ECOWAS’ Response to Coups in West Africa, 2020-2021

Catherine Galley,Research Analyst, Leadership and Governance Policy Lab
cgalley@africacfsp.org

West Africa is the most coup-prone region in Africa. As coups are associated with decreased economic growth, an increase in human rights abuses, and a lack of democracy, how ECOWAS has responded to recent coups is an important topic of study. This report thus examines ECOWAS’ responses to the 2020 Malian Coup, the 2021 Guinean Coup, and the 2021 military transition of power in Mali. This report further discusses the importance of preventative measures, measures such as ensuring good governance in member states and preventing state leaders from manipulating the constitution to remain in power.

Introduction

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 to promote economic integration between its 15 member states.¹ However, prompted by the outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1989, ECOWAS gradually transformed into an organisation that is also responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crises which undermine peace and security within member states.² The expansion of ECOWAS’ mandate was codified in the 1993 Revised Treaty and the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.³ Following the democratic transition of many African countries in the early 1990s and the African Union’s move from non-interference to the promotion of democracy, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001.⁴ The Protocol codified ECOWAS’ rejection of unconstitutional changes of government; subsections b and c of article 1 state that “every ascension to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections” and that there is “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.”⁵ This protocol was one of ECOWAS’ most ambitious attempts to strengthen peace, democracy, and stability in the region.⁶

However, there have been nine successful coups and 12 attempted coups in ECOWAS member states since 2001, suggesting that the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance has not been effective in preventing unconstitutional changes of government. West Africa has historically been the most coup-prone region in Africa: 40% of attempted coups and 56% of successful coups have taken place in West Africa since 1952. Of the nine attempted or successful coups between January 2020 and March 2022, six took place in West Africa. Only two of the 15 ECOWAS member states have never experienced a military coup or unconstitutional change in government (Senegal and Cabo Verde).⁷

Although some academic experts – including Dr Francis Nguendi Ikome, Professor Nikolay Marinov, and Associate Professor Hein Goemans – suggest that coups can be advantageous because they remove dictators and can facilitate the introduction of elections,⁸ many, including Professor Nic Cheeseman and Dr Oisín Tansey, agree that coups are typically harmful because they allow the military to entrench its preferences, tend to lead to more coups, and do not result in countries becoming more democratic.⁹ There is no evidence that military leaders govern any better than elected leaders. Instead, coups often result in increased state repression and a decrease in growth that negatively impacts many indicators of development – indicators such as infant mortality, education, investment, and indebtedness.¹⁰

It is important to understand how international institutions can act both to prevent coups and to encourage a return to democracy following a coup. This piece examines how ECOWAS responded to the recent coups in Mali and Guinea and presents suggestions on how ECOWAS could improve its responses in the future. ECOWAS’ response to the January 2022 coup in Burkina Faso is not examined because ECOWAS has yet to impose sanctions.¹¹

The 2020 Malian Coup

The 2020 Malian coup followed mass anti-government demonstrations in which thousands of Malians protested against rising insecurity, alleged corruption, and the failing economy.¹² In July 2020, the ECOWAS commission recognised that “the current crisis [in Mali] is quite similar to the one that occurred in 2012, when violent demonstrations led to a military coup on 22 March 2012 that plunged Mali into uncertainty and fostered the expansion of terrorist jihadist groups in the country.”¹³ Following the security services killing 14 protesters in July, ECOWAS deployed a ministerial mission to Bamako and made a series of recommendations to the Malian government. These recommendations included the establishment of a national unity government, a body which would have included members of the opposition and would have been tasked with managing the consequences of the demonstrators, implementing reforms, and improving governance.¹⁴ A national unity government was never implemented. Protests continued throughout July and August.¹⁵

On 18 August 2020, following a dispute over military promotions, Colonel Goita, Commander of the Malian Special Forces, and a group of military officers arrested Malian President Kieta and established the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP).¹⁶ In the days following the coup, opposition supporters celebrated Kieta’s overthrow, hailing the overthrow a “victory of the Malian people.”¹⁷ The CNSP did not present a radical agenda of change, instead stating that they wanted to do the job that elected leaders had failed to do.¹⁸

