Russia’s Influence in Africa: The Problematic Use of Quasi-State Corporations

Emily Fennell, Foreign Policy & Diaspora Studies
efennell@acstrap.org

The 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept towards Africa promulgated “mutually beneficial trade” and “settling… regional conflicts.”¹ Russia’s foreign policy by examining four cases: the Central African Republic, Egypt, Libya, and South Africa. Due to Russia’s economic limitations, quasi-state actors such as Yevgeny Prigozhin and Gazprom enable Moscow’s presence on the continent. Overall, Russia’s involvement asymmetrically benefits Russia’s national and private sector’s agenda over these African nations. Russia’s policy is stunting African economic growth and weakening governance across the continent.²

Introduction

In the mid-2000s, Russia joined the race to establish relations with growing African countries. Russia’s involvements are asymmetrically beneficial for the Russian regime and President Vladimir Putin. Moscow’s actions include supplying arms, fighters, and running election influence campaigns in various countries across the continent. Since the official establishment of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept in 2013, Russian involvement has worked towards regime protection and embedded corruption in the Central African Republic (CAR), Egypt, Libya, and South Africa (SA) rather than economic development and conflict resolution. However, Russia is financially limited, and therefore utilizes quasi-state actors to sustain foreign engagement. The goal is to re-establish Russia as a geopolitical and economic power.³ Unfortunately, Moscow’s involvement is encouraging international human rights abuses and violating international rules, norms, and laws.

Kimberly Marten of Columbia University is influential in the scope of this paper. She identified businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin as a quasi-state actor with great influence on Russian policy towards Africa. Furthermore, his associated companies – the Concord company, Internet Research Agency (IRA), and Wagner Group – participate in ethically questionable practices. From Moscow’s perspective, murky military agreements are the path to economic gain for the heads of state in Egypt and CAR. Available information reveals that Prigozhin’s Wagner forces actively participated in the Libyan conflict for the purpose of placing Russia in an advantageous negotiating position to win lucrative business contracts with the “winning” side.

The Russian-African relationship impedes international and domestic efforts for good governance in Africa. Indeed, Moscow is stunting African economic growth and future hopes for financial independence.⁴SA serves as a case study where Russia’s strategy was not successful. Fortunately, President Cyril Ramaphosa of the African National Congress (ANC) party continues to uphold the values of the new anti-corruption agenda. Although SA maintains influence across the continent, the increased presence of Russian interests in Africa exacerbates challenges related to embedded corruption in CAR, Egypt, and Libya.

Historical Context

Unlike nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union (USSR) maintained several strong engagements in Africa. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR was motivated to spread communism across newly independent African states.⁵ Initially, the Soviets achieved prestige through relations with influential leaders such as Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah, and Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein.⁶However, the Soviets’ commitments proved costly and generally ineffective at balancing the influence of the United States.⁷ Nevertheless, until the fall of the Soviet Union, it maintained a notable presence on the continent.

In 1959, the USSR began demonstrating its devotion to several newly independent African states by creating African research institutions in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Meanwhile, the Soviet government began offering university scholarships to African students, resulting in a total influx of 4,928 Africans to the USSR by 1969.⁸ However, major setbacks in the USSR’s strategy occurred in the form of two unsuccessful military operations during the 1960 Congo crisis. Due to a Security Council resolution, a series of African regions began to veer away from Lumumba’s socialist ideology and the Soviets. First, the 1966 coup d’état in Ghana removed Nkrumah from power, prompting the Soviets to lose another strategic ally.⁹ Second, in 1972, the USSR lost the strategically important Egyptian partnership when President Anwar Sadat favored the United States.

The USSR made important political contributions to Africa’s decolonization by elevating African issues on the international UN agenda and funding higher education for African students. However, the Soviet Union had only a minor ideological footprint despite its extensive efforts. Further, by 1991, the economic costs of Soviet Russia’s involvement placed sub-Saharan nations in an estimated $17 billion of debt.¹⁰

A Quasi-State Actor in Africa

In early 2010, Russia reemerged in Africa. Post-Soviet Russian foreign policy was described as “business-like” insofar as it was oriented towards economic gain and Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s place as a geo-economic power.¹¹ Africa, as a rapidly emerging market, holds an important role in the future of the international system. By 2060, the African middle-class population is projected to reach 1.1 billion.¹² 2100 projections from the United Nations suggest Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Egypt will rank among the ten most populous countries in the world.¹³ Moscow has expressed its interest by substantially forgiving African debt to the tune of $16 billion in 2008 and an additional $20 billion in 2012.¹⁴ Despite this, Russia has been criticized as emerging “late to the game.”¹⁵ Major actors such as China, India, Turkey, South Korea, and the EU began increasing cooperation with African states in the early 2000s.¹⁶ Therefore, in order to compete, Putin’s strategy focuses on utilizing the private sector.

