The Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Reaction to Security Threats in South Africa and Eswatini

Dr. Charles Moyo, Research Analyst, Security & Intelligence Lab
cmoyo@africacfsp.org

In June and July 2021, violent protests which led to loss of lives and property erupted in Eswatini and South Africa respectively. In Eswatini, pro-democracy groups demanded political reforms. The arrest of South Africa’s former President, Jacob Zuma, triggered violent social unrest in South Africa. This paper assesses SADC’s reaction to the protests in the two countries. The paper contends that SADC’s reaction exposed the regional bloc’s fault lines. The paper recommends the adoption of a pragmatic, proactive, sustainable, and maximalist approach to conflict prevention and management by SADC.

Introduction

Southern Africa is considered one of the most peaceful regions in post-colonial and post-Cold War Africa. However, the region continues to grapple with a series of violent intrastate conflicts and latent security risks.¹ Political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Lesotho political crises, and the insurgency in Mozambique are notable security threats in Southern Africa from the last two decades. The latest threats to peace and security in the region have manifested themselves in the form of violent protests, particularly in South Africa and Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland). The two neighbouring countries are located in a region wherein violent protests have become threats to peace and security.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional organization with a mandate to facilitate regional integration. It aims to “promote and defend peace and security”²in the context of collective security. The way SADC has dealt with the political crises in South Africa and Eswatini has put the organization under a spotlight. This paper analyzes SADC’s reaction to the security threats in the two countries. The first section provides a brief overview of SADC, while the following section examines the present peace and security dynamics in Southern Africa. The next section presents a background to the protest, looks at how SADC reacted to the protests, and the factors that influenced such a reaction. The conclusion details the core elements of the paper and provides policy recommendations.

SADC: A Brief Overview

SADC, which is a successor to the Frontline States (FLS)³ and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),⁴ is a regional, political, and socio-economic bloc of 16 countries in Southern Africa: Angola, Comoros, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Malawi, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Eswatini, and Zimbabwe. SADC’s institutions include the Summit of Heads or State or Government, Summit Troika of the Organ, SADCAT, SADC Council of Ministers, Sectoral & Cluster Ministerial Committees, Standing Committee of Senior Officials, SADC Secretariat, SADC National Committees and SADC Parliamentary Forum.

SADC’s objectives are codified in the organization’s founding Treaty (1992). They include, amongst others, poverty alleviation, advancement of common political values, systems and institutions, and promotion of peace and security.⁵ SADC’s mandate is predicated on the fact that successful regional integration hinges on peace and security – hence the launch of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) by SADC in 1996. The overall objective of OPDS is to ‘promote Peace and Security within the SADC region.’⁶ As shall be elaborated in detail in the successive sections, the OPDS seeks to promote peace and security through the tackling of military/defence, crime, intelligence, peace-making and peacekeeping enforcement, foreign policy, conflict management, prevention and resolution, and human rights issues. OPDS’ jurisdiction in the context of its mandate includes politics and diplomacy, defence, police, state security, public security, and regional peacekeeping.⁷ SADC’s OPDS has a critical mandate and role to play in terms of the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC region.

SADC (under the auspices of the OPDS) has dealt with security threats in the DRC (1998), Mozambique, Zimbabwe (2000-today), Lesotho (2002, 2005, 2014), and Madagascar (2009). Yet, the results of the interventions did not lead to sustainable peace and security. For instance, in the DRC, insecurity remains rife especially in the Kiev region whilst Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis threatens to spiral out of control. Globalization and interdependency have led to the proliferation of new forms of security threats and challenges. The SADC region has not been spared from such security threats.

