South Sudan & the Dilemma of Civilian Disarmament
Andrew Karl, Research Fellow, Security and Intelligence Policy Lab
akarl@africacfsp.org
In response to a sharp escalation of intercommunal violence, South Sudan launched a civilian disarmament campaign in July 2020 to counter the proliferation of small arms. Rather than quelling the violence, this coercive campaign risks deepening South Sudan’s pervasive insecurity. Past attempts at civilian disarmament have repeatedly led to violent clashes between communities being disarmed and an abusive security sector, while geographically staged, incomplete disarmament efforts have often escalated intercommunal violence. Further, this approach does nothing to address the demand factors driving proliferation, leading communities to re-arm following the completion of disarmament exercises.
As 2020 – the year to “Silence the Guns in Africa” – draws to a close, a sharp escalation of intercommunal conflict in South Sudan and an ill-conceived, coercive response from Juba have undermined progress towards the African Union initiative of building a sustainable peace on the continent. Between January and March 2020, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) documented more than 275 episodes of violence affecting civilians, involving at least 1,767 civilians injured or killed. Compared to the same period in 2019, this represents a 73% increase in the number of incidents and a 94% increase in the number of victims.1United Nations Mission in South Sudan Human Rights Division, “Quarterly Brief On Violence Affecting Civilians (January-March 2020),” June 2, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmiss_hrd_quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_-_jan-march_2020.pdf. During the subsequent period, from April to July, 2020, the number of violent incidents affecting civilians saw an additional 52% increase as compared to the preceding quarter.2United Nations Mission in South Sudan Human Rights Division, “Quarterly Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians (April-June 2020),” October 20, 2020, http://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_april_june2020.pdf. This surge in violence is primarily due to an intensification of intercommunal conflict, which accounts for 80% of all observed violence affecting civilians over this period.3United Nations Mission in South Sudan Human Rights Division, “Quarterly Brief On Violence Affecting Civilians (January-March 2020),” June 2, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmiss_hrd_quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_-_jan-march_2020.pdf; United Nations Mission in South Sudan Human Rights Division, “Quarterly Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians (April-June 2020),” October 20, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_april_june2020.pdf.
These localized, sub-national conflicts have had devastating impacts in Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Warrap, and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States. In these areas, disputes over access to water and grazing land, cattle raiding, and cycles of revenge killings have long been a source of fractious relations among the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle communities.4United Nations Mission in South Sudan, “Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General,” September 20, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/secretary generals_report_on_south_sudan_8_september_2020_0.pdf. Several contributing factors have been cited to explain the recent intensification of these intercommunal conflicts, including: a leadership vacuum at the state and sub-state levels resulting from the dissolution of government institutions in February 2020; inflamed ethnic antagonisms and the rising use of hate speech since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013; and heightened resource pressure resulting from severe flooding.5Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “South Sudan: 1,000+ Killed in Inter-Communal Violence since January,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, November 15, 2020, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/; Will Ferroggiaro et al., “South Sudan Hate Speech Lexicon II,” PeaceTech Lab, March 25, 2019, https://www.peacetechlab.org/south-sudan-lexicon-2. Another key factor exacerbating the violence is the adoption of military tactics and military grade weapons, which has become increasingly commonplace in recent years.6Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “South Sudan: Bachelet Calls for Accountability as Hundreds Reported Killed in Intercommunal Violence,” www.ohchr.org, May 22, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25902&LangID=E. Historically, cattle raiding was carried out with machetes, spears, and other more rudimentary weapons. Today, AK-47s, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers typify these intercommunal clashes.7Yuki Yoshida, “Emerging Ethnic Hatred in Jonglei State, South Sudan” (E-International Relations, July 13, 2013), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/40507. South Sudan is a heavily armed, highly militarized society, where most young men own or have access to small arms.8Conflict Research Programme, “South Sudan: The Perils of Payroll Peace” (London School of Economics, March 2019), https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/03/The-Perils-of-Payroll-Peace.pdf. Estimates indicate there are between 1.9 and 3.2 million small arms in circulation, with about two-thirds of these in the hands of civilians.9Sarah Skinner, “Civilian Disarmament in South Sudan A Legacy of Struggle,” Saferworld, February 2012, https://www.cmi.no/file/2157-south-sudan-civilian-disarmament; Small Arms Survey, “National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan A UNDP-Supported Baseline Assessment of Civilian Firearm Holdings, Violence Victimisation, and Perceptions of Security in South Sudan,” February 2017, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Reports/South%20Sudan%20National%20Small%20Arms%20Assessment%20-%20Web%20Version.pdf. Survey evidence indicates at least 15% of South Sudanese households possess at least one firearm, although there is significant variation from state to state. In Lakes and Eastern Equatoria states, 35% and 38% of households have reported owning at least one firearm, respectively; in Western Equatoria, only 4% of households affirmed possession of a firearm.10Small Arms Survey, “National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan A UNDP-Supported Baseline Assessment of Civilian Firearm Holdings, Violence Victimisation, and Perceptions of Security in South Sudan,” February 2017, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Reports/South%20Sudan%20National%20Small%20Arms%20Assessment%20-%20Web%20Version.pdf., 9-11. Household surveys suggest that more than half (54%) of all firearms are automatic weapons.11Ibid, 10.
