Political Violence and Insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger: Understanding the Impact

Catherine Galley, Research Analyst, Leadership and Governance Policy Lab
cgalley@africacfsp.org

Terrorism, political violence, and insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has resulted in political instability. The increased possibility of violence and refugee movement across borders threatens neighboring countries. This report examines how terrorism, organised crime, migration, great power competition, and the need to ‘save face’ impacts European countries’ response to terrorism and political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Background

The Central Sahel is, as the Italian Institute for International Political Studies described, “one of the world’s quintessential fragile areas,” with 8.7 million people experiencing a state of crisis or famine between June and August 2021, 2 million people internally displaced, and more than 1,500 civilians killed in 2021 alone.¹ Most of the political instability is concentrated in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, though other Sahelian countries including Chad and Cameroon have also been affected by terrorist violence and political instability.² This report focuses on the impact of insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and how this affects these countries, the wider region, and the West. The importance of understanding the situation in the Sahel is emphasised by Portugal’s Minister of Defence, who stated, “we need to address the growing arc of crises in our immediate neighbourhood because security crises and armed conflicts tend to be contagious, with multiple, often faraway impacts, that are difficult to predict,” adding that “the collapse of any of the Sahelian states would be a major risk for the security of North and West Africa, with significant knock-on effects for the security of Europe.”³

Conflict and instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has been fuelled by climate change, rapid population growth, widespread poverty and unemployment, weak governance, corruption and human rights violations.⁴ The desertification of the Sahel – resulting from rising temperatures, increased exposure to drought and declining water availability – has led to conflict over land and resources between ethnic groups.⁵ These tensions have been exacerbated by human rights violations by security forces and armed self-defence groups, often pushing marginalised populations towards jihadist organisations that can provide protection.⁶

The crisis in the Central Sahel began with the Tuareg rebellion in Mali in 2012.⁷ Tuareg and Islamist groups conquered territory in Northern Mali, before being pushed out by French forces in 2013.⁸ The Tuareg groups signed a peace agreement with the Malian government in 2015, though it was never fully implemented.⁹ However, Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, remained active in Mali and violence has since spread to the neighbouring states. In Burkina Faso, President Compaoré’s deposition in 2014 led to the erosion of existing conflict regulation and monitoring mechanisms and the dissolution of the presidential security regiment, an elite regiment that played a crucial role in intelligence and whose role has not been taken on by other national forces.¹⁰ Militant groups operating in Mali were able to build upon local grievances and ineffective military control to gain support in Burkina Faso. Similarly, militant groups crossed over into Niger, taking advantage of porous borders, limited government reach, and entrenched poverty to gain support.¹¹ By 2021, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were all in the top ten countries most affected by terrorism.¹²

The terrorist threat has continued to evolve. Currently, the al-Qaeda aligned Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State aligned Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) pose the greatest threat. These groups operate throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, have established governance structures, and provide justice and security to communities under their protection.¹³ In Mali, the government only exerts its authority within large cities in Central Mali, with much of the rural area effectively controlled by JNIM.¹⁴

Recorded Fatalities in Central Sahel 2021 — Map 1: Recorded Fatalities in the Central Sahel. Credit: Jules Duhamel, https://julesduhamel.wordpress.com/category/sahel/

However, militant groups are not entirely to blame for the violence. The security forces of all three countries have committed mass human rights violations and employed communal punishment whilst fighting the jihadist groups, as have the ethnic militias that these governments have used as proxy forces. In 2020, the security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso killed more civilians than the militant jihadist groups, and the Nigerian armed forces were accused of grave abuses against civilians.¹⁵ In 2020, the Human Rights Watch Director for the Sahel wrote that “it is vengeance over extrajudicial executions and other abuses by soldiers and pro-government militias that – more than anything else – is driving recruits into the Islamist ranks.”¹⁶ Indeed, violence between jihadists and self-defence militias has fractured around ethnic fault lines, with reprisal attacks often leading to a spiral of violence against civilians of opposing ethnic groups.¹⁷

Although most terrorist activity occurs along state borders where government control is weakest (see Map 1), the impact of terrorist violence has been felt across all three countries. In Mali and Burkina Faso, dissatisfaction with the security situation led to coups, with military leaders taking power.¹⁸ There was also an attempted coup in Niger in 2021. The Institute for Economics and Peace stated that the political instability following the coups and the internal political conflict in Niger were likely to provide jihadi groups with greater opportunities to exploit dissatisfaction with the government and lead security forces to be overstretched in their attempt to balance counterterrorism with internal peacekeeping.¹⁹

The impact of political violence and insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has already resulted in thousands of deaths, millions of people displaced, and two democratically elected leaders being overthrown.²⁰ However, there is potential for the situation to worsen. Continued insecurity may lead to future coups or give the transition governments an excuse to postpone the transition to democracy. Already, the military government in Mali has attempted to postpone elections until December 2025.²¹ Military governments are unlikely to prioritise holding security forces accountable for human rights violations, even though these are fuelling jihadist recruitment. Government failure to prevent security force violations is likely to escalate the conflict.