Security Climate in Southern Africa: A Synopsis

Collective Security and Human Security Paradigms

The prevailing security situation in the SADC region should be viewed through the lenses of collective security and human security frameworks. Collective Security is a device of crisis management that emphasizes a commitment on the part of all the nations to collectively meet an aggression that may be committed by any state against another.⁸ It is a deterrent mechanism aptly captured by Morgenthau’s⁹ articulation: “one for all and all for one is the watchword of collective security.”¹⁰ Any potential aggressor would, ideally, think twice before attacking any member state belonging to a collective security architecture. Collective security is also crucial for state survival. Empirical research indicates that “states that practice collective security principles are more likely to survive in a realist world than states that operate according to realist principles.”¹¹ SADC states practice collective security at a regional level.

The Human Security paradigm was introduced and espoused by the UNDP and articulated through the 1994 global Human Development Report (HDR). The human security approach broadens the scope of security analysis and policy from territorial security to the security of people. Its essential elements are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.¹² Human security represents a sharp departure from the traditional form of security which is parochial and state-centric in theory and praxis. The human security concept articulates a wide range of issues such as climate change, political rights, food security, and health. Human security and collective security operate largely in conjunction. They are dependent on each other in the sense that a breach on one has a ripple effect on the other and vice-versa. It is useful to view the current security dynamics in the SADC region in the context of collective and human security paradigms.

Prevailing Security Situation in Southern Africa

Countries in Southern African have faced multi-layered security challenges, especially during the colonial and Cold War eras. However, over the past two decades, most of the countries in the region have been peaceful and stable.¹³ For a quarter of a century, the countries in the region, with the notable exceptions of Botswana and Mauritius, were under various forms of authoritarian, apartheid, or one-party rule.¹⁴ Most of the conflicts in the region germinated from colonialism and the Cold War. Consequently, conflict and war marked the region considerably – particularly conflicts over enduring systems of apartheid and colonialism, which engulfed most of Southern Africa and led to millions of deaths.¹⁵ For instance, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola gained their independence through the barrel of a gun. Angola and Mozambique suffered further from post-independence civil wars, fuelled in part by Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia.¹⁶ In the post-Cold War era, political instability in Lesotho and the Second Congo War (1998-2003) have been the most notable conflicts in the SADC region.

In the past decade, the region’s peace and stability pattern has been put to test due to armed insurgencies, social cleavages, and governance deficits relating to authoritarian rule and abuse of state resources in Southern Africa.¹⁷ The residual conflict in the DRC, insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province, the Zimbabwe Crisis, and the latest violent protests in South Africa and crackdown on protestors in Eswatini are some of the latest security challenges facing SADC. In most cases, conflicts are fuelled by poverty, marginalization, and the weakness of states in the SADC region.¹⁸ The SADC’s interventions in the aforementioned countries have historically had significant issues. Part of the reason why SADC has failed to deal with conflicts is that the bloc’s institutional framework for regional peace and security is proving ineffective as its leaders are unwilling to enforce democratic principles.¹⁹ Another human security threat in the SADC region is the COVID-19 pandemic which has claimed 69,850 lives out of the 2,436,758 reported cases as of 4 September 2021;²⁰ the political and socio-economic ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic are wide and far-reaching. SADC’s record of ineffectively tackling crises in the SADC region has also attracted scrutiny regarding how the regional bloc has handled South Africa’s and Eswatini’s recent violent uprisings. For instance, the crisis in Eswatini raised uncomfortable questions for SADC as the way the regional bloc handled the crisis was reminiscent of how it tackled the COVID-19 pandemic, effects of climate change (e.g., drought), and Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado crisis which almost spilled into the rest of the Southern African region.²¹ Due to SADC’s inertia, South Africa’s President, Cyril Ramaphosa, had to deploy the army to quell the protests; the move was deemed undemocratic but ‘a necessary evil.’²²

SADC’s Reaction to Political Crises in South Africa and Eswatini

Brief Background to the Protests

In the summer of 2021, the kingdom of Eswatini and the country of South Africa were plagued by violent protests. Protests against King Mswati III’s 35-year-old kleptocratic, monarchical, and iron-fisted rule erupted on 20 June in Eswatini. Protests emerged in South Africa in the Kwazulu Natal and Gauteng provinces after the arrest of South Africa’s former President, Jacob Zuma, on 8 July. In Eswatini, protests were spearheaded by the civil society and opposition parties such as the Community Party of Swaziland (CPS), People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), Economic Freedom Fighters of Swaziland (EFFSWA), and the African United Democratic Party (AUDP). In South Africa, a faction of the ANC loyal to Jacob Zuma was behind the protests. The protests in both countries had a common consequence: massive violence whose economic effects spilled over into the entire SADC region.

