Caroline Ognibene, Research Fellow, Resource, Environment, and Energy Policy Lab
cognibene@africacfsp.org

The ongoing presence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia exacerbates regional instability and poses a distinctive threat to women. After providing historic context to Al-Shabaab’s rise, this report identifies foreign intervention in Somali resource management as a causal factor behind the group’s continued influence.

This report ultimately suggests three local-level policies that would reduce vulnerability to both Al-Shabaab and foreign actors: seaweed farming, regenerative agriculture, and supportive day centers for women victims.

This report details the environmental conditions and resource issues that promulgate the presence of Al-Shabaab. Policy reactions to urgent problems run the risk of overlooking the holistic conditions behind immediate threats. Part 1 of this report therefore establishes a brief historical and economic contextual background of Somalia in order to demonstrate that Al-Shabaab cannot be treated on the surface level alone. Part 2 explains the ways in which Al-Shabaab particularly harms women, why women are perceived to be valuable to the group, and how some women are recruited and abused. The persistence of Al-Shabaab is an enormously complex phenomenon, and thus cannot be reduced to one cause or another. This report focuses on two resource-based issues that factor into the power and de facto legitimacy of Al-Shabaab. Part 3 discusses maritime resources, and Part 4 focuses on agrarian policy.

In Part 5, this report presents a few policy recommendations that indirectly address women’s health through resource management. While terrorism is a militarized threat, counterterrorism need not be an entirely militarized project, and recognition of the broader picture helps identify areas where local resource policy can address multifaceted security issues. The natural, economic, and global factors that bolster Al-Shabaab’s power cannot be ignored; if extreme poverty, acute food insecurity, and displacement are not addressed, continued instability will risk further violence and disproportionate harm to women. To conclude, Part 6 provides an overview of some of the international impediments to systemic counterterrorism through resource management.

Part 1: A Contextual Introduction to Al-Shabaab

The significant attention to Somalia’s status as a ‘failed state’, and its ongoing internal conflicts, has unfortunately come to obfuscate Somalia’s past before the civil war. Responding to Al-Shabaab attacks and the endemic food insecurity is an urgent task, but in planning long-term sustainability, it is important to bear in mind historical context.

Due to its strategic geographic location between mainland Africa and Asia, as well as its significant coastline, Somalia has always been considered a prime territory. In 1884, Somalia was divided amongst the colonial powers of Britain, Italy, and France, with the mostly Somali region of Ogaden taken by the Ethiopian empire. In 1960, the British and Italian regions voted in favor of independence and united to become the state of Somalia.¹Hamza Ashrif, director. “Somalia: The Forgotten Story.” Al Jazeera, November 2016. https://www.aljazeera.com/program/al-jazeera-world/2016/11/2/somalia-the-forgotten-story/. From 1960 to 1969, Somalia experienced approximately a decade of functioning democracy, and was nicknamed ‘The Switzerland of Africa.’²Ibid. Somalia’s first elected president, Adam Abdullah Osman, was in office from 1960-1967, before handing power to the second elected president, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who was assassinated two years later in 1969. The presidency was then briefly held by Speaker of the Somali Parliament, Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein, but the October 1969 military takeover led by General Siad Barre quickly ended the streak of electoral democracy. Barre’s regime initially held the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and built-up public infrastructure, cooperative farming, and national literacy; later in his regime, Barre silenced political opposition and marginalized many Somali clans.³Ibid.[/mfn[ Barre’s eventual downfall began with a failed attempt to retake the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, which cost Somalia the support of the Soviet Union, and left the Somali population broadly disheartened and dissatisfied.³Ibid. Barre was eventually overthrown in 1991, whereupon General Mohamed Ali Farah Aidid and self-declared President Ali Mahdi Muhammad, who had the support of the U.S., made conflicting claims to power.⁴Lee Wengraf. Extracting Profit: Imperialism, Neoliberalism, and the New Scramble for Africa (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2018), 208. The subsequent civil war created a power vacuum, disintegrated central government, and gave rise to competing factions.