Russia’s foreign policy towards Africa shifted to a low-cost, high-reward model following international sanctions from the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The Russian Reserve Fund, Moscow’s monetary cushion, was emptied by 2017 after containing $87 billion in 2014.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Russia made few concessions within their African policies. During this time, the presence of both Concord company and Wagner Group grew in Africa; both companies are associated with businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin.¹⁸

US special counsel Robert Mueller included Prigozhin’s Concord company and Internet Research Agency (IRA) in his investigation of Russian influence in the 2016 US election.¹⁹ According to the case file from the District of Columbia’s Grand Jury, Russia’s influence campaigns focused on creating “political intensity through supporting radical groups.” Employees were instructed to create social media accounts that “appeared to be operated by US persons.”²⁰ Since the publication of the Mueller Report, similar involvements can be seen in elections across Africa. The Project, an independent Russian media outlet, revealed that Prigozhin interfered in at least 20 different state elections. Further, election infiltration is likely after a leaked document confirmed Prigozhin’s interests in a total of 39 African countries.²¹ Prigozhin is an increasing threat as his involvements expand into regional conflicts.

Under Putin, Prigozhin gained oligarchic influence in Russia’s political circle, and analysts note this his activity branched into more lucrative business opportunities in the mid-2010s.²² In 2016, investigative journalists revealed that Prigozhin was operating as the primary contractor of the Wagner Group.²³ Marten identified the Wagner Group as a quasi-state private military corporation (PMC) working in foreign activities where both private and state interests collide. Wagner forces have been identified in Nigeria, possibly Iraq, Ukraine, Syria, and now Sudan, the CAR, and Libya.²⁴ Despite Mercenaryism being constitutionally illegal under Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, Putin continues to allow Wagner, and others like it, to operate abroad. In December 2018, during Putin’s end-of-the-year press conference, the President defended these actions, stating “if Wagner violates something, the Prosecutor General should evaluate them. But if they don’t break Russian laws, they can carry out their business anywhere in the world.”²⁵ Putin has continued to protect companies working as quasi-state actors by issuing a decree in September 2018 that classified information about any individual cooperating with Russian foreign intelligence agencies without needing to be directly employed by institutions like Russia’s intelligence agency, the GRU. Additionally, independent news organizations investigating groups like Wagner could be charged for treason.²⁶

Kimberly Marten of Columbia University further concluded that the illegality of PMCs means Putin has the power to exert control by prosecuting groups like Wagner at any time.²⁷ Throughout the following case studies, it is apparent that Prigozhin has become an essential asset in Putin’s strategy for gaining influence in Africa. Quasi-state involvements are bolstering Russia’s presence in African conflicts. COVID-19 posed further risks as Russia suffered economic losses due to crude oil prices dropping to an all-time low of $5/barrel. Therefore, without quasi-state actors, Moscow would have been forced to regress foreign policy commitments.²⁸

Central African Republic

The government of the CAR has been battling for autonomy against rebel armed groups since 2013, killing thousands and displacing more than a million people.²⁹ Moscow got involved after the CAR’s President, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, appealed the arms embargo to the UNSC’s Sanctions Committee in 2017. Since 2018, Moscow has had a military presence in the CAR. It is unclear if Russia has helped stabilize the CAR’s government or simply supplied aid for monetary gains.