In Eswatini, the protests by pro-democracy groups demanding political reforms turned violent as some protestors burnt property belonging to the ruling elite.²³ In a bid to suppress the protests, King Mswati III declared a state of emergency and unleashed security forces on the protestors and general populace. As a result, at least 40 people were killed and over 150 protestors were hospitalized with injuries from live ammunition or beatings by security forces.²⁴ Despite the political cosmetic changes made by the King – such as the retiring of the army chief, appointing of a Prime Minister, and ‘negotiating’ with aggrieved groups – protests in Eswatini continue albeit at a slow, sporadic, and spontaneous pattern. The ever-shrinking democratic space, poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the royal family’s opulent lifestyle, and the government’s failure to pay civil servants fuelled the protests.²⁵

On 29 June, Jacob Zuma was sentenced to 15 months in prison for defying a constitutional court order to provide evidence at an inquiry investigating high-level corruption during his tenure in office. The resultant protests led to unprecedented violence. More than 100 people lost their lives, and numerous business enterprises were looted and destroyed, especially in Kwazulu Natal and Gauteng.²⁶ South Africa’s President, Cyril Ramaphosa, had to deploy the army to quell the mayhem. Although the protests in South Africa dissipated with the deployment of the army, the root causes of the protests remain.

There are two dominant theses on the causes of South Africa’s protests: the first thesis views the protests from the view of the Cyril Ramaphosa versus the Jacob Zuma factions in the ruling ANC whilst the latter points to the deep-seated economic inequality and poverty in South Africa. The first thesis is supported by political analyst Mohammed Jameel Abdulla, who notes that some protestors were political agents of the anti-Ramaphosa and pro-Zuma faction in the ruling ANC.²⁷ The second thesis is predicated on South Africa’s chronic poverty and inequality gap. For instance, in 2018, the World Bank listed South Africa as the most unequal country in the world, meaning that Africa’s most advanced economy does not equally benefit all its citizens.²⁸ Such structural issues are deeply rooted in the legacy of Apartheid and are a breeding ground for chaos, as witnessed in July of 2021. The economic cost of the protests was gigantic: “more than 200 shopping malls [were] looted empty and or burnt, while infrastructure worth billions of dollars was destroyed.”²⁹ The total value of economic loss after the protest stood at 3.4 billion dollars.³⁰

South Africa is Southern Africa’s ‘powerhouse’ due to its role in supplying large portions of the region with goods and services. The violence in the country restricted the movement of goods and services to countries such as Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Mozambique. Evidently, protests in the two countries have the potential of triggering a domino effect across the SADC region.

SADC’s Reaction: Influencing Factors

To understand SADC’s reaction to crises in Southern Africa Countries, and Eswatini and South Africa in particular, it is crucial to understand the underlying factors that influence the regional bloc’s response trajectory: Colonialism, the Cold War, African culture, and SADC’s current leadership.

Besides Ethiopia and Liberia, all countries in Africa bore the yoke of colonialism and imperialism by European powers. The Netherlands, Britain, Portugal, France, and Germany were the notable colonial forces in Southern Africa. Colonial domination in Africa bred resistance, especially through the process of decolonization. The decolonization process was largely a violent program – particularly in the countries of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa. According to political philosopher Frantz Fanon, “decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder.”³¹ Further, decolonization produced radical African leaders who treated the West with suspicion and scepticism.³² In most cases, opposition parties and civil society groups were viewed by these leaders as puppets of the West, bent on reversing Africa’s independence. Consequently, this perception, imagined or real, affects the way SADC reacts to crises in the region.

