hostilities reflects a pattern of violence observed in recent years, the looming departure of the UNAMID peacekeeping mission has heightened concerns over the ongoing state of insecurity and Protection of Civilian needs in western Sudan.

Rising Violence Amid the Mission’s Looming Exit

In recent months, the Darfur region of western Sudan has seen growing civil unrest and a renewed escalation of intercommunal violence. Tens of thousands of protesters from across Sudan took to the streets during the month of July to voice grievances over chronic insecurity, a thwarted political transition, and rising inflation.¹ Meanwhile, frequent episodes of violence underscore the insecurity still felt within Darfur. Officials declared a state of emergency in North Darfur on July 13 after an Arab militia, reported to be at least 100 strong, attacked villagers at the Fata Bornu IDP camp.² Later on July 25, hundreds of unidentified Arab militia members launched an assault on the town of Masteri that left 61 dead and 88 wounded, in addition to several villages razed and markets looted.³ In response to the growing insecurity in the region, more than 2,500 people have fled into neighboring Chad, while UN estimates suggest the most recent wave of violence has impacted an additional 20,000 people living in Western Darfur.⁴ Further, incidences of rape and sexual violence have seen a 50% increase in parts of Darfur according to reports from The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa.⁵

Amid the ongoing escalation of violence and heightened insecurity, the draw-down and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) looms large. In June, the Security Council voted unanimously to move forward with plans to close the mission and to replace it with a civilian-based political mission to assist with Sudan’s democratic transition.⁶ Operating under a Chapter VI mandate, the new mission, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), can support the maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace, but is not authorized to use force for the prevention of resurgent violence.⁷ Without a Chapter VII peacekeeping mandate for protection of civilians, many fear the mission’s exit will only exacerbate the current state of insecurity in the region. In May, nearly one hundred civil society leaders, human rights organizations, and rebel groups alike voiced opposition to UNAMID’s departure, pointing to the ongoing violence against civilians as evidence of the continued need for uniformed peacekeepers.⁸

Rising Violence

During the month of July 2020, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) identified 217 fatalities in Sudan resulting from political violence, making it the deadliest month in more than two years of low-level armed conflict.⁹ Similarly, the 451 fatalities observed in the months of May-July represent the most violent three-month period since June 2017.¹⁰ Following the attack on the Fata Borno IDP camp, a statement from UNAMID attributed the cycle of violence in Darfur to the farming season, noting that the peacekeeping mission had “witnessed this occurrence in the past.”¹¹ Indeed, corresponding with the June-July planting season for millet and sorghum, the months of May-July have been marked by a sharp escalation of violence in recent years¹². Since 2017, these months have repeatedly seen the worst violence of the year in Sudan, while August and September were marked by sharp declines in violence.¹³

The ongoing escalation of violence in Darfur follows, in part, from unresolved land disputes, where displaced farmers have attempted to return to their previous land but are often met with violence by the Arab pastoralists who have since settled on the land. As UNAMID’s draw-down and impending exit have led to a reduction in humanitarian aid, people are leaving IDP camps in greater numbers to return to their farms or to seek out alternate livelihoods. Additionally, movement restrictions imposed due to Covid-19 have reduced opportunities for community engagement and patrols, potentially undermining the impact of the peacekeeping mission.¹⁴ Whether the latest escalation of violence will soon subside, following the pattern of recent years, remains to be seen. Clearer is the ongoing need for protection of civilian measures.