This period of Somali history is marked by heavy interference from foreign forces. The role of foreign involvement in Somalia is a topic beyond the scope of this report, but it is essential to note that these interferences were not necessarily welcome. Foreign aid has devastated local economies, as food aid programs systematically weakened indigenous agribusiness and trade while establishing business-warlord alliances.⁵Aisha Ahman. “Agenda for peace or budget for war? Evaluating the economic impact of international intervention in Somalia.” International Journal (Spring 2012): 327. More broadly, global powers, nominally the U.S., have continuously and illegally channeled arms and supplies to whichever leader or faction poses a political advantage, supporting dramatic upheavals and violence in both Somalia and Ethiopia.⁶Ibid, 329.  

From 1980 to 1989, the U.S. funneled approximately $1 billion in aid to Barre’s increasingly violent and oppressive regime, around one-third of which was in the form of arms and munitions.⁷William D. Hartung. “Somalia and the Cycle of Arms Sales.” The Christian Science Monitor, February 22, 1993. https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0222/22181.html Launched by the Carter administration, this support included a quiet arms deal just days before Barre’s invasion of Ethiopia.

Military support continued under the Reagan administration as Barre heightened his repressive politics.⁸Branwen Gruffydd Jones. “The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the ‘Failed State’ Ideology.” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, no. 2 (May 2008): 196-7. Following Barre’s expulsion, Somalia faced external militarized involvement, including Operation Restore Hope, launched by then-President George H. W. Bush, ANISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia), and Ethiopian forces. American forces killed several thousand Somalis, including women and children, and have thus far ignored the allegations of torture and murder on the part of US soldiers that followed the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.⁹Wengraf, Extracting Profit, 209. Somalia has been used as an ideological battleground for imperial global powers, and this external interference has overloaded the region with arms, created power imbalances, and manufactured chronic debt in the global market.¹⁰Ibid, 193.

In efforts to establish order, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was formed in 2004. By 2006, the ICU had successfully decreased crime and eliminated many warlords through strict enforcement of Sharia Law.¹¹Samantha D. Farquhar. “When Overfishing Leads to Terrorism.” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 21, no. 2 (2017): 73. In 2006, the U.S. supported the ‘Warlord Alliance’ to overthrow the ICU, which killed hundreds and displaced thousands.¹²Ahman, “Agenda for peace,” 329. Eventually, the ICU did dissolve, and Al-Shabaab emerged as a militant faction. In the absence of national governance, Al-Shabaab provided basic governmental structures, and in so doing, created a system of taxation to generate a steady stream of funding. By the time of the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Al-Shabaab had aligned interests with Al-Qaeda, identified as a stronghold in the global war against the West, and called for the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Somalia, which would also include portions of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.¹³Farquhar. “Overfishing Leads to Terrorism,” 73-4. As Part 6 will expand upon, the 1880s to present day, colonial forces have manufactured this complex insecurity in Somalia.

Part 2: How Al-Shabaab Threatens Women’s Health and Wellbeing

One of the most significant threats to the health and wellbeing of Somali women is the ongoing presence of Al-Shabaab. In addition to posing a perpetual threat of violent harm, Al-Shabaab affects women in very specific ways. The role of women operating within the organization is difficult to document. Many defectors or wives of members feel unable to talk due to fear of retribution, and Al-Shabaab tactfully uses secrecy and obfuscation techniques to maintain the opaqueness of their operations. There are, however, some defector accounts that provide insight to how women are treated. For example, a survey study conducted by Adam Smith International from mid-2018 to mid-2019 helps shed light on how Al-Shabaab targets, uses, and attracts women.¹⁴Dr. Orly Maya Stern. “The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab.” Adam Smith International (September 2019). A similar study by the Institute for Security Studies focuses on women facing violent extremism in Kenya through case studies, including a detailed interview with a woman who survived nine years at an Al-Shabaab camp.¹⁵Irene Ndung’u, Uyo Salifu, and Romi Sigsworth. “Violent extremism in Kenya: Why women are a priority.” Institute for Security Studies (November 2017). Many other defectors and survivors have provided anonymous interviews, but it remains difficult to know precisely how the group operates. Nonetheless, some impacts on women are clear.