Attempting to contend with this escalation of communal violence and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), President Salva Kiir launched a disarmament campaign in early July 2020, targeting armed civilians in the Terekeka, Warrap, and Jonglei areas.12Obaj Okuj, “SSPDF on Why It Launched Disarmament in Tonj First,” Eye Radio, July 3, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/sspdf-on-why-it-launched-disarmament-in-tonj-first/. Following a series of heavy-handed and generally unsuccessful disarmament campaigns from 2005-2016, a number of NGOs and civil society organizations, including the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), expressed concern that communities would resist disarmament unless necessary measures were taken to ensure the protection of disarmed communities and the cattle upon which they depend.13Garang Abraham, “Update: Warrap Disarmament Clashes Leave 127 Dead,” Eye Radio, August 11, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/update-warrap-disarmament-clashes-leave-127-dead/. Indeed, by August 2020, violence had erupted in Warrap State. A dispute over a red scarf turned deadly when soldiers taking part in the disarmament exercise opened fire on an armed youth fleeing the confrontation.14Abdi Latif Dahir, “Effort to Disarm Communities in South Sudan Fuels Deadly Clashes,” The New York Times, August 11, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/world/africa/south-sudan-violence-disarmament.html; Garang Abraham, “Update: Warrap Disarmament Clashes Leave 127 Dead,” Eye Radio, August 11, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/update-warrap-disarmament-clashes-leave-127-dead/. In the ensuing violence, 82 civilians and 45 soldiers were killed in a series of assaults on police headquarters in Tonj.15Garang Abraham, “Update: Warrap Disarmament Clashes Leave 127 Dead,” Eye Radio, August 11, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/update-warrap-disarmament-clashes-leave-127-dead/. Security forces withdrew from the region and suspended the disarmament exercise in Warrap State for nearly three months.16Alhadi Hawari, “Army ‘halts’ Disarmament in Tonj,” Eye Radio, August 18, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/army-halts-disarmament-in-tonj/; Obaj Okuj, “Army Resumes Disarmament of Tonj ‘Gelweng,’” Eye Radio, November 19, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/army-resumes-disarmament-of-tonj-gelweng/. By late November 2020, the army resumed disarmament operations and announced that the exercises will continue until the year’s end, by which time the disarmament campaign will expand to Unity, Lakes, and other regions.17Obaj Okuj, “Army Resumes Disarmament of Tonj ‘Gelweng,’” Eye Radio, November 19, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/army-resumes-disarmament-of-tonj-gelweng/. However, civilian disarmament, as it has been implemented in South Sudan, is highly problematic. As seen in the explosive violence in Tonj, forced disarmament risks deepening insecurity, while failing to address the underlying demand factors which drive the proliferation of small arms.
