Restarting Growth in Countries with Ongoing Conflicts After Covid-19

Apungwa Cornelius Ntabe, Research Associate, African Political Economy Policy Lab
cornelius@africacfsp.org

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has caused disruptions across the globe on a scale not previously imagined. The pandemic unquestionably presents an era-defining challenge to public health and the global economy. Notably, it has exacerbated existing crises in conflict-afflicted countries. In light of this, UN Secretary General Guterres called for a ceasefire to allow countries to address the pandemic as it was impossible to embark on two battles simultaneously. This paper contends that the same will be true for the post-COVID-19 recovery, as the presence or threat of conflict will render any attempts at economic growth extremely difficult. ¹ Furthermore, it recommends that the fight against COVID-19 should coincide with the fight against various socio-political crises and armed conflicts in order to lighten the challenge of rebuilding the economy and dealing with the conflicts after the pandemic.

Introduction

COVID-19 has wreaked significant havoc across the globe and presents an era-defining challenge to public health and the global economy. In conflict-affected countries, meaning those with ongoing conflicts, at high risk of conflict relapse, or countries recovering from conflict, the pandemic has exacerbated existing crises.

The lessons are clear: violent conflicts exacerbate the spread of the pandemic and further prevent sustained and effective local and international responses in conflict epicentres, which in turn affects conflict-vulnerable communities. This paper will examine the financial constraints that fighting the pandemic poses to economies trying to rebuild in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Massive amounts of funds have been mobilised by some countries to fight socio-political crises and armed conflicts. Moreover, additional funds that are being mobilised to fight the pandemic will complicate economic recovery. Restarting growth in war-torn countries after the pandemic requires innovative approaches. Undoubtedly, we have yet to see an end to the COVID-19 crisis, but it is not too soon to start considering a future without COVID-19.

Statement of the problem

In cases of active conflict, national and international medics and humanitarian workers are struggling to relieve and aid vulnerable communities. In 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) and international NGOs struggled to contain an Ebola outbreak in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), despite support from UN peacekeepers, due to violent local militias that blocked access to some affected areas.² At times, combatants targeted doctors and medical facilities themselves. Although the Congolese authorities and WHO succeeded in ending the outbreak in recent months, the disease lasted far longer and claimed more lives (with a confirmed 2,264 fatalities) than would have been the case in a stable area.³ Security obstacles are similarly likely to hamper the COVID-19 response in places with continuing hostilities.

It is against this backdrop that the UN Secretary General called for an immediate global ceasefire on March 23, 2020 due to concerns over the spread of the disease.⁴ Accordingly, UN Secretary General António Guterres pointed out that the focus of states should be on the fight against COVID-19 instead of any prior conflicts. Following this appeal, several of the world’s most powerful countries, including France, China, the US, and the UK, agreed on the principal of a global ceasefire.⁵ A ‘substantial number of conflict parties’ in several countries in Africa initially expressed their agreement to a cessation of hostilities, notably in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, and Sudan.⁶ Historically, ceasefires-for-vaccine-campaigns have been implemented to significant overall affect, such as during conflicts in El Salvador in the 1940s and 1980s, when the Pan-American Health Organization facilitated one-day truces, known as “days of tranquillity”, to allow for vaccine campaigns against polio, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, and measles.⁷

As the global response to the pandemic gathers steam, the rhetoric of wartime mobilization is everywhere. In China, President Xi Jinping declared a “people’s war” on coronavirus. In the United States, President Trump pronounced himself a “wartime president” fighting against “the Chinese virus.” In France, Emmanuel Macron declared the country at war with an “invisible enemy.” In Italy, the worst-affected country in Europe, the government’s anti-virus czar has called for the country to “equip itself with a war economy” to confront the disease. And at the frontline, healthcare workers have been portrayed as combatants who are putting themselves at risk to treat COVID-19 patients.⁸ Despite the atomized nature of life under quarantine, the coronavirus resembles war in one crucial aspect; as a highly infectious virus with a significant mortality rate, it has the potential to cause massive death tolls.

The war against the pandemic comes as a second war for countries that were already experiencing socio-political crises or armed conflicts. The recognition of the inability of states to fight the pandemic with the presence of conflict is an indication of the unique challenge that will be involved in rebuilding or restarting growth after the pandemic within these war-torn countries. The social and financial burden for Africa’s conflict-affected countries, which are also struggling to get a hold on the pandemic, will impede considerably their ability to rebuild their economies after the pandemic.

This paper intends to draw the attention of policy makers to this important issue through analysis and recommendations that could be capitalised on when considering economic recovery in countries facing multiple crises. In theorizing a future without COVID-19, the first step is to restart growth without facilitating future conflict or exacerbating current ones, considering the fact that, during COVID-19, warring parties were asked only to cease hostilities. The second step is to ensure that restarting growth does not mean a return to conflicts which existed prior. The best-case scenario will be to restart growth without conflict and will incorporate the fight against the pandemic with plans to end armed conflicts simultaneously.