Al-Shabaab is well-known for their tactical use of gender stereotypes. Their official membership is estimated to be between 3,000 and 9,000 full members, but its impact in the region is bolstered by thousands more associated persons, or people involved in the greater invisible network of information and recruitment.¹⁶Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 10, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab This greater network primarily comprises women, who for the most part do not act directly as militants themselves.¹⁷“Women and al-Shabaab’s Insurgency.” International Crisis Group, June 27, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency The ‘Amniyat,’ the intelligence division of Al-Shabaab, informs the base of vital information such as military movements or other government action.¹⁸Stern, “Invisible Women,” 9, 18.] Women members can also support the group as recruiters or act as faces to business operations, as they are generally perceived to be more trustworthy and honest than men.¹⁹Ibid, 18. Interviews with screeners at the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) reveal a similar gender stereotype, with one screener saying “Most of the women are taken as being ‘victims.’ We don’t take them as criminals.”²⁰Ibid, 33. Additionally, despite their firm stance against sex work, Al-Shabaab also purchases information from women sex workers in Nairobi, who are not regarded as threats and are therefore occasionally privy to confidential information.²¹Ibid, 13. The general perception of women as trustworthy, or as victims, incentivizes Al-Shabaab to recruit or abduct more women members, as they can transport both information and weapons more easily.

Literature assessing why women in particular join Al-Shabaab often assumes that only men are genuinely convinced and compelled by the group’s mission, and women are peripheral victims to the fight. Some women do join voluntarily, or provide aid to, Al-Shabaab out of belief in the insurgency, and the generalized category of Somali women ought not be considered as a monolithic victim.²²Chandra Talpade Mohanty. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” On Humanism and the University, 1984. Of course, the criteria for a decision to be considered truly voluntary is not always clear. Social and economic conditions for women throughout Somalia can make Al-Shabaab appear to be a preferable alternative. As one defector is quoted in the Adam Smith International report, “Al-Shabaab survey certain women. One of their considerations is women’s poverty levels. They take women who are desperate.”²³Stern, “Invisible Women.” Another former member reported that “poverty is pushing people into embracing Al-Shabaab […] I joined with Al-Shabaab because I was jobless and needed a job.”²⁴“Al-Shabaab: Inside the ranks of women fighters.” The East African, January 31, 2018.

Al-Shabaab also recruits Kenyan women, who cross the border to join the group. Once there, women often face sexual abuse, exploitation, and forced marriage.²⁵Stern, “Invisible Women,” 13. Many women are promised jobs, compensation, or other forms of support that never materialize, but they find it difficult to defect once they are associated with Al-Shabaab or are known to have been sexually assaulted. Somalia’s penal code addresses sexual violence not as a criminal assault, but rather as a scourge on a woman’s sexual honor, adding to the stigma surrounding assault survivors.²⁶“Somalia.” Minority Rights Group International, May 2018. https://minorityrights.org/country/somalia/ Sexual assault occurs both in Al-Shabaab camps and during counterterrorism raids; a militarized response to a militarized threat often renders women vulnerable to increased abuse and assault.²⁷Ndung’u, Salifu, Sigsworth. “Violent extremism,” 7. Al-Shabaab abductions and recruitment of men often leave women without income, and the constant threat of attack can induce psychological trauma throughout familial and social groups, further harming Somali women in an indirect way.²⁸Stern, “Invisible Women,” 26.

Part 3: Maritime Resources

The prevalence of terrorism in Somalia is additionally connected to patterns of piracy and foreign overfishing. While piracy in Somalia has gained notoriety and media attention, its fundamental causes have not. Following the collapse of Barre’s regime, Somali environmental regulations were not robustly enforced, leaving Somali waters vulnerable to foreign fishing.²⁹Farquhar. “Overfishing Leads to Terrorism,” 72.] Lack of maritime resource regulation leads to overfishing, particularly as advances in technology allow enormous factory ships to catch indiscriminately and in bulk. Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing (IUU fishing) wreaks havoc on local economies, draining natural resources and undercutting domestic prices.