Disarmament & Deepening Insecurity
The hastily conceived, coercive design of the ongoing civilian disarmament campaign risks deepening insecurity through several causal mechanisms. As was the case in Tonj, forced disarmament can, and often does, lead to violent altercations between the security sector and communities being disarmed. In August 2020, a convoy carrying disarmament forces came under attack in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, mirroring the violent resistance to arms control measures observed in past campaigns.18United Nations Mission in South Sudan, “Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General,” September 20, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/secretary generals_report_on_south_sudan_8_september_2020_0.pdf. For example, the 2005-2006 disarmament campaign in Jonglei State was met with fierce resistance from the outset by members of the Lou Nuer community, resulting in the deaths off an estimated 1,600 people—approximately one death for every two weapons seized during the exercise.19Richard Garfield, “Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei,” PSU.edu, December 2007, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download, 17. Chronic food shortages emerged as an additional consequence of the campaign, as soldiers raided livestock and lived off the land during the prolonged intervention.20The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), “Sudan Issue Brief: Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” February 2007, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-03-Jonglei.pdf. Villages were razed and pervasive looting broke out. Indeed, civilian disarmament campaigns in South Sudan have often borne a resemblance to an abusive counter-insurgency campaign, resulting in appalling bloodshed and human rights violations.21Abdi Latif Dahir, “Effort to Disarm Communities in South Sudan Fuels Deadly Clashes,” The New York Times, August 11, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/world/africa/south-sudan-violence-disarmament.html; Geoffrey Duke and Hans Rouw, “The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives On Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” September 2013, https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/the-catch-22-of-security-and-civilian-disarmament.pdf, 13. During disarmament exercises in 2008, a spate of extrajudicial killings led to the outbreak of fighting in the town of Rumbek. When soldiers were deployed to the region, they reportedly opened fire on civilians and looted the town.22IRIN News, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civilian Disarmament Remains Elusive as Government Rethinks Process,” The New Humanitarian, December 3, 2008, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/244167.
Likewise, a disarmament campaign in 2012 was characterized by both sporadic attacks on soldiers, as well as widespread security sector abuses, including rape and sexual violence, torture, extrajudicial killings, and the theft of livestock.23Geoffrey Duke and Hans Rouw, “The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives On Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” September 2013, https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/the-catch-22-of-security-and-civilian-disarmament.pdf, 25-26. Surveys of disarmed communities found that 78% of respondents described the process as having involved the use of force, as opposed to being peaceful and voluntary.24Ibid, 27. Lacking political legitimacy, the South Sudanese state has often resorted to violence to elicit compliance, jeopardizing the very security of civilians that disarmament seeks to achieve and further eroding trust in government among the population.25Ibid, 40.
As it has been implemented in South Sudan, civilian disarmament further risks deepening insecurity as a result of a regional, piecemeal approach that has characterized past exercises.26Ibid, 12. Rather than pursuing simultaneous disarmament, past campaigns have been sporadic, in which one county is disarmed while neighboring counties have retained weapons.27Ibid, 6. A commonly voiced position throughout the country is, “We will disarm, but only if all the other communities disarm as well.”28Sarah Skinner, “Civilian Disarmament in South Sudan A Legacy of Struggle,” Saferworld, February 2012, https://www.cmi.no/file/2157-south-sudan-civilian-disarmament. Repeatedly, these campaigns have left disarmed communities vulnerable to attacks from communities that were not equally disarmed. This dynamic is reflected in an August 2020 survey released by SSANSA, which found widespread opposition to the latest disarmament initiative, stemming from concerns that communities would be left defenseless against cattle raids and revenge killings.29Alhadi Hawari, “Army ‘halts’ Disarmament in Tonj,” Eye Radio, August 18, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/army-halts-disarmament-in-tonj/. Such was the outcome of the 2005-2006 campaign in Jonglei State, in which disarmament exercises concluded before the Murle communities were asked to disarm. In the following years, the neighboring Lou Nuer communities endured a series of deadly attacks from the Murle tribesmen to the south. After heavily re-arming, the Lou Nuer launched similarly lethal assaults in retaliation.30Yuki Yoshida, “Emerging Ethnic Hatred in Jonglei State, South Sudan” (E-International Relations, July 13, 2013), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/40507; Geoffrey Duke and Hans Rouw, “The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives On Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” September 2013, https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/the-catch-22-of-security-and-civilian-disarmament.pdf, 12. In total, the ensuing intercommunal clashes claimed an estimated 750 lives and saw the emergence of a new trend in which both sides engaged in massive civilian killings.31Yuki Yoshida, “Emerging Ethnic Hatred in Jonglei State, South Sudan” (E-International Relations, July 13, 2013), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/40507. Communities residing near South Sudan’s porous borders face similar concerns. Later attempts to disarm the Murle in the southeast have given rise to concerns of a potential attack from the Turkana in Kenya, while disarmament along the northern border has stoked fears that Dinka and Nuer communities would become vulnerable to cross-border raids from the Misseriya in neighboring Sudan.32IRIN News, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civilian Disarmament Remains Elusive as Government Rethinks Process,” The New Humanitarian, December 3, 2008, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/244167.
