An Emerging Landscape of Terror in Mozambique: Implications for the Southern African Development Community

Dr. John Bosco Nizeimana, Research Fellow, Leadership & Governance Policy Lab
bnizeimana@africacfsp.org

This article analyses the current crisis in Mozambique and its implications for the SADC region. Since 2017, northern Mozambique has been experiencing terror campaigns led by ‘Ansar al-Sunna’, an Islamist armed group. Large numbers of civilians have been killed and displaced, and the crisis threatens to set the region ablaze. Despite the government’s attempts to defeat the extremists, the crisis continues to escalate. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) maintains “a wait and see approach,” which is counterproductive to conflict resolution. The international community should intervene immediately to prevent further escalation.

Background

The African continent has been experiencing major terrorist attacks in recent years, and counterterrorism initiatives put forth by the African Union (AU) have largely failed.¹ Terrorist groups on the continent are growing, while established groups are developing more sophisticated networks. Presently, Al-Shabab is not only a danger to Somalia, but to East Africa and the Horn of Africa as well. Furthermore, the Nigeria-based Boko Haram has stretched its operations beyond Nigeria to terrorize communities in Cameroon and Chad.²

Recently, Mozambique has found itself battling terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado; a northern oil-rich province which borders Tanzania. The terror campaign has been spearheaded by the self-proclaimed Islamist militant group known as Ansar al-Sunna (meaning “the followers of Sunna”—that is of Prophet Muhammad’s teachings and actions).³

Although the country has substantial experience in armed conflicts, due to the 1976-1992 civil wars, it nonetheless faces extraordinary challenges in combating this insurgency. In response to attacks by the Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado in November 2017, the Mozambican government launched military operations. Since then, approximately 2500 have died and 570,000 civilians have been displaced, according to International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC).⁴ War crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed on the part of Ansar al- Sunna.⁵This has sent a wave of alarm and panic throughout the region and failing to implement strong preventative measures could result in further instability. The government has utilized heavy weaponry to defeat the insurgents. However, despite these efforts, Mozambican government asked for outside intervention from neighbouring members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other parts of the world while preserving its sovereignty.⁶

Established on August 17, 1992, SADC is a regionally integrated group of 15 member states in Southern Africa, including countries which share a border with Mozambique (South Africa, Eswatini, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania). Its main goals are to achieve peace and stability, economic growth, enhanced standards of living, and heightened levels of trade among its member states.⁷ Thus far, SADC has been reluctant to intervene and aid member states experiencing terrorist insurgencies.

The Root Causes of Terrorist Attacks

The root causes of terror campaigns in Mozambique are resource distribution inequalities and the widespread social, economic, and political marginalization of people in the northern region of the country. Cabo Delgado is a mineral-rich region, thereby being a catalyst for development that can improve the livelihoods of the local population.

According to Yussuf Adam, a professor at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, economic and social grievances are central to the radicalization. “These are people who find themselves marginalized, who do not receive the benefits they should receive.”⁸ The marginalization of the Muslim community plays a major role in the current crisis. Years of government neglect, poverty, and increasing unemployment levels among the youth are key drivers of militia recruitment.⁹ Therefore, the problem is not religious at its core, but is driven by vulnerability and economic precarity among Mozambican youth.

Government Response

The Mozambican government’s response thus far has been to set up regional military barracks and increase the presence of security forces in Cabo Delgado. The deployment of a substantial number of troops, which lack essential military combat gear, did not cease the terrorist attacks.¹⁰ Subsequently, operations within the province have intensified and even spread into neighbouring Tanzania, killing civilians. For instance, reports allege that approximately 300 armed extremists crossed into Tanzania on October 14, 2020, and killed at least 22 civilians, including three Tanzanian security forces personnel. The next day, Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for carrying out the attacks.¹¹ This illustrates that ISIS is collaborating with Ansar al-Sunna and they are willing to extend the terror campaign in Mozambique to other countries in the region. These actions have resulted in panic in other SADC countries. The government also requested military support from Portugal to train their military on how to fight the terrorist insurgency: “What we are going to do is to support Mozambican authorities so that they can exercise their sovereignty,” said the Portuguese Defence Minister Joao Gomes Cravinho during his trip to Mozambique on May 25, 2021.¹²

The Magnitude of the Crisis and Threats to Civilian Populations

More than 250,000 people have fled the region for neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South Africa.¹³ In addition, the United Nations (UN) has expressed concerns, citing that since 2017 the conflict has forced 250,000-300,000 residents to seek refuge in Mozambique and neighbouring countries, and more than 2,000 people have lost their lives.¹⁴

In September 2020, Ansar al-Sunna captured Mocimboa da Praia, a port town within Cabo Delgado, marking a significant gain for the group. Since the outbreak of terrorist attacks in the northern region of Cabo Delgado and Mozambique, the magnitude of the crisis has significantly escalated.¹⁵ For instance, the level of violence increased by 300% towards the end of 2020 as compared to the first months of 2019. About 285 people were killed in attacks, which brought the total death toll to 1000 as of early 2020. War crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed with impunity, and civilian populations in Cabo Delgado struggle with terror daily.¹⁶ For example, during the first week of November 2020, it was reported that Ansar al-Sunna killed more than 50 people in the Cabo Delgado region. As it currently stands, Mozambique is failing to contain the terrorist attacks in the north. For the month of March to April 2021, about 16, 000 civilians have fled the from Palma, a town in Cabo Delgado, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report of April 9, 2021.¹⁷

According to Tibor Nagy, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the rise of the insurgency in Mozambique is comparable to Boko Haram. He said, “Boko Haram was just a small movement, and because of the way the Nigerian government initially responded to it, it grew into a very serious threat, not just to northeast Nigeria but to surrounding countries.”¹⁸ His analysis explains how the crisis in Mozambique poses a danger to civilians and all southern African nations. It also reveals the fact that the state of the insurgency is broader than previously thought.