Once the CAR was granted an exception, France proposed to send 1,400 AK pattern rifles acquired through multinational anti-piracy operations in Somalia. However, Russia vetoed the idea, arguing that confiscated weapons from the enforcement of that UNSC embargo should not be regifted to offset another. Following a September 2017 UN General Assembly and an October meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Touadéra, Moscow offered to provide weapons and the Sanctions Committee unanimously agreed in December 2017.³⁰

This aforementioned exception allowed Moscow to send weapons and military trainers to aid CAR security forces. Although officially deemed necessary for political stability by the UNSC,³¹ Russian presence in the CAR has been shrouded in secrecy. It is known that the first shipment of weapons was received and accompanied by 170 civilian trainers along with six military officers. Russian trainers in the CAR are widely believed to be Wagner forces, though no documented proof is available at this time.³²

In 2018, Putin expanded Russia’s foothold in the country after suggesting that Touadéra appoint former GRU operator, Valery Zaharov, as the CAR’s national security advisor. CNN concluded that Zaharov might have been paid by Prigozhin to accept the position.³³ Russian presence in an advisory position within the CAR weakens its regional governance.

Prigozhin has personal interests in the CAR. He maintains financial dealings with several artisanal diamond and gold mines. In return for Wagner contractors guarding the mines, Prigozhin receives a percentage of the profits. However, only one of the mines is operational according to the Kimberly Process (KP), the UN-mandated trade institution for screening rough diamonds to ensure they are from conflict-free zones. In 2020, Russia rotated to the Chair of the KP.³⁴ Russia’s actual “national interests” are complicated by Aleski Moiseev, Russian Deputy Finance Minister and the current chair of Alrosa, a major Russian diamond company. Moiseev has said his intention is to get all of the CAR approved before Botswana takes over as the KP chair in 2021.³⁵ Meanwhile, Boda is the one KP-certified region of the CAR; Boda is also known to have contracts with Prigozhin. It is possible Wagner is funneling minerals from conflict areas and selling them out of Boda, but this cannot be confirmed. Moreover, Russia does not appear motivated to help stabilize the CAR. Rather, its actions are driven by opportunities for economic benefit.

By March 2018, another shipment of weapons to the CAR included several thousand rifles and hundreds of grenade launchers. The first class of cadets graduated in Spring 2019 from the Wagner trained CAR special operations forces program. The training method used by Wagner is not one of the UN or EU training programs that mandates respect to uphold human rights as a core value. The fact that these new CAR forces are not trained to respect human rights and international rules of engagement is a threat to the sub-Saharan region.³⁶ The involvements of Wagner are thus surrounded by further secrecy. In the summer of 2018, three Russian journalists were killed after investigating Wagner in the CAR.³⁷

Zaharov and Prigozhin have been influential in peace deal negotiations with militia groups that account for 80% of the CAR not under control of Bangui.³⁸ However, a UNSC vote on 31 January 2020 renewed the arms embargo that might end Moscow’s foothold in the CAR.³⁹ Peace deals have installed rebels with positions in the government and defense forces without going through an electoral process. The empowerment of these individuals could lead to further corruption and the breakdown of the CAR’s government.⁴⁰

Egypt

Moscow’s alliance with Cairo is one of its oldest partnerships. Indeed, Egypt played a strategic role in Soviet foreign policy and Moscow has actively sought to reaffirm these historic relations since the onset of its latest interest in Africa.⁴¹ The military coup d’état of July 2013 named Abdel Fattah al-Sisi president, and Putin was the first major head of state to visit Egypt in 2014.⁴² In 2019, along with other examples of economic and diplomatic cooperation, the two countries signed an arms deal amounting to $3.5 billion.⁴³

Positive relations led the two states to co-chair the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, consisting of 43 heads of state among the 53 countries represented. Outcomes included discussing agreements in economic and education cooperation, energy and mineral exploration, technology, transportation infrastructure development, and cooperation in peace and security.⁴⁴ In early 2020, the Dossier Center – a project led by Kremlin oppositionist Mikhail Khodorkovsky – released a memo from Prigozhin’s office which discussed the initial planning and goals for the summit.⁴⁵ Although Sochi advertised itself as a symbolic celebration of collective ambitions between countries, the new information illuminates the blurred lines between Russia’s private and public sector. The 2019 summit continues to be regarded as Putin’s most significant vie for influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁶

In 2019, the Dossier Center additionally proved Russia is funding the largest “franchise-like” troll factory in Egypt. A team at the Stanford Internet Observatory analyzed 73 Facebook pages and seven Instagram accounts with content administrators in Egypt and Mozambique. Leaked documents published by the Dossier Center confirmed the Concord company is the true content creator. Therefore, Russia is responsible for funding influence operations targeting Libya, Sudan, Madagascar, the CAR, and Mozambique. The pages had over 1.7 million ‘likes’ and a high rate of activity, posting over 8,900 times in October 2019 alone.⁴⁷ In Libya, these pages boasted pro-Haftar and memorial Gaddafi propaganda.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, operations targeting the CAR included memes discrediting France and public opinion posts that asked blatantly biased questions such as “should the CAR sign a peace accord or does it need more casualties?”⁴⁹ Prigozhin’s quasi-state activities went unnoticed until recent reports because his firm utilizes local Egyptians as group administrators. The Facebook Page Transparency feature alone would not connect these specific groups to Russia without the leaked information.⁵⁰ Therefore, quasi-state organizations enabled Russia to embark on illegal activities while escaping the consequences of international law.

As one considers the entire case of Egypt, diplomatic and economic relations remain strong and are vital for Russia to gain influence throughout Africa. Moscow is not engaged in asymmetrical agreements with Cairo. Economic interdependence is mutually beneficial as seen within trade agreements of weapons, grains, and tourism.⁵¹ Additionally, Moscow announced commitments of $190 million for four new reactors at the el Dabaa nuclear power plant by 2029.⁵² The sustained bilateral commitments and addition of Prigozhin’s disinformation center enables the continuation of Moscow’s low-cost, high-reward strategy. To maintain relations with Egypt, Russia proved willing to coordinate its response in Libya.

Libya

Russian-Libyan relations date back to 2008, when Russia wrote off $4.5 billion of Soviet era debt. In return, the Russian energy company Gazprom acquired contracts to build a multi-billion dollar 4,128km (2,580 mile) oil pipeline across the continent.⁵³ By 2016, Gazprom reported two Libyan license blocks in their factbook report.⁵⁴ Therefore, when conflict broke out in Libya, the Kremlin saw an opportunity to negotiate for oil and development contracts.

After the General National Accord’s (GNA) creation from the 2015 UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), or Skhirat Agreement, Libya experienced a six-year conflict. Fighting occurred between the Eastern Tobruk-based government and the Tripoli-based GNA. Russia, along with most Arab states, supported the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by warlord Khalifa Haftar.⁵⁵ Due to the involvement of many external actors, the battle for governance was long and complicated. Despite doubting Haftar’s leadership, Moscow violated international law to remain involved. Moscow likely wished to gain monetarily for such efforts.

During this conflict, Moscow supplied military armaments and printed billions in Libyan dinars, which helped to pay troops and bribe local tribes.⁵⁶ In early Spring 2018, private Russian operatives in Libya reported, “opportunity in [Haftar’s] weakness and suggested that Russia could win leverage over Mr. Hifter if it sent mercenaries to bolster [the LNA].”⁵⁷ Having received the new intel, Moscow increased quasi-state resources in their military strategy. A video from 2018 shows Prigozhin participating in a meeting between Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and Haftar.⁵⁸ From 2018 to 2020, Moscow sent thousands of Wagner fighters to aid the LNA.⁵⁹ Because of the nature of the group, the state is not required to report the resulting combat deaths or send rescue missions.⁶⁰

Despite the January 2020 peace discussion at the Berlin Conference, Russia continued to back Haftar’s advance on Tripoli in the spring.⁶¹ In July 2020, imagery by US Africa Command identified a Russian Command II-76 military cargo aircraft, a Vagner Pantsir SA-22 air defense combat vehicle, and Vagner Su-24 fencer jets sent to Wagner forces at Al Khadim Airfield. The presence of Russian military equipment was a direct violation of the UN arms embargo.⁶² However, the UN ceasefire monitoring committee did not impose sanctions on Moscow for such actions. The illegal status of Wagner enables Russia to avoid international sanctions through plausible deniability. In this case, the involvement of Wagner did not impact the outcome. They did not tip the balance between the East and West conflict prior to the 2021 resolution.

South Africa

In the early years of Putin’s presidency, SA held great strategic importance. However, after the 2019 election of Cyril Ramaphosa, future Russia-SA cooperation looks bleak. According to Georgy Petrov of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, “… Russian business is returning to Africa, and South Africa is becoming a gateway to the African continent for Russian people.⁶³⁶⁴ Overall, under the Zuma administration, economic interdependence blossomed, although agreements asymmetrically benefited Russia.