Without sufficient measures in place to ensure the protection of civilians, the current disarmament campaign further risks accelerating the cycles of revenge killings that typify the ongoing intercommunal conflicts. In a September 2020 report, UNMISS cites an uptick in intercommunal violence observed in advance of the disarmament process as associated with communities’ concerns over selective and biased disarmament.33United Nations Mission in South Sudan, “Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General,” September 20, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/secretary generals_report_on_south_sudan_8_september_2020_0.pdf. “When they heard disarmament is taking place, they resorted to more violence. They want to avenge before their guns are taken from them,” explains Santino Ater Amon, the former Secretary General of Gok State.34Priscah Akol, “Official Wants Lakes ‘Gelweng’ Forcefully Disarmed,” Eye Radio, October 2, 2020, https://eyeradio.org/official-wants-lakes-gelweng-forcefully-disarmed/.
As Juba looks to expand the civilian disarmament initiative into 2021, the causal pathways described here carry the dangerous potential to deepen insecurity in South Sudan. Accordingly, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo’s Political Violence Early Warning System has identified South Sudan as one of three countries in sub-Saharan Africa meriting particular attention for non-state violence in its latest forecast.35Hegre, Håvard, Marie Allansson, Matthias Basedau, Michael Colaresi, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, Frederick Hoyles, Lisa Hultman, Stina Högbladh, Naima Mouhleb, Sayeed Auwn Muhammad, Desiree Nilsson, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Gudlaug Olafsdottir, Kristina Petrova, David Randahl, Espen Geelmuyden Rød, Nina von Uexkull, Jonas Vestby (2019) ‘ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system’, Journal of Peace Research, 56(2), pp. 155–174. doi: 10.1177/0022343319823860. Should civilian disarmament lead to greater violence, this will likely undermine the prospects for future disarmament initiatives, aggravate already-fractious ethnic cleavages, and imperil the fragile peace process at the national level.
Disarmament & Demand
Driving the many attempts at civilian disarmament is the assumption that removing SALW will remedy South Sudan’s intractable intercommunal conflicts. This assumption has repeatedly been contradicted by on-the-ground developments.36Sarah Skinner, “Civilian Disarmament in South Sudan A Legacy of Struggle,” Saferworld, February 2012, https://www.cmi.no/file/2157-south-sudan-civilian-disarmament, 5. While disarmament may interrupt the available supply in the short term, these initiatives have done nothing to reduce the demand for small arms. Interview research conducted in 2012 by Saferworld found the most cited reasons for acquiring and keeping arms are for the protection of property (specifically livestock) and self-defense.37Ibid, 7. Yet disarmament campaigns have done little to improve pervasive insecurity or the convention of cattle raids. Twelve months after the conclusion of exercises, only 3.3% of the participants interviewed stated that security had significantly improved since disarmament.38Geoffrey Duke and Hans Rouw, “The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives On Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” September 2013, https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/the-catch-22-of-security-and-civilian-disarmament.pdf, 6. Communities affected by intercommunal conflict can be expected to continue to resist disarmament or to re-arm themselves until they feel secure enough to surrender their arms with the knowledge that the government will provide security for them. However, the security sector has yet to demonstrate the capacity to quell South Sudan’s persistent state insecurity, and the population remains distrustful of the police and army.39Simon Tisdall, “South Sudan: Challenge of Disarming a Nation When No One Trusts the State,” The Guardian, July 4, 2013, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/04/south-sudan-disarming-a-nation.