During the liberation struggle, liberation movements in Southern Africa and their parties formed a strong bond under the philosophy of Pan-Africanism.³³ In their revolutionary and solidarity parlance, the ANC (South Africa), ZANU PF (Zimbabwe), SWAPO (Namibia), FRELIMO (Mozambique), and Chama Cha Mapinduz (Tanzania) parties referred to themselves as “sister parties.” Such an intimate relationship – coupled with African culture which places much value on brotherhood/ sisterhood, togetherness, and respect – have arguably strangled constructive criticism directed towards SADC leadership. Additionally, most of the above-mentioned liberation movements were supported by communist and socialist countries such as East Germany, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China during the liberation struggle. The association with the communist bloc led to the adoption of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideological philosophy by post-independence African leaders. The process of decolonization and ideology shaped SADC’s leaders’ political perceptions and reactions to events in the region.

Another key issue to SADC’s reaction to crises is the current leadership that exists in the region. There are generally two categories:

The first category comprises the heroic but old-style conservative leadership, the vanguard of the liberation struggle, which brought independence from colonial rule. It inflexibly believes in absolute sovereignty regardless of the changing times and, occasionally, it is also radical. It publicly claims to be correcting the injustices of the past even as it creates its own share of injustices. It has less enthusiasm for substantive political and economic liberalization. It pays lip service to democratically acquired popular legitimacy. It does not trust the Western world that it blames for most, if not all, past (colonial) and current injustices. Moreover, it suspects the West of harbouring sinister motives in Africa. It regards neo-liberalism as a western-propelled strategy to re-conquer and exploit the natural resources of the Third World in general, but Africa in particular. Last, but not least, it refrains from supporting democratic trends in other countries hiding behind the façade of the ‘non-interference’ clause in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Thus, the international relations of this category of African leadership are primarily motivated by its regime security and survival concerns.³⁴

A closer look reveals that the old-style conservative leadership that is largely impervious to democratic norms and principles is dominant in Southern Africa – especially in Eswatini, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Angola. This kind of leadership conveniently views any form of opposition or protests as a threat of neo-colonialism. This partially explains why the leadership in Zimbabwe (under Mugabe and Mnangwagwa), Tanzania (under Magufuli), Madagascar, and Eswatini have not been strongly censured by SADC for abusing their citizens. To Fanon, “each generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it.”³⁵ In the same vein, in one of his seminal works, Jonathan Moyo indicates that, in Africa, there are four generations of leaders: the Pan-African generation, the nationalist generation, the globalist generation, and the renascent generation.³⁶ The majority of the leaders in SADC now fit neatly into the nationalist generation which fought for the region’s independence. These leaders support each other through thick and thin, no matter the circumstances. However, there is a secondary category of African leadership that is scant in number. This generation of leadership fits in Moyo’s globalist generation:

The second category consists mostly of a new and young generation of modern, pragmatic and forward-looking African leaders who appear to be politically and economically reform-oriented. This group, currently predominant in the opposition, promises to depend on democratically acquired popular legitimacy to govern successfully. Whilst it remembers the past and attaches great importance to acquired inalienable values such as independence and sovereignty, it believes that these are, practically, relative rather than absolute. Equally, it believes that contemporary international relations produce relative rather than absolute gains since actors ‘take’ in return for ‘giving’, a basis which forms the essence of diplomacy. It is seemingly determined to move African countries forward, in tandem with the demands of a globalizing world so as to maximize its relative benefits, and also believes in the inevitability of legitimate expectations of internal peaceful democratic political change. Furthermore, it exhibits a stronger preference for constructive engagement and integration with the Western world rather than confrontation and de-linking. Its international relations are motivated not by suspicions and fear but by a combination of aspirations and hopes. It openly supports democratic trends in other countries. Thus, African countries in this category insist that pan-African solidarity should be strictly qualified rather than distorting it for the sake of unconditionally preserving discredited incumbent parties and leaders.³⁷