The Russian private sector – Renova Group, Norilsk Nickel, Evraz Group, and Rosatom – seeks to extract raw materials from SA. Currently, Russian companies are not planning on opening any factories in SA. However, if production shifted into SA, the region would experience a multiplying economic effect due to increased job creation.⁶⁵ SA, as a member of the South African Development Community (SADC), is interested in the added value of economic relations. Moreover, Pretoria maintains the upper hand due to the many interested international partners. On 22 September 2014, President Jacob Zuma and Putin signed a major nuclear framework agreement valued at an estimated $50 billion. Other competitors included France, South Korea, the United States, and China. Although construction never began, Rosatom secured the contract for the installation of eight nuclear reactors.⁶⁶ Moscow is economically reliant on the energy deal, which explains why Putin closely monitored the 2019 presidential election.

Moscow believed future cooperation relied on the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) party maintaining control.⁶⁷ Therefore, Prigozhin’s troll factories backed the ANC candidate, Cyril Ramaphosa, through a propaganda influence campaign. The troll factories used tactics to discredit Ramaphosa’s opponents in 2019 and forecasted the likelihood of the ANC winning.⁶⁸ In 2019, the ANC won the election, suggesting the Internet Research Association and Russia have developed a viable means of influencing foreign elections. Yet, mainstream Western news outlets have shown declining interest in the IRA’s ongoings since 2016. The IRA and affiliate companies have infiltrated elections in Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, Mozambique, and several others by saturating social media platforms. The second form of infiltration is via an adversarial committee sent to supervise the electoral process to “legitimize the election.”⁶⁹ In the end, the efforts did not benefit Moscow as Ramaphosa continues to remain true to his anti-corruption platform during his first term. Shortly after the election, the nuclear infrastructure deal was canceled.⁷⁰ Moreover, Ramaphosa ushered in a new era of Russian-South African relations which does not favor bilateral cooperation. South Africa represents the shift to good governance and should be exemplified as a case to inspire African nations in the region.

Conclusions

The USSR’s activities in Africa did not leave as much of a sweeping ideological impact as Soviet leaders had originally hoped. By the end of the Cold War era, the significant debts of African nations proved Soviet foreign policy was costly. Further, they did not achieve many of their initial foreign policy goals. The remaining aspects of Soviet efforts were diplomatic relations and a lot of unpaid debt. Putin appears to understand the lesson from the USSR. His goal is to keep foreign policy expenses down and increase the input from quasi-state actors enabled by Russia’s continued involvement.

The 2019 Sochi Summit is proof of a strong diplomatic partnership between Cairo and Moscow. Meanwhile, Cairo enables some of Russia’s most corrupt activities in Africa by allowing the Concord company to operate in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt is affiliated with the extension of the Libyan conflict and regime protection in the CAR. The CAR continues to be a ‘hot spot’ for Russian influence and Egypt is supporting the Kremlin’s tactics.

Additionally, Russia’s monetary-based activities contradict the reported motivations for providing military aid. Without a peace agreement or a plan, the region remains unstable. Due to the precarious training methods of CAR special forces, Russian involvement is simply prolonging the regional conflict. Similar to the Libyan case, the use of Wagner forces allows Russia to swiftly withdraw if and when instability causes a complete state collapse. Furthermore, Prigozhin’s mining contracts are likely a scheme to bypass the Kimberly Process. Therefore, Russia is committing human rights violations for monetary gain as well as encouraging further violations.

In South Africa, Ramaphosa shifted away from bilateral relations with Putin after Russians infiltrated the 2019 presidential election. Ramaphosa canceling the installation of eight nuclear reactors is a message to African leaders to be wary of the corruption associated with Putin. Although Russia could help SA develop necessary electrical infrastructure, avoiding lucrative Russian deals is more important for Pretoria’s anti-corruption efforts. If South Africa wishes to deepen relations with Russia, Ramaphosa must avoid Putin’s asymmetrically beneficial agreements. In this case, SA’s actions to protect democracy are the first step towards African solutions for African problems. Yet Putin’s close relations with Touadera and Sisi suggest that Russian foreign involvements continue to support poor governance and dictatorships within the continent.

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