According to Bernardino Rafael, the General Commander of Police in Mozambique; “the militants had attacked several villages in the districts of Miudumbe and Macomia, killing civilians, abducting women, and children, and burning down homes in the province.” He went on to say “they burned houses then went after the population who had fled to the woods and started with their macabre actions.¹⁹” On November 10, 2020, Zimbabwean President, Emmerson D. Mnangagwa, expressed deep concern for the murder of civilians on his social media, “I am deeply shocked by recent reports of terrorist activity in Mozambique.” He continued, “These acts of barbarity must be stamped out wherever they are found. Zimbabwe is ready to assist in any way we can. The security of our region is paramount in the protection of our people.” For all these reasons, intervention by the international community, and SADC, is critical for de-escalation in the region, as this could prevent Mozambique from becoming a regional harbour of terrorism.

Early Prevention

SADC countries are hesitant to intervene in the Mozambican crisis for fear of retaliation by Ansar al-Sunna. Although President Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique called for regional support from SADC, such intervention remains unlikely.²⁰ SADC countries, despite their concerns over the escalating situation in Mozambique, have appeared apathetic, as no country is willing to take a leading role in the fight against insurgency in Mozambique. As of April 2021, a meeting of heads of states and military leaders produced no concrete measures to respond to the crisis in Cabo Delgado. They only recommended the deployment of missions to assess the situation and make a recommendation for their next sitting, which is not effective given the nature of the crisis and ongoing civilians sufferings in Northern Mozambique.²¹

SADC members gathered on August 17, 2020, but the meetings concluded without resolution for the crisis in Mozambique.²² This indecisiveness to the regional principle of SADC’s collective defence and security raises questions over whether SADC is ready to face terrorist attacks as complex and devastating as the one at hand. In the past, certain SADC countries have been involved in other conflicts, such as the war in Angola during the 1990s, and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, 2000, and 2013.²³However, none of these conflicts had a religious component (as the current one in Mozambique does), and SADC as an organization has never involved itself in regional conflicts.

The Prospects of a SADC Intervention in Cabo Delgado

The complex nature of terrorism and security challenges inhibit Africa’s capacity to adopt effective counterterrorism strategies. Through SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact, adopted in 2003, intervention in intrastate conflict is a device that could be utilized in Mozambique’s case. However, this is contingent on all SADC countries’ approval. The pact was extended to the protocol of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of 2001. It is stipulated in Article 6, (1) that an attack on one-member country is a collective threat requiring a swift collective response. This includes an insurgency within a given country, and it is worth noting that these insurgencies are linked to external terrorist networks. Collective actions are measures agreed to by consensus of SADC member states and recommended at the summit. Each country must be involved in enforcing collective action as it deems necessary (Article 3). In addition, Article 6 (4) stipulates that all measures and decisions must be reported to the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).²⁴ In the context of Mozambique, the prospects of collective intervention by SADC remains highly unlikely. Despite Article 6 (1) providing a legal framework for collective action against an armed attack, SADC member countries remain apprehensive. This demonstrates that SADC is not prepared to swiftly respond to crises like the one in Mozambique.

Failing to collectively respond to armed conflicts in a timely manner is not new to SADC. In 1998, SADC member states disagreed on military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While South Africa, Malawi and Zambia preferred diplomatic negotiations, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola emphasized aiding the Kabila government to thwart rebel attacks via military force. The late President Mugabe expressed these divisions by arguing that, “No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict, those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out but let them be silent about those who want to help.²⁵” Therefore, the Mozambican government should not expect collective support from all SADC member states.

Towards the end of 2019, the government of Mozambique started to solicit military aid from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, instead of SADC-led operations.²⁶ This suggests a lack of confidence in SADC as an organization, even if the Mozambican government does have confidence in specific SADC countries. Despite a legal framework, the likelihood of SADC intervention is mere speculation, even with consent from the Mozambican government.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Recommendations

Given the dire humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado, it is recommended that Mozambique and countries across Africa address the issues of governance that enable disparities across stratified social classes. In particular, equitable resource distribution will prevent inequities among marginalized and oppressed groups. Therefore, local governments, sub-regional groups (like SADC), and regional organisations (AU) must invest in more resources and develop projects that engender political participation, especially among youth and disadvantaged groups. This is essential for sustainable development and peace.

Secondly, it is imperative that the AU coordinate with SADC on how to assist Mozambique. Ansar Al-Sunna’s crimes against humanity include assassinations, beheadings, beatings, and other war crimes. It is the government’s responsibility to protect its people from such danger and despair. Further, the Mozambican government must openly invite SADC and the AU to collaborate and explore solutions. It must not deal with the crisis alone, as the problem has the potential to threaten the security of the region at large.

SADC and the AU should immediately address the ongoing crisis in Cabo Delgado. Crimes against humanity are also occurring in this province. Through the AU Peace and Security Council, SADC can employ the AU Constitutive Act, which aims to maintain peace and security by supporting peace operations in domestic affairs. Article 4(h) states:

“The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.²⁷”

There is an urgent need for substantive cooperation by SADC countries to establish measures that mitigate the crisis in Mozambique. SADC countries should forge a collective strategy that will prevent perpetual terrorist insurgencies and will build capacity for future coalitions and initiatives.

Conclusion

Since 2017, the province of Cabo Delgado has been home to terror campaigns led by Ansar al-Sunna, an Islamist armed group. The crisis between government forces and Ansar Al-Sunna continue to cause massive civilian suffering and still threatens to destabilize the entire SADC region if no significant efforts are put in place to halt the crisis.

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