Number of People Killed by Terrorism in 2021 — Source: Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2022

Number of Internally Displaced People March 2022 — Source: UNHCR Operational Data Portal. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger

Number of People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance 2022 — Source: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Mali Factsheet, Burkina Faso Factsheet, Niger Factsheet

Impact on the Surrounding Countries

As with all conflicts, political violence and instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has spilled over national borders, impacting the surrounding countries. The neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania, and Nigeria have all been classified as “hotspots” by the Institute for Economics and Peace, meaning they have low levels of resilience and high or extremely high catastrophic threat levels.²² It is thus possible that surrounding countries may be particularly vulnerable to political instability if terrorist groups spill over borders.

Jihadist groups have already been expanding their areas of influence across borders. Suspected JNIM militants have recently carried out attacks in Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire, with Côte d’Ivoire experiencing at least 12 jihadist attacks in 2021.²³ Caleb Weiss of the FDD’s Long War Journal has recently expressed his concern that the rise of IED attacks by JNIM in Côte d’Ivoire is “disturbingly similar to the situations in both Burkina Faso and Niger wherein a slow trickle of initial IED’s eventually gave way to larger and more frequent attacks.”²⁴ Additionally, Northern Benin, which has recently been targeted by JNIM, has the same farmer-herder tensions and problems over land ownership as Niger and Burkina Faso, fuelling concern that this may be a futile recruitment ground for jihadist groups.

Infiltrating the coastal states would allow jihadist groups to create new supply lines for food and equipment and to unlock new sources of income, such as banditry, thus providing vital advantages for armed groups.²⁵

Impact to Europe

This section explores five ways in which political violence and insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger threatens Europe. There is significant concern that the success of jihadist groups in the Central Sahel may inspire terrorist attacks in the West – as was seen in France with the 2015 and 2016 Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice, incidents inspired by the Islamic State’s establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. ²⁶ The threat of international terrorist attacks is particularly concerning for France, which has a history of significant Islamist attacks and has been identified by JNIM as its primary enemy.²⁷ The concern is likely amplified by the salience of Political Islam in French politics and the 2022 Presidential elections, in which President Macron faced a significant challenge from the far right. France is also concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks on the French-owned uranium mines in Niger, which supply three quarters of France’s energy.²⁸

Furthermore, jihadist groups in the Central Sahel are also involved in organised crime. Due to the proximity of the Central Sahel to Europe and the well-established smuggling routes through North Africa, European countries are vulnerable to the spill over of prohibited goods and individuals from the Central Sahel into Europe.²⁹ The Africa Organised Crime Index 2021 found that human trafficking, cocaine smuggling, cannabis smuggling, arms trafficking, and the proliferation of synthetic drugs are all rife in West Africa.³⁰ Additionally, unprecedented drug seizures between 2019 and 2021 confirmed the resurgence of the international cocaine trade in the region, with much of the product being supplied to West and Central Europe.³¹ Armed groups have also repeatedly engaged in kidnapping for ransom, directly targeting European citizens. In October 2020, JNIM reportedly received €10 million and the release of over 200 fighters in return for the release of French humanitarian worker Sophie Pétronin and Malian opposition politician Soumaîla Cissé.³² The Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime recently stated that the value of illicit flows in the region exceeds the national budgets of some transit countries. Indeed, criminal financial flows in the region further insecurity, heighten weak governance, fuel corruption, and could undermine the transition from war to peace.³³

European countries are very concerned about the possibility of increased migration and refugee flows that could follow increasing political violence and insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The EU has already spent billions of euros to stop the small amount of irregular migration from Africa to Europe, and Germany increased troop contributions to the Central Sahel following the 2015 refugee crisis.³⁴ The 2015 migrant crisis had a corrosive effect on liberal politics and encouraged populist reactions such as Brexit and the growth of far right parties, such as the National Rally and the Alternative for Germany.³⁵ Europe’s far right parties are xenophobic and share a dislike of American global leadership and a fondness for Russia, thus straining the trans-Atlantic relationship.³⁶ Thus, European countries are very concerned that the possibility of another refugee crisis would further erode liberal politics. However, EU concern has led to policies that contributed to the deterioration of the security situation, by taking away livelihoods and allowing criminal entrepreneurs, likely linked to armed groups, to replace local actors.³⁷ This has not prevented illegal migration but has made it more dangerous and expensive.³⁸