UNAMID & UNITAMS

UNAMID’s closure has been on the Security Council agenda since 2017. Originally slated to close in 2019, the peacekeeping mission’s mandate was extended to October 2020 to support the political transition in Khartoum, and then extended again to December 2020 after coronavirus travel restrictions and a suspension of peacekeeping troop rotations delayed UNAMID’s exit.¹⁵ Now into the fourth year of preparations for the mission’s departure, the process has gained a momentum that is likely to conclude with the mission’s complete exit by the year’s end or, at the latest, within the first months of 2021. While broad support has been offered for a special political mission to succeed UNAMID, there currently appears to be insufficient political will for a continued uniformed presence in Sudan.¹⁶ Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock outlined Sudanese priorities for a follow-up mission in two letters to the UN Secretary General in January and March 2020. In the first letter, Hamdock made explicit requests for protection of civilians, police advisors, and human rights monitoring carried out under a Chapter VI PSO mandate; in the second letter – which was the product of consultations with military counterparts on the Sovereign Council and the Council of Ministers – these appeals were conspicuously absent.¹⁷ Likewise, in a March 2020 report, the UN and AU recommended against the continued presence of uniformed contingents, instead favoring an enhanced role for military and police advisors.¹⁸

Scheduled to begin operations by January 2021, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) is authorized to “to assist, advise and support” Government of Sudan-led protection efforts.¹⁹ Under that authority, UNITAMS can fulfill several critical civilian protection roles, including conflict monitoring and crisis mediation. A less-militarized approach to protection of civilians, these roles reflect the growing consensus around the importance of field-based dialogue and engagement, as well as an understanding that UNAMID’s protection “doesn’t come from the troops’ weapons (which they rarely use) but rather from their standing as the eyes and ears of the international community.”²⁰

Security Sector Abuses

Without the continued presence of uniformed peacekeepers, the transitional government in Khartoum will need to adopt the primary responsibility for addressing the chronic insecurity in Sudan’s Darfur states. However, the relationship between the communities of Darfur and Sudan’s police and security forces is marked by severe distrust following decades of abuse. Following the assaults on the Fata Borno IDP camp, locals claim that security forces stood aside allowing the attack to occur. Internal UN reports explicitly note the troops’ failure to intervene.²¹ Likewise, locals accused high-ranking Rapid Support Forces (RSF) officers of being complicit in the attacks on Masteri in late July.²² Created by former President al-Bashir in response to rebel movements in Darfur, the RSF is the Sudanese government’s main paramilitary group, composed largely of the former “Janjaweed” militia that had carried out al-Bashir’s decades-long campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.²³ Since its establishment, RSF forces have been linked to multiple episodes of extrajudicial violence, including a bloody crackdown on a peaceful sit-in, which killed more than 100 protesters in June 2019.²⁴ Human rights groups allege that the RSF has continued to engage in war crimes and other serious human rights violations, documenting evidence that the RSF damaged or destroyed at least 45 villages in central Darfur between July 2018 and 2019, in addition to other abuses including: extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, systematic looting, and forced displacement.²⁵ As UNAMID has scaled down its presence in Darfur, the RSF moved to occupy the mission’s recently vacated outposts and bases.²⁶

Recommendations:

In response to the chronic insecurity and ongoing escalation of violence in Darfur, Prime Minister Hamdock and the Sovereignty Council of Sudan should take the following actions:

Reassess the state of insecurity and protection of civilians needs in Darfur at the close of UNAMID’s March-July reporting period. If the current escalation of violence continues or critically worsens, Prime Minister Hamdock should be prepared to request an extension to the current mandate to allow for a more gradual withdrawal by the mission, as circumstances warrant. A short, clearly defined extension of the UNAMID’s mandate could carry an additional benefit of enabling a smoother transition between the two missions.
Take ownership of Protection of Civilians activities through a rigorous commitment to conflict prevention and mitigation, promotion of intercommunal dialogue and engagement, peacebuilding, and reconciliation, as well as efforts to foster a protective environment such as measures to strengthen rule-of-law and human rights.
Pursue sweeping security-sector reforms to fundamentally reorient the culture and operational capacities of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Sudanese Police Force, and paramilitary groups like the RSF. Take full advantage of the UNITAMS advisory and capacity building and make good on Prime Minister Hamdock’s promise to build a new army.²⁷

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