ECOWAS and other international bodies condemned the coup. ECOWAS immediately suspended Mali from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies, closed all land and air borders, and stopped all financial, economic, and trade flows and transactions between ECOWAS member states and Mali.¹⁹ It is worth noting these restrictions did not apply to basic essentials, drugs, supplies for the fight against COVID-19, petroleum products, and electricity.²⁰ ECOWAS also imposed targeted sanctions on military putschists and their collaborators, dispatched a delegation to Mali, and called for the immediate activation of the ECOWAS standby force.²¹ Despite their initial demands for a three-year military led transition, the CNSP was quick to concede to ECOWAS’ demands for an 18-month civilian led transition.²² In late September, the CNSP appointed former Defence Minister (and retired Army Colonel) Bah Ndaw as President and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Moctar Ouane as Prime Minister, with Colonel Goita as Vice President.²³ On 5 October, ECOWAS agreed to lift sanctions following the appointment of a civilian President and Prime Minister, the establishment of an 18-month transition period, and the removal of the provision allowing the Vice President to replace the President.²⁴

The 2021 Malian Transition of Power

After a disagreement over a government reshuffle that would have threatened the military’s influence, Colonel Goita (currently serving as Vice President) detained acting President Bah Ndaw and acting Prime Minister Moctar Ouane on 24 May 2021.²⁵ The interim government, led by Colonel Goita, initially announced that elections would continue as planned in 2022 and agreed to appoint a new, more broadly based government in response to the ongoing challenges and the threat of renewed protests.²⁶

ECOWAS’ initial response to Colonel Goita’s seizure of power was milder than their response to the 2020 coup. ECOWAS suspended Mali’s membership and stated that authorities must stick to the timetable for the return to democracy.²⁷ ECOWAS did not impose sanctions or call for Colonel Goita to step down from his role as interim President. Instead, ECOWAS called for the nomination of a new civilian Prime Minister and the formation of an inclusive government to proceed with the transition program.²⁸ ECOWAS shifted to a harsher stance in September over continued concerns about the slow pace of preparations for the elections and imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on individuals and groups “whose actions have negative impact on the transition timetable,” including all the members of the Transition Authority.²⁹ Following the Transition Authorities’ submission of an election calendar on 13 December 2021 – scheduling the Presidential elections to take place before December 2026 (which was resubmitted on 8 January 2022 to schedule presidential elections before December 2025) – ECOWAS imposed new sanctions on Mali and the Transition Authorities, stating that the new calendar allows “an illegitimate military transition Government [to] take the Malian people hostage [for] the next five years.”³⁰ These new sanctions include the recall of ambassadors, the closure of land and air borders between ECOWAS member states and Mali, and the suspension of all non-essential commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS member states and Mali. ECOWAS also froze the assets of the Republic of Mali in ECOWAS Central Banks and the assets of the Malian State in Commercial Banks. Additionally, ECOWAS suspended Mali from all financial assistance and transactions with all financial institutions.³¹ It is not evident whether the Transition Authorities’ delay in scheduling elections results from ineptitude, the continued political insecurity, or the Transition Authorities’ desire to retain power. However, as the 2021 Transition of Power occurred because the military was concerned about losing influence, it is likely that the Transition Authorities are seeking to entrench the military’s position in politics before elections are held. Nevertheless, the new sanctions demonstrate that ECOWAS is prepared to take a firm stance regarding the return to democracy in Mali. The organisation may have been influenced by the coup in Guinea and fear of further coups in the region.

The 2021 Guinean Coup

In Guinea, President Conde’s efforts to seek a controversial third term sparked a year of violent protests and accusations that his victory was fraudulent. On 5 September 2021, a group of elite troops led by Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya removed President Conde from office on 5 September 2021 and installed Colonel Doumbouya as the President of the Comitè National du Rassemblement pour le Dèveloppement [National Committee of Reconciliation and Development] (CNRD).³² President Conde’s demise was greeted with a wave of celebrations across Conakry and other large cities.³³ ECOWAS responded to the coup by suspending Guinea from all ECOWAS governing bodies, dispatching a high-level ECOWAS mission to Guinea, imposing a travel ban and asset freeze on members of the CNRD and their families, stating that Presidential and legislative elections must be held within six months, and declaring that no member of the CNRD would be allowed to contest the Presidential election.³⁴ ECOWAS has repeatedly stated that sanctions will not be lifted until constitutional order is restored. Six months after the coup, Guinean leaders have yet to propose a schedule for the return to democracy.³⁵