In the SADC region, the above-mentioned leaders can be found in Botswana, Mauritius, and Zambia (newly elected Hakainde Hichilema). South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Lesotho, and DRC’s leadership are arguably hybrids of the nationalist and globalist generations. ‘Globalist’ leaders such as former Presidents Ian Khama of Botswana and Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia were the only leaders with the audacity to rebuke their fellows for human rights abuses. In short, the majority of SADC’s leaders’ perceptions of and reactions to crises in the region are shaped by the legacy of colonialism, liberation struggle, ideological beliefs, and African culture. These factors shape their thinking, loyalty, and support for each other. These factors could help explain SADC’s reaction to South Africa’s and Eswatini’s violent protests.

The South African and Eswatini Cases

South Africa

The way SADC tackled South Africa’s protest is concerning for several reasons. It can best be described as a lukewarm response that was underpinned by a ‘wait and see’ attitude. As discussed in the preceding sections, the protests in South Africa were extremely violent, claimed numerous lives, led to the destruction of property, and threatened to tear apart the social and moral fabric of Nelson Mandela’s ‘Rainbow Nation.’ By its own admission, SADC notes, “the violent protests are not only a threat to human life, they breed instability, stifle economic growth, amplify risks and half the much-needed return to investment.”³⁸

Despite the gravity of the protests in South Africa, SADC merely issued a statement through its Chairperson, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique. Part of the statement read:

“The Southern African Development Community (SADC) expresses its concern and regret at the reported loss of life and wanton destruction of property during the recent protests in the Republic of South Africa… SADC therefore unreservedly condemns these attacks on properties, businesses and persons.³⁹

Notably, SADC’s statement failed to address the root causes of the protests: the deeply seated economic inequality and factionalism in the ANC. Rather, the statement called on the protestors to be peaceful. SADC’s statement was devoid of any robust policy prescription to the crisis. This is in sync with SADC’s old tradition of ‘quiet diplomacy’⁴⁰ and the ‘wait and see’ diplomatic strategy. Further, SADC’s statement was partisan insofar as it rebuked protestors, exonerated the Ramaphosa administration, and ignored alleged breaches by security forces. SADC’s intervention in South Africa was only limited to the issuing of the mentioned statement. The South African protests dissipated with the deployment of the army by President Ramaphosa.

Eswatini

As previously stated, it is the SADC’s mandate, via the OPDS, to maintain peace and security in the region through intelligence gathering for conflict prevention purposes. Yet, in the case of Eswatini, SADC only intervened after the civil society organization and the ANC bemoaned the deteriorating situation. Part of the ANC’s statement on the Eswatini crisis read:

We call on the Eswatini government to work towards the normalization of the political environment by unbanning opposition political and other parties, releasing political activists, and engaging in meaningful dialogue with opposition parties, its citizens, and trade unions to find a collective solution to the socio-economic circumstances in the country.⁴¹

The ANC’s statement highlighted the root causes of the protests in Eswatini: the need for dialogue and progressive political and socio-economic reforms (democratization). It was therefore in line with the aspirations of pro-democracy groups and the aims of Eswatini’s citizens more generally.