Beyond addressing security gaps, many households believe arms ownership is an inalienable right and a sign of masculinity.40Sarah Skinner, “Civilian Disarmament in South Sudan A Legacy of Struggle,” Saferworld, February 2012, https://www.cmi.no/file/2157-south-sudan-civilian-disarmament; The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), “Sudan Issue Brief: Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State,” February 2007, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-03-Jonglei.pdf. Taking part in cattle raids is widely seen as a rite of passage for adolescent boys, where firearm ownership and participation yield social status.41Hannah Wright, “Masculinities, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Men through a Gender Lens,” www.saferworld.org.uk, November 2014, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/862-masculinities-conflict-and-peacebuilding-perspectives-on-men-through-a-gender-lens. In many parts of South Sudan, women sing songs to shame those who fail to take part or are unsuccessful in cattle raids.42Ibid, 7. South Sudan’s bride price system further contributes to these gender norms. Marriage signifies the transition into manhood, and young men will often resort to cattle raiding to pay the bride price.43Ibid. Additionally, South Sudan’s decades-long history of civil war has reinforced a militarized notion of masculinity, in which membership in the armed forces or communal militias provides a sense of identity and self-worth for young men.44Ibid. These gender norms suggest the need for widespread community outreach and sensitization to effect long-term attitudinal changes.
Policy Recommendations
The Government of the Republic of South Sudan should suspend the ongoing civilian disarmament initiative until such a time that intercommunal conflicts can be addressed through the following actions:
- Engage in nationwide community dialogue and sensitization campaigns to educate communities on the need to disarm and the costs of intercommunal violence. This process should be widely consultive and wholly inclusive in nature, seeking to bring together communities, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and other relevant stakeholders. Communities should provide input on best practices, seeking to build consensus around how to conduct disarmament and address the driving factors that lead communities to arm themselves. Confidence-building measures should be undertaken to foster trust between and within communities, notably those with a recent history of violence. Where necessary, security forces should be deployed to provide a buffer between warring communities in order to safely foster dialogue.
- Assess protection of civilian needs to ensure the physical security of vulnerable communities participating in disarmament programming and to mitigate the risk of aggravating local insecurity. This should be achieved through direct consultation with communities prior to disarmament. Where possible, consultations should seek innovative solutions tailored to local needs and capacities. These could include efforts to trace and return raided livestock, as well as opportunities for informal security and justice mechanisms that communities can offer to complement the work of the security agencies. This assessment should include a gendered approach to better understand the specific security needs of men and women, boys and girls alike.
- Pursue peaceful, voluntary civilian disarmament that uniformly and simultaneously covers the whole state, working in conjunction with community leaders, village elders, chiefs, and neutral third-party brokers (where possible). Individuals should be provided appropriate compensation or inducements for participation, as informed by consultations with disarming communities. The use of force should be reserved as the very last resort only after meaningful efforts have been made toward voluntary disarmament. Strict measures should be taken to ensure accountability for misconduct by security forces, including mechanisms to monitor, document, and bring to justice offending security personnel.
- Advocate for a comprehensive regional approach to minimize illicit cross-border SALW flows by working in concert with neighboring countries and relevant regional bodies, including the Intergovernmental Development Authority. South Sudan’s porous borders necessitate regional cooperation to address arms flows, while offering the potential to increase capacity-building and strengthen the allocation of resources among countries.
- Strengthen protocols concerning arms registration, storage, and disposal to eliminate the potential for arms to spill back into conflict-affected communities. These protocols should be finalized and made public prior to the collection of arms to provide communities the assurance that any surrendered arms or munitions will not be used against them at a later date. Collected weaponry should be registered and records made public prior to destruction as a means of holding leaders accountable should arms resurface later. Further, necessary measures should be taken to improve the security of arms held by the security sector to prevent their continued spillage into communities.
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