Analysis

Country	Initial Response	Lifting Sanctions	Transition of Power
Mali (2020)	Suspended Mali from all ECOWAS decision making bodies with immediate effect Closed all land air borders. Stopped non-essential financial, economic and trade flows and transactions Called for the immediate imposition of targeted sanctions against coup leaders Called for the immediate activation of the ECOWAS standby force	Sanctions lifted after the appointment of a civilian President and Prime Minister, the provision of an 18-month transition period, and the imposition of a clause preventing the Vice President from taking power This occurred 48 days after the coup The scheduling of elections was not required for sanctions to be lifted	18-month transition of power with a civilian President and Prime Minister Colonel Goita allowed to become Vice President
Mali (2021)	Immediately suspended Mali from ECOWAS Institutions Called for a new civilian Prime Minister to be nominated immediately Reaffirmed the need to respect the 18-month transition period	Sanctions imposed after the transition Government attempted to schedule elections for December 2025 will be lifted when an acceptable and agreed election calendar is finalised and satisfactory progress is realised in the implementation of the calendar for the elections.	Transition of Power to end 18 months after Mali 2020 Coup (nine months after Mali 2021 Transition of Power) Colonel Goita allowed to remain as President
Guinea (2021)	Suspended Guinea from all governing bodies with immediate effect Six days after the coup, ECOWAS imposed travel bans and froze the financial assets of members of the CNRD and their families Announced elections should take place within six months	Sanctions will be lifted once constitutional order is restored.	Six-month transition of power Colonel Doumbouya allowed to remain as President

Initial Response

ECOWAS responded differently to the 2020 Malian coup, the 2021 Malian transition of power, and the 2021 Guinean coup. Initially, following all three coups, ECOWAS immediately suspended the membership of each country from ECOWAS governing bodies and condemned the coups. However, ECOWAS was harshest in its response to the Malian 2020 coup; ECOWAS immediately closed all land and air borders and stopped non-essential financial, economic, and trade flows and transactions on the day of the coup and called for sanctions against the coup leaders just two days later.³⁶ In comparison, sanctions were not implemented onto Guinean coup leaders until eight days after the coup had occurred and Guinea’s land and air borders were never closed.³⁷ After Colonel Goita’s seizure of power in 2021, ECOWAS did not impose sanctions until nearly four months later when concerns grew over the preparations for the elections in February.³⁸ The immediate imposition of sanctions after the 2020 Malian coup may have been influenced by fears of coups spreading to other countries. Coups often inspire more coups, and it is likely ECOWAS did not want a repeat of the wave of coups that occurred between 2008 and 2012, when five coups occurred in four ECOWAS member states. Presidents Conde and Ouattara reportedly favoured harsh sanctions on the coup leaders in Mali to deter the opposition in their countries (who strongly opposed their attempts to secure a third term) from considering unconstitutional means to replace them.³⁹ After the Guinean coup, ECOWAS may have been more hesitant to impose sanctions as those imposed on Mali had evidently not prevented military leaders in Guinea from choosing to overthrow President Conde. Additionally, the harsh sanctions imposed on Mali, particularly the closing of borders and the stopping of trade flows and transactions, have alienated Malians, with thousands protesting in support of the military government after the sanctions were announced.⁴⁰

Lifting Sanctions

Another difference in how ECOWAS responded to the coups is the speed at which ECOWAS removed the initial sanctions. Although the 2020 Malian coup experienced the harshest initial sanctions, these were lifted after the appointment of a civilian President and Prime Minister, the provision of an 18-month transition period, and the imposition of a clause preventing the Vice President from taking power.⁴¹ Notably, the timetable for elections had not been announced when ECOWAS lifted the sanctions. However, ECOWAS has upheld the travel ban and asset freeze on members of the CNRD and their families in Guinea, which will continue until constitutional order is restored, even though the Guinean junta has adopted a transition charter, appointed a civilian Prime Minister, and formed a transition government.⁴² ECOWAS’ reluctance to lift sanctions in Guinea may reflect the lack of progress made by the Malian junta to return to democracy after the initial sanctions were lifted.

Transition of Power

A further difference in how ECOWAS responded to the coups is the length of the transition period they demanded. After the 2020 Malian coup, ECOWAS allowed an 18-month transition period led by a civilian President and Prime Minister.⁴³ However, ECOWAS allowed Colonel Doumbouya to remain in power but insisted on a six-month transition period after the Guinean coup.⁴⁴ This reduction in the length of the transition period may have been influenced by Colonel Goita’s seizure of power in Mali in May 2021 which suggested the possibility that an extended transition period allows for disruption to derail the return to democracy.