In 2003, for example, in Somali waters, 337.2 million tons of fish were caught by IUU fishing, compared to 32.4 million tons caught by local fisherman.³⁰Ibid, 72. This enormous financial loss was a catalyst for Somali piracy, which was at least initially considered a form of self-defense from foreign fishers.³¹Ibid, 75. In addition to depleting resources, foreign ships have reportedly also pushed Somali boats off their own waters using force or the threat of force.³²Ashrif, “The Forgotten Story.” IUU fishing initiated unwarranted competition over Somalia’s rich maritime resources and what would become an internationally notorious system of crime.

Hassan Mohamed Roble, a member of the HIBO Fishery Cooperative Network, explains that the subsequent international attention on Somali piracy worsened the problem, “the world began attacking with military boats under the guise of fighting Somali piracy […] now those military boats are here protecting the illegal fishing boats.”³³Ibid Geography Professor Abdi Samatar also made clear that “the costliest pirates are not the Somalis who hijack the ships, they are the Italians, the Spaniards, the Belgians [and] everyone else looting the Somali waters.”³⁴Ibid This analysis does not serve to justify all the behavior of Somali pirates, but it does explain it, and reveals the obscured culpability of the international community.

Although Western media has often conflated piracy with terrorism, Al-Shabaab has no direct link to maritime crime.³⁵Currun Singh and Arjun Singh Bedi. “War on Piracy: The conflation of Somali piracy with terrorism in discourse, tactic, and law.” Security Dialogue. (October 2016): 447. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26294238 It is important to stress their distinction; as piracy off the horn of Africa reached its height in the early 2000s, media coverage often unduly associated piracy with Al-Qaeda and broader jihadist terrorism.³⁶Ibid, p. 448. The true interrelationship between maritime crime and extremist groups is far more nuanced. However, there is a connection in their prevalence; correlating data shows that Al-Shabaab has previously depended on pirate actors for funding.³⁷Farquhar, “Overfishing,” 76. The recent decrease in Somali piracy may seem like a plainly positive improvement, but with the defense of neither piracy nor robust maritime protection laws, Somali waters remain vulnerable to foreign IUU fishing. This vulnerability risks a dangerous repetitive cycle. Even if Somali piracy remains infrequent, loss of fishing income and resources harms the Somali fishing industry and local economy. Somali fishermen are increasingly hesitant to fish in certain areas, as foreign vessels can be dangerous and can also easily undercut local prices and drive Somalis out of business.³⁸Ashrif, “The Forgotten Story.” Ahmed Mohamed Ali, a fisherman who quit his job after a large foreign vessel nearly killed him, noted that “if the illegal fishing doesn’t stop, people will look for alternatives – like piracy, joining Al-Shabaab, becoming criminals, or migrating.”³⁹Jessica Hatcher. “Illegal overfishing and the return of Somalia’s pirates.” Al Jazeera, October 6, 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/10/6/illegal-overfishing-and-the-return-of-somalias-pirates Any economic harms that result from loss of resources or lack of control over resources manufactures a state of poverty and food insecurity upon which Al-Shabaab capitalizes.

Part 4: Agrarian Resources

Much like maritime resources, agrarian resources can either heighten or reduce the impact of Al-Shabaab. Agricultural practices in Somalia have changed dramatically over the past few decades. While Western media often frames historic Somali tribalism as a root cause of violence, the pre-colonial traditional kinship systems had “an economic counterpart [of] nomadism and peasant agriculture. All households had access to productive resources. The system was egalitarian and lacked institutionalized forms of state power.”⁴⁰Abdi Ismail Samatar. “Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia.” Economic Geography. (January 1993): 35. https://doi.org/10.2307/143888 This agricultural system was subverted by colonial and postcolonial state systems.