Analysis of the problem

There were at least 15 countries with active armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 when the novel strain of coronavirus first hit the headlines. These countries include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Eight were low-intensity, subnational armed conflicts, and seven were high-intensity armed conflicts (Nigeria, Somalia, the DRC, Burkina Faso, Mali, South Sudan and Cameroon). Nearly all the armed conflicts were internationalized due to state actors (whether directly or through proxies) and the transnational activities of violent Islamist groups, other armed groups, and criminal networks. Fighting these wars requires extensive military expenditures.⁹

World military expenditure is estimated to have been USD1.917 trillion in 2019. It accounted for 2.2 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) or USD249 per person. Spending in 2019 was 3.6 percent higher than in 2018 and 7.2 percent higher than in 2010. The growth in total global military spending in 2019 was the fifth consecutive annual increase and the largest of the decade, surpassing the 2.6 percent rise in 2018. It has also increased in developing and conflict-affected countries.¹⁰

Armed conflict is one of the main drivers for the volatile nature of military spending in sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹ For example, in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, where there are several ongoing armed conflicts, military spending in 2019 increased in Burkina Faso (22 percent), Cameroon (1.4 percent), Mali (3.6 percent), but fell in Chad (–5.1 percent), Niger (–20 percent), and Nigeria (–8.2 percent). Among Central African countries that were involved in armed conflict, military spending in 2019 rose overall. The Central African Republic (8.7 percent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16 percent), and Uganda (52 percent) all increased military spending in 2019.¹² The combined military expenditure of states in Africa grew by 1.5 percent to an estimated USD41.2 billion in 2019—the region’s first spending increase in five years.¹³

Policy Recommendations

The fight against COVID-19 should coincide with fights against socio-political crises and armed conflicts. As we approach the end of 2020 and plans to restart growth are underway, it is of great concern when one reads the news that meetings targeted at conflict resolution have been cancelled in favour of the fight against the pandemic. For example, Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta called off a summit planned for March 16 with Ethiopia and Somalia that aimed to diffuse dangerously escalating tensions between Nairobi and Mogadishu, even though Kenyan officials cited their need to focus on efforts to halt the virus’s spread.¹⁴ Further, a summit between leaders of the EU and the “G5 Sahel countries” (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) was also cancelled.¹⁵ In South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Cameroon, and DR Congo, important peacebuilding programs and dialogues have been cancelled.¹⁶ It is imperative that we maintain peace processes and conflict prevention efforts by working with UN envoys and other mediators. Elections hold the key to some major ongoing armed conflicts, thus where authorities have delayed elections or other polls for legitimate COVID-19 related reasons. It is important that they offer outside support – such as declarations of extra-electoral assistance once the disease subsides or mutual diplomacy between the parties to reassure citizens that they will eventually get to vote once the pandemic is over.
A strong and inclusive state is essential for securing stability and recovery. Post-conflict countries need to rebuild state capacity quickly, including the capacity to collect revenue and allocate it effectively. Improved transparency is especially important for countries rich in natural resources. Greater revenues mean states are better equipped to rapidly rebuild their economies.
The ability of people to recover and restructure their own lives after conflict depends significantly on the human capital they embody. Human capital stock is manifested in the education, skills and aptitudes of laborers, and is usually depleted by conflict, which can undermine the prospects for economic recovery. Reversing the damage and investing in people is an important aspect of post-conflict economic recovery. In rehabilitating post-war human capital, it is important to consider societal inequities that may have contributed to the dynamics of conflict in the first place.
Rehabilitation should aim to reform rather than merely restore pre-existing systems, following a rigorous analysis of pre-war flaws. This will require carrying out in-depth assessments as soon as possible. Education and health sectors will shape and influence social norms and interactions. Therefore, the overarching need for conflict sensitivity in all assistance programmes and projects is particularly acute for these sectors.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes must take a longer-term view than previously envisioned. The full reintegration of ex-combatants depends on how quickly the economy can expand to provide the demand for labour. It is particularly important for training programmes to be carefully curated to anticipate which skills are desirable for economic recovery rather than those that reflect the current market profile. Lastly, job training should be longer and more rigorous, and graduates should be given support over a longer period.

Conclusion

The plan to restart the economy will have to consider economic losses rendered by the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing armed conflicts. All efforts should be geared towards putting an end to armed conflicts as these states embark on restarting growth. Attempting to restart growth after the COVID-19 pandemic while dealing with ongoing conflict will only make things difficult if not impossible for these states to recover the economy. A ceasefire was necessary to deal with COVID-19. The same is true for post-COVID-19 recovery: economic recovery is only possible without armed conflicts. Re-building will be effective if done at the end of both wars. In cases where armed conflicts cannot be resolved as the pandemic rages on, effective implementation of economic policy may speed up the conflict resolution in some countries. Bureaucratic and diplomatic actors must demonstrate their commitment to resolving these conflicts through diligence and mediation.

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