It was only after the ANC called on the SADC “to intervene before the situation escalates beyond control”⁴² that the regional bloc released a statement on 2 July citing only one of the forty total fatalities reported on by independent organizations. SADC’s statement – presented by the OPDS Chairperson, President Mokgweetsi Masisi of Botswana – noted:

SADC also urges all stakeholders to channel their grievances through the established national structures, and the authorities to have an open national dialogue, in order to continue upholding the legacy of peace and stability that has characterised the people of the Kingdom of eSwatini, and the region at large.⁴³

As per SADC’s tradition, the statement focused on the violence perpetrated by protestors and turned a blind eye to the state’s heavy-handedness on the protestors and the public. SADC’s statement was also conspicuously silent on the drivers behind the crisis. This silence, in turn, casts doubt as to whether the regional bloc had the political will and capacity to resolve the conflict. Further, SADC attempted to downplay and cover-up the crisis by under-reporting the loss of life and referring to the uprising as “disturbances.”⁴⁴

As the above-cited statement was condemned by civil society organizations, SADC, under the auspices of OPDS, sent a delegation to Eswatini to meet governing officials on 4 July. The delegation – which consisted of South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Naledi Pandor, and Botswana’s Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation, Lemogang Kwape – held talks with Eswatini’s Acting Prime Minister, Themba Masuku, who promised that Eswatini would work with SADC to resolve the conflict.

Later, the Chairperson of SADC OPDS, Mokgweetsi Masisi, issued another statement wherein he announced the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Eswatini from 15 to 22 July.⁴⁵ Calling for restraint and dialogue, the purported purpose of the mission was to “analyze the political and security situation in the country, with a view to support the people of Eswatini towards finding a durable solution.”⁴⁶ The mission was mandated with conducting an all-stakeholders meeting to tackle the conflict. Accordingly, the mission held meetings with government officials, church groups, civil society organizations, and labor unions. However, the government of Eswatini was accused by pro-democracy civil society groups of excluding critical voices by handpicking civil society groups to meet the SADC delegation. Furthermore, the SADC mission’s visit did not pay notable dividends; Eswatini remains at a tipping point, as evidenced by the spontaneous and sporadic protests that continue to characterize the country.

Conclusion and Recommendations

SADC is geared towards providing “African solutions to African problems.” However, the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, Pan-Africanism, and African culture (the ‘brotherhood’) has greatly influenced how the regional bloc perceives and reacts to crises in Southern Africa. SADC, under the aegis of the OPDS, is mandated with protecting both human and collective security in Southern Africa. Nonetheless, the regional bloc struggles to preserve peace in the SADC region. Although SADC has played a commendable role in the context of facilitating dialogue between belligerent parties in Southern Africa, the recent violent protests and/ or security threats in South Africa and Eswatini further expose its fault lines.

In the case of South Africa, SADC adopted a ‘quiet diplomacy,’ ‘wait and see’ approach as the protests spiralled out of control and threatened to spill-over into neighboring countries. The regional bloc hoped that the protests, violence, and looting would dissipate on their own accord. Similarly, in Eswatini, SADC only flexed its diplomatic muscle after the ANC called on the regional body to act. Upon intervention, SADC did not rebuke King Mswati III for his excessive repression against protestors and citizens. Rather, the regional bloc adopted a partisan policy of appeasement towards King Mswati III by downgrading the crisis to merely “disturbances” and under-reporting the atrocities committed by security elements. In Eswatini, SADC prioritized regime security (the Mswati III regime’s survival) over human and collective security. Such an individualistic and state-centric approach is detrimental to sustainable peace and security. Also, the tendency to insulate authoritarian leaders like King Mswati III is prejudicial to the democratization project in Southern Africa and has given rise to strongmen (strong leaders) at the expense of strong institutions. Hence, the widespread belief that most states in Africa, including in the SADC region, are strong where they ought to be weak and weak where they ought to be strong.

Weak conflict resolution mechanisms have also undercut SADC’s peace maintenance efforts. SADC’s intervention efforts in South Africa and Eswatini largely focused on the symptoms rather than the causes of the crises. In South Africa, the violent unrest emanated from deep-seated economic inequality within the social edifice and the cut-throat factional battles in the ANC. In Eswatini, an acute democracy deficit was a primary source of turbulence. Yet, SADC’s conflict resolution approach peripheralized these core grievances. The regional bloc was fixated on the circumstantial elements rather than the fundamentals of the crises in the two countries.