Food policy is causally related to conflict. Until the late 1970s, Somalia was food self-sufficient.⁴¹Wengraf, Extracting Profit, 207. Eventually, global financial policies enforced neoliberal privatization through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.⁴²Ibid, 207. In 1981, Somalia adopted its first formal Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), giving Barre’s government access to foreign currency loans.⁴³Ibid, 32. SAPs involve the implementation of two main mechanisms that facilitate debt repayment: the redirection of all existing cash flows towards repayment, and the deregulation of economies, such that foreign actors can capitalize on both austerity and liberalization.⁴⁴Jason Hickel. The Divide: Global Inequality from Conquest to Free Markets. (New York City: Random House, 2017), 144-5. For example, the banana industry in Somalia was subject to liberal reform; in 1982, the Italian investment firm De Nadai helped launch Somalfruit, which quickly implemented production policies aimed at maximum production at minimal cost.⁴⁵Samatar. “Structural Adjustment,” 32, 35. Under the auspices of ‘development,’ foreign investors can increase profit margins by lessening the costs of production, which namely means worsening standards of labor. Despite this increase in industrial efficiency, banana production, and profit margins, “liberal reform in the banana sector did not lead to development [as] nearly 75 percent of earnings from exports were realized by overseas interests, depriving Somalia of an important source of capital for reinvestment.”⁴⁶Ibid, 40. Women and girls suffered the most under these labor conditions, as they were the primary workers throughout the stages of production.⁴⁷Ibid, 35-7. Global liberalization forced Somali farmers to compete with heavily subsidized U.S. products, and as austerity measures weakened the Somali shilling, Somalia became increasingly dependent on international imports.⁴⁸Michel Chossudovsky. “The IMF’s role in the creation of famines in Somalia.” Third World Resurgence, No. 251/252 (Summer 2011): 23-24. Barre’s failure to implement robust labor protections, in addition to the significant damage caused by SAPs, laid the groundwork for Al-Shabaab’s rise to power. People, particularly women, who have been denied reliable income for years are susceptible to Al-Shabaab’s messaging and recruitment.

The striking amount of famine and malnutrition across Somalia may mean global food aid is necessary as a stop-gap solution. However, the effects of this aid are not all positive. Food aid throughout the U.S. and United Nations interventions further devastated community economies, particularly during the harvest season, when locally grown food was devalued by the presence of foreign imports.⁴⁹Ahman, “Agenda for peace,” 326. USAID produce is often not actually fit for consumption, which is counterproductive both in the practical sense and because it is insulting to recipients.⁵⁰Ashrif, “The Forgotten Story.” More recent food aid can also harm the livelihoods of local farmers. Mahmoud Musa, a farmer interviewed by Al Jazeera, explained:

“I was surprised by the cars full of vegetables and tomatoes coming from Ethiopia. This is the cause of my poverty. It crashed the price and forced me to throw away everything I’d grown. If I’d sold them at the market, no one would have bought them. They bought the Ethiopian vegetables instead. The foreign markets kill the domestic market. The state has no economy. This is reality and this is our lives.”⁵¹Ibid.

Because a considerable number of Somalis rely directly on agriculture, damages to the economy can quickly have dramatic effects. As of October 2020, 2.6 million Somalis are formally considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).⁵²Somalia Country Brief.” World Food Program, October 2020. https://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia One of the ongoing causes of displacement is loss of livelihood for those who depend on agriculture for sustenance and/or income. The Somalia Water and Land Information Management Project (SWALIM) has found that soil erosion and desertification are the principal causes of land degradation.⁵³“Land Degradation in Somalia.” Somalia Water and Land Information Management, FAO. https://www.faoswalim.org/land/land-degradation Dry soil renders farms more vulnerable to water and wind erosion, and a lack of soil nutrients reduces crop output. As a result, many Somalis are forced to move away from their homes, a phenomenon well recognized and exploited by Al-Shabaab.⁵⁴Laura Heaton. “Somalia’s Climate for Conflict: How Drought Brings War to Somalia.” The Groundtruth Project (April 2017). https://thegroundtruthproject.org/somalia-conflict-climate-change/ Al-Shabaab recruiters offer stability, land, and food security to facilitate a constellation of dependency that includes their members and their members’ families.