A fourth concern for European countries is the possibility of great power competition. China has provided 45.5 million USD to the security and counterterrorism operations of the G5 Sahel joint force, indicating a desire for greater influence in the region. Additionally, between 2015 and 2018, Russia signed 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African countries, including Niger and Burkina Faso.³⁹ Protestors supporting the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have also been waving Russian flags and calling for greater cooperation with Russia, whilst calling for the removal of French troops.⁴⁰ Protestors were inspired by Russia’s intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR), where mercenaries from the Wagner group repelled an attack on the capital by insurgents in January 2021, ended a rebel blockade on the CAR’s supply channel from Cameroon, and retook most rebel strongholds after twenty years of insurgency.⁴¹ Tensions between Mali and European powers escalated after the deployment of Russian Wagner mercenaries; Denmark and Sweden withdrew their troops from the Takuba task force in January 2022 and the EU imposed sanctions.⁴²

Finally, European countries are also concerned with ‘saving face’ with regards to their presence in the region. French operations in the Central Sahel have been dubbed “France’s Forever War” and compared to the US intervention in Afghanistan; after nine years of operations in Mali, the situation is worse than when France first intervened in 2013.⁴³ Additionally, the French and EU presence has become increasingly unpopular. In 2021 and 2022, Malian and Burkinabe demonstrators protested French intervention in the region.⁴⁴ The French ambassador was expelled from Mali in February 2022 and President Macron announced the removal of French forces from Mali in February 2022.⁴⁵However, Katherine Pye of the Centre for European Reform notes how success in the Sahel has become important for Europe’s credibility as a crisis manager as “the EU must now prove it is capable of solving complex problems in its own backyard.”⁴⁶

The Current Approach

The current approach to improving the security situation in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has primarily focused on counterterrorism techniques, such as leadership decapitation. While this approach has had some limited success – including killing the EMIR of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abdelmalek Droukdel, and the leader of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi – this approach has not been effective in restoring security.⁴⁷ Many tactical victories have been undermined by security force violations that have pushed populations into the arms of the jihadists. Indeed, a Chatham House report states that “military action against armed groups will fail as long as impunity prevails and local armies can kill civilians and topple governments without consequence.”⁴⁸ Additionally, there are so many international forces acting in the Central Sahel that it has been referred to as a “Security Jam,” with forces deployed through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the French Operation Barkhane, the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Civilian and Law Enforcement Capacity Building Missions in Mali and Niger, the EU Task Force Takuba, and the G5 Sahel Force. ⁴⁹ However, each operation has varying objectives and capabilities.

Sahelian governments, Western governments, think tanks, NGOs and citizens’ movements, journalists, and academics all identify good governance as the solution to insecurity in the Sahel.⁵⁰ However, there is no funding for long-term projects in the Central Sahel. While France has 89 civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants, Burkina Faso has only eight, Mali has six, and Niger only three.⁵¹ How France has allocated spending also demonstrates their priorities; France has spent approximately 900 million euros on Operation Barkhane, but only 85 million on bilateral development aid to Mali.⁵² Additionally, attempts by European countries and their allies to reduce violence have been undermined by their support for governments that are feared and mistrusted by many of their citizens.⁵³ European attempts to restore the state presence are not desirable to the many citizens who perceive the state authorities as predatory and corrupt.⁵⁴ When European allies do not condemn human rights abuses by the security forces they work with and have trained, their credibility is damaged and their effectiveness is limited.

Recommendations

The Malian, Nigerian, and Burkinabe governments, along with the EU and other allies, should move from a short-term counterterrorism focus to a long-term commitment to development.
The governments should give greater attention to service provision, notably healthcare and education, even in areas where security forces are not deployed.⁵⁵ Jihadist groups are often accepted by communities because they are able to provide services, such as security and justice, where the government has been unable to.⁵⁶ Thus, a focus on providing these services may deter communities from allying with jihadist groups.
The EU and its allies should be willing to sanction governments that are complicit in human rights abuses, as human rights abuses facilitate jihadist recruitment.⁵⁷
Sahelian governments and their allies should also be open to negotiations. Already, the Sahelian states open attitude to bottom-up negotiations has significantly reduced violence in several districts in Central Mali and Burkina Faso.⁵⁸ Both the Malian government and JNIM have expressed interest in opening dialogues, though the French government has refused to be open to the possibility.⁵⁹ Although negotiations should be careful not to allow jihadists to cement their control over local communities, counterterrorism operations alone are unlikely to defeat jihadi groups.⁶⁰

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