Poor intelligence gathering and fragile early warning systems are likely to be SADC’s Achilles’ heel in the context of peace and security maintenance in Southern Africa. Its conflict resolution effort is largely reactive rather than proactive – hence the ‘fire-fighting’ in South Africa, Eswatini, and other conflict-ridden countries in Southern Africa. Unlike ECOWAS, which is known for taking tough corrective action against any breach by its members, SADC is traditionally known for its inability to enforce sanctions against its members. For instance, King Mswati III is likely to get away with brutalizing pro-democracy groups and the general populace in Eswatini.

Considering the above shortcomings, the following recommendations could be crucial for the maintenance of peace and security by SADC in Southern Africa in general, and in South Africa and Eswatini in particular:

Tackling Root Causes of Conflicts. The protests in South Africa and Eswatini are symptomatic of deep-seated political and structural issues. In South Africa, any solution to public discontentment should address social and economic inequality, a monster that largely owes its existence to Apartheid. Developing a robust ‘zero tolerance to corruption’ government policy, strengthening social safety nets, increasing access to education, spearheading general and racial equality policies, and distributing land fairly and sustainably are some of the solutions that could bridge the wide inequality and poverty gap in South Africa. On the other hand, in Eswatini, there is a need for SADC to heed the call from pro-democracy voices and press for genuine political reforms and the opening of the democratic horizon. In an age of globalization and interdependency, an absolute monarch is no longer fashionable. The monarch should play a ceremonial role and a multi-party democracy should be introduced.
Democratization. There is a need for all SADC countries to embrace and practice democratic norms and principles. At its present state, SADC consists of a blend of a few democracies, relative democracies, de facto military dictatorships, monarchical and ‘divine’ rule, and civilian dictatorships. Such heterogenous governance systems at the state level certainly scuttle peace and security maintenance at the regional level. Experience from the European Union indicates that successful regional integration occurs when countries share the same governance culture, vision, and aspirations. Democracy should be embraced at theoretical and praxis levels by all SADC countries. The democratic aspirations of the people of Eswatini should be realized.
Adopting New Diplomatic Approaches. SADC’s minimalist approach to conflict prevention and management premised on ‘quiet diplomacy,’ ‘crisis postponement,’ partisan diplomacy, and a ‘wait and see’ attitude should be abandoned. Such an approach did not bear fruits in Zimbabwe and was ineffective in Eswatini and South Africa. A maximalist approach that is realistic, inclusive, genuine, and proactive is needed. Conflicts should be tackled from a collective and human security perspective rather than from a state-centric philosophical position. Prevailing security threats are multi-pronged and multi-layered and there is a need to involve more actors in peace building and maintenance initiatives. The role of all governance actors – especially states, civil society organizations, the UN, eminent personalities, labor, traditional institutions, youths, women, and the business community – should not be overlooked.
Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Early Warning Systems. The SADC OPDS should develop a robust intelligence gathering framework that would feed into the regional body’s early warning system. This will help to detect crises before they erupt. Also, such a framework and system could reverse SADC’s trend and trajectory from reacting to crises to preventing them. In Eswatini and South Africa, SADC played a reactive rather than a preventative role.
Sanctions. SADC is known for treating its member states with a ‘velvet glove’ when they abuse their citizens. Classic examples of such preferential treatment were witnessed in Zimbabwe (under Robert Mugabe and Emmerson Mnangagwa), Tanzania (under John Magufuli), and Eswatini (under King Mswati III) when SADC turned a blind eye to tyrannical rule. This retrogressive trend should cease, and the SADC should look to the example of ECOWAS which traditionally has not hesitated to suspect a member state if it seriously breaches the rules. A ‘carrot and stick’ diplomatic approach could bear positive results. SADC should consider implementing the above highlighted recommendations lest it remains a mere talking shop.

Please Share this Article