Part 5: Review and Policy Recommendations

This report has focused on the ways in which environmental factors promulgate the ability of A-Shabaab to remain a robust and insidious threat to the region and to women in particular. The consistent pattern behind Al-Shabaab’s recruitment techniques is the utilization of the presence of extreme poverty and insecurity. Projects run by nonprofit organizations such as Mercy Corps already work in Somalia to reduce governmental, economic, and social instability.⁵⁵Mercy Corps, “Somalia.” https://www.mercycorps.org/where-we-work/somalia However, additional local strategies to reduce poverty, insecurity, and displacement can be taken without the need for foreign intervention. This report presents three policy suggestions:

1. Foreign fishing vessels seem likely to remain a problem until the international community takes more substantive steps to regulate and prevent IUU fishing. On the local level, a viable option to replace lost income is the development of seaweed farming. Seaweed farming is an environmentally sustainable practice that requires little technology to launch, and can be done immediately off the coast, out of the way of international trawlers. Somalia’s indigenous seaweed species and extensive coastline would serve seaweed cultivation well.⁵⁶Dennis J. McHugh. “Prospects for Seaweed Production in Developing Countries.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2002): section 5.2 Cultivation of seaweed would increase local food security, but could also eventually lead to a profitable export, as the 2020 seaweed market value is estimated to be $16.7 billion.⁵⁷“Seaweed Cultivation Market by Type.” Research and Markets (October 2020). To cut down on operational costs, harvesting should leave portions of the plants to regrow on their own, and seaweed should be dried in the sun immediately after harvesting.

2. Regenerative farming techniques, such as no-till agriculture, crop rotation, and incorporating livestock manure into soil can help minimize desertification.⁵⁸Janet Ranganathan, Richard Waite, Tim Seachinger et al. “Regenerative Agriculture: Good for Soil Health, but Limited Potential to Mitigate Climate Change.” World Resources Institute, (May 2020). https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/05/regenerative-agriculture-climate-change
   Implementation of these practices requires no cost or technology. Agrarian policymakers should also be wary of focusing on profit-based agriculture. USAID Somalia is currently encouraging Somali farmers to grow sesame, a strong drought-resistant crop with potential for international value.⁵⁹Karla Christensen, “Somalia’s Sesame Seed Farmers Prosper.” Agrilinks, September 14, 2020. https://www.agrilinks.org/post/somalias-sesame-seed-farmers-prosper USAID describes the sesame market as a strong opportunity for Somalia as an exported good and hopes the job creation and sales income will help make Somalia more independent. However, though the most prevalent development narrative insists on a transition away from subsistence farming towards export-based production, as seen with the issues caused by Somalfruit, entering the global market while in national developmental phases can cause domestic harm. Cash crops run the risk of increasing unequal exchange, wherein multinational corporations take advantage of cheap land and cheap labor, forcing poorer countries to compete with large, expansive bodies.⁶⁰Hickel, The Divide, 28. Under this system, women labor is often undercompensated.⁶¹Filomina Chioma Steady, “An Investigative Framework for Gender Research in Africa in the New Millenium.” in Africa Gender Studies: A Reader, ed. Oyèrónké Oyêwùmí (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). In order to lessen Al-Shabaab’s de facto legitimacy, Somalis need to have control over their own food security. This year, the IMF and World Bank have begun a debt relief program for Somalia under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which will help normalize Somalia within the international community.⁶²Andrea Shalal. “IMF, World Bank clear Somalia for debt relief, normal ties to world.” Reuters, March 25 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-debt/imf-world-bank-clear-somalia-for-debt-relief-normal-ties-to-world-idUSKBN21D05Q However, to benefit from the HIPC initiative, countries must sign an agreement to follow the liberal policies of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are a virtual reincarnation of the disastrous SAPs. Under PRSPs, Somalia is unlikely to gain sovereignty or genuine independence.⁶³David Calleb Otieno. “Somalia should reject IMF & World Bank Debt Relief.” Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, February 17, 2020. https://www.cadtm.org/Somalia-should-reject-IMF-World-Bank-Debt-Relief

3. Finally, better safeguards for Al-Shabaab defectors need to be established. Interviewees in the Adam Smith International report suggested that permanent residential centers may not be effective, due to social stigma around defectors, but instead recommended day centers or similar safe houses.⁶⁴Stern, “Invisible Women,” 39. This would provide some relief for women who wish to leave Al-Shabaab but have no viable alternative.

Part 6. International Impediments

As this report has detailed, international intervention in Somali resource management has been a causal factor in the collapse of the Somali state and subsequent rise of Al-Shabaab. In the first week of December 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously renewed Resolution 2554, which authorizes the use of “all necessary means” to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia.⁶⁵“Security Council Renews Authorization for International Naval Forces Fighting Piracy Off Somali Coast, Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2554.” United Nations, December 4, 2020. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14373.doc.htm There have been no successful pirate attacks in the past 12 months, but the UNSC nonetheless determined that the threat of another surge in piracy remains. Resolution 2554 “express[es] serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing,” and encourages the Somali government to enforce fishing licenses.⁶⁶“Resolution 2554,” United Nations Security Council, December 4, 2020. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2554(2020) It is unlikely, however, that the Somali government is in the position to deter successfully IUU fishing by foreign industrial bodies. Adequate surveillance of marine areas is expensive, and transnational corporations have the extensive resources and technology to fish at competitive rates.⁶⁷Lo Persson and Ida Karlsson. “Finding Somalia’s missing fisheries.” Rethink Earth, December 4, 2019. https://rethink.earth/finding-somalias-missing-fisheries/ United Nations Sustainable Development goal number 14.4 hoped to end IUU fishing by 2020, but it does not identify foreign IUU fishing as a security threat in addition to an unsustainable practice.⁶⁸“Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.” United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/ The international community also has yet to recognize the independence of the Republic of Somaliland, a self-declared country within the borders of Somalia. It is therefore denied aid of its own, despite having established an independent system of politics and army.⁶⁹Ashrif, “The Forgotten Story.” Additional international impediments to systemic resource management reform have already been detailed; whether the PRSPs lead to the extractive privatization of natural resources such as sesame remains to be seen.

This report has presented the history of colonial and neocolonial interference in Somalia as causal factors to the proliferation of terrorism in the region. Lack of accountability for, or even recognition of, this causality is a significant impediment to reconstruction and peacebuilding. To that end, reframing the narrative of violence in Somalia could be a powerful first step towards developing sustainable peace and security. Despite an admitted “absence of publicly available sources of information,” Transparency International consistently ranks Somalia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, reportedly due to financial mismanagement, fund misappropriation, broad negligence, and concealment.⁷⁰Marie Chêne. “Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia.” Transparency International, July 13, 2012. https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/337_Overview_of_corruption_and_anti-corruption_in_Somalia.pdf Media depictions of decontextualized violence cumulatively encourage the misconception that African ethnic divides are inherently prone to conflict, implying that foreign intervention is justified.⁷¹Wengraf, Extracting Profit, 9. Overall, these processes of legitimization for foreign involvement date back to the colonial era and continue to the modern day so-called ‘War on Terror,’ continually relying on the rhetorical idea of a failed state or ungovernable peoples.⁷²Jones, “Political Economy of Social Crisis,” 198. These approaches problematically obfuscate the intricate, systematic damage to Somalia through colonialism and global liberalism.

Under the auspices of aid and security, foreign intervention has continually harmed the autonomous development of Somali economics and politics, and it would be both inaccurate and unjust to develop modern counterterror policies on the assumption that Al-Shabaab’s potency is fueled only by gross corruption and infighting. Al-Shabaab’s abilities to present itself as a viable alternative and to kidnap and coerce new members are predicated on a context of economic insecurity, an insecurity promulgated by foreign interference. Therefore, while some militarized containment and security is perhaps warranted, the broader and more systemic factors require more attention.