Lack of Preventative Measures

In addition to exploring ECOWAS’ response to coups, it also important to examine their actions before the coups took place. In both Mali and Guinea, protests and military discontent preceded the coups. In Mali, President Keita was largely viewed as a symbol of government corruption, unable to resolve the ongoing insecurity or the failing economy.⁴⁵ In Guinea, President Conde’s decision to introduce a new constitution in 2020 that allowed him to remain in power for a third term and allegations of election fraud challenged the legitimacy of his power.⁴⁶ Additionally, President Conde closed Guinea’s borders prior to the election and severely restricted phone and internet lines, in violation of ECOWAS community rules.⁴⁷

Despite claiming to promote peace, democracy, and stability in the region, ECOWAS did not intervene prior to the coups to ensure good governance. Although ECOWAS recognised that the situation in Mali in the Summer of 2020 was similar to the one that preceded the 2012 coup, ECOWAS’ intervention was limited to a Ministerial Mission and recommendations about the formation of a National Unity Government, the resignation of all the members of parliament whose elections were contested, and a quick investigation into the security force’s killing of protestors in July 2020.⁴⁸ In Guinea, ECOWAS did not prevent President Conde from securing a third term, despite this being unconstitutional and unpopular.

It is possible that if ECOWAS had acted to ensure good governance in Mali and Guinea, security forces may not have felt it necessary to use unconstitutional measures to remove the Presidents from power. Similar concerns about ECOWAS’ failure to challenge the actions of sitting governments and act only when there is an unconstitutional change of government were raised following the five coups in ECOWAS member states between 2008 and 2012.⁴⁹ David Zounmenou, a senior consultant at the Institute for Security Studies, summarises the challenge caused by ECOWAS’ failure to act proactively, commenting in the Financial Times that ECOWAS has “lost credibility and influence, because of the gap that exists between the norms they are trying to promote and their attitudes towards those norms when one of theirs is flaunting them.”⁵⁰ ECOWAS’ decisions are made by the Head of States of member countries who often seek to act in their own interests. Heads of State that have successfully extended their time in power, such as President Ouattara and President Gnassingbé, are unlikely to criticise similar attempts in other countries. Similarly, where governments have been accused of human rights abuses – such as those in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria – the Heads of State are unlikely to criticise similar abuses in other countries. Where leaders are concerned about the possibility of a military coup in their own country, they are likely to respond harshly when coups occur in neighbouring countries to set an example. Self-interest among Heads of State is likely to curtail ECOWAS’ interest in implementing preventative measures and encourage harsh reactions after a coup has occurred.

Additionally, the efficacy of ECOWAS’ sanctions has been limited by countries willing to support the juntas – countries including Mauritania, Russia, and China. Harsh sanctions have often turned populations against ECOWAS and its European allies. In Mali, for example, the harsh sanctions increased tensions between the population and ECOWAS, with protestors calling for Russian intervention and the junta gaining support rather than being undermined by the sanctions.⁵¹ ECOWAS should balance its desire to utilise sanctions with the importance of retaining support in target countries.

Conclusion

This report has examined how ECOWAS responded to the coups in Mali and Guinea and has compared ECOWAS’ initial response, criteria for lifting sanctions, and requirements for the transition period. ECOWAS has prioritised the return of elections, often allowing coup leaders to remain in power in the interim. However, given that leaders in Mali and Guinea have not yet scheduled elections or provided a timetable for the return to democracy and an additional coup in Burkina Faso in January 2022, it does not appear that ECOWAS’ response to the coups has been effective in returning countries to democracy or in discouraging militaries in other countries. In Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, the coups followed mass protests and discontent with the incumbent President. ECOWAS should investigate what actions it can take to help prevent coups, as returning countries to democracy after coups have occurred is challenging.

Recommendations

ECOWAS should continue to monitor the effectiveness of sanctions and consider alternative options. International organisations, including the African Union and United Nations, should provide information about alternative solutions and suggest methods that have worked elsewhere, whilst providing support where sanctions have been implemented to increase their efficiency.
ECOWAS should work to present a more consistent position on democracy and good governance in member states by specifying mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of the rule of law, human rights protection, democracy, and good governance, and devising sanctions for the lack of implementation. ECOWAS should also seek to ensure that judgements on elections and democratic crises given by the ECOWAS Court of Justice are obeyed, as the Court currently has no means to enforce its judgements.⁵²
ECOWAS should seek to tackle other forms of unconstitutional governance, such as the extension of Presidential terms by imposing sanctions and publicly condemning all forms of unconstitutional governance, not just coups.
ECOWAS should seek to reduce corruption, increase security, and challenge inequality within member states by creating mechanisms for transparency, exposing corrupt activities, and providing member governments with security and development assistance that is conditional on security forces not committing human rights abuses.
ECOWAS should investigate further methods of support for member states experiencing political turmoil, such as was occurring in Mali in between June